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題名:公共設施保留地容積移轉市場交易機制之研究
作者:劉厚連
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:地政研究所
指導教授:賴宗裕
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2009
主題關鍵詞:公共設施保留地容積移轉市場機制交易成本容積銀行land reservations for public facilitiestransferable development rightsmarket mechanismtransaction costsTDR bank
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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公共設施保留地容積移轉在於藉由市場交易機制,使公共設施保留地地主在等待政府徵收之前,得透過容積出售給開發業者獲致價金補償之機會,並免除政府直接辦理徵收之財政壓力。容積移轉制度基本精神是以市場效率解決土地分區使用之公平問題,然現行制度下,不同地區之公共設施保留地移出容積可得價金懸殊缺乏公平性,且容積交易集中於特定地區,造成當地生活環境品質之惡化。故本研究在制度建立之政策層面,尋求達到「受損補償,受益付費」公平原則,使容積購買者付出合理的價金購買公共設施保留地地主持有容積並透過制度設計控管容積移轉對生活環境品質衝擊之問題。在容積交易市場層面,則透過市場機制設計,塑造有助於市場形成與價格維繫之環境及降低容積買賣雙方之交易成本,以促進市場交易之效率並實現前述對地主之公平為目標。
本研究首先從市場供需之角度,分析容積供需失衡,對公共設施保留地容積移轉市場中容積價格之影響,並檢視影響TDR方案成功之市場運作因素與供需條件。其次,就買賣雙方交易盈餘分配進行探討,運用賽局理論中那許均衡之概念,分析討價還價之均衡解,以闡明信息不對稱下,如何解決地主在容積交易中議價資訊不足之問題,提高容積移轉價格,增進該制度在保障公共設施保留地地主財產權之貢獻。第三,引用中間層理論探討TDR銀行在解決交易成本問題之優勢,並闡明非營利性質因減少中介費用支出,增加交易雙方之交易剩餘,較能使TDR方案成功。第四,藉由前述理論之探討,本研究研擬改善現行公共設施保留地容積移轉的市場機制之相關議題,透過學者專家問卷及權利關係人的問卷調查之設計,汲取市場機制改善之建議。
本研究認為我國容積移轉市場存在容積總量超出環境容受力、市場所能提供之交易資訊不足、容積價格落差過大、中介者所提供的服務仍待加強及交易成本偏高等問題,需透過政府介入加以解決。因此,提出以容積銀行為容積移轉政策執行核心之市場交易機制,由各直轄市、縣市政府成立一個非營利性質的容積銀行,作為容積移轉交易平台,並成立專款專用之容積銀行運作基金,作為政策性購買容積取得所需公共設施保留地之用,賦予容積銀行資訊提供、中介媒合、價格引導、確保交易等功能,降低容積移轉交易成本,創造有利之交易環境,確保公共設施保留地地主,能以合理價格出售變現、政府財政可以負荷及都市居住環境品質得到掌控與維護的政策目標。根據研究結果提出建立公共設施保留容積移轉政策之決策與實踐機制及以容積銀行交易平台為主之交易市場機制等制度建議,作為政府未來改善公共設施容積移轉制度之參考。
The transferable development rights (TDR) of land reservations for public facilities are a unique transferring method of development rights in Taiwan. This system allows the owners of land reservations for public facilities to sell the land, through market transaction mechanism and before the acquisition by the government, to developers through TDR in order to earn land transferring compensation. This system can also reduce the financial burden on the government on land acquisition. However, TDR has been questioned for deteriorating the urban living environment due to overdevelopment, and the transaction mechanism may reduce the market function and efficiency due to high transaction costs. Therefore, this study aims to design a market mechanism that can control the impact of TDR on the living environment, create an environment that is conducive to market formulation and price maintenance, and reduce the transaction costs of sellers and buyers, in order to facilitate the efficiency of market transaction and realize the fairness on the land owners.
This paper first analyzes the imbalance between the TDR supply and demand from the market supply and demand perspective, and examines the effect of TDR of land reservations for public facilities on volume price in the market, as well as the market operational factors and supply/demand conditions that affect the success of TDR plans. Then, it discusses the surplus distribution of buyers and sellers, and applies the concept of Nash Equilibrium in the Game Theory to analyze the equilibrium solution of price bargaining. It aims to expound on how land owners could raise the TDR price under insufficient information due to information asymmetry during the bargaining process, and enhance the contribution of this system on the proprietorship of the land owners on land reservations for public facilities. Third, this paper applies the intermediation theory to discuss the advantages of TDR banks in solving the problem of transaction costs, and explains the reason that non-profit characteristics are more likely to guarantee the success of TDR plans. Fourth, based on the above discussions, this paper aims to improve the market mechanism of the TDR of land reservations for public facilities, and conduct questionnaire survey on experts and interest parties in order to collect opinions on the improvement schemes.
Lastly, this paper proposes the market mechanism of using TDR bank as the policy executor of TDR, and establishing a non-profit TDR bank in each city/county by the local government as a transaction platform for TDR transaction. TDR bank operational fund should be established for exclusive use on the policy-oriented purchase of TDR of land reservations for public facilities. Thus, the TDR bank has the functions of providing information, mediating, price guiding, and transaction guaranteeing, in order to reduce the TDR transaction costs, create a favorable transaction environment, ensure the land owners of land reservations for public facilities to sell their lands at reasonable prices, reduce the financial burden of the government, and maintain a fair urban living environment. Suggestions are provided based on the research findings as a reference to the government on improving the TDR system of land reservations for public facilities.
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