歷經六次憲政的臺灣憲法變遷，是出自政治人物的操控或是國民的期待？是基於憲法體系性的需求，環是外國勞力的干預？在每次憲改的過程中，都引起各方討論。隨著六次憲改的落幕，以往以國民大會為主輔的修憲機制已經不復存在，如何從學術上對臺灣憲改的背後脈絡做出定位，又如何從這些既有的經驗，釐清未來臺灣憲法變遷的走向，乃是本文要處理的問題。 探討臺灣憲改背後的脈絡，單從個別單次憲改討論個別的憲改儇文，並無法看出整體憲改的全貌，本文因而彙整臺灣自民主轉型以來六次憲改的背景，尤其從戰後以來臺灣面對國民政府來臺以侑中華民國憲法的適用所造成的摸索調適，嘗試為六次憲改，釐清背後的主軸脈絡。 本文發現，九七憲改以前臺灣憲改的主軸在於解決代表性強化的問題。九七憲改本身則更進一步面對臺灣對外代表性的危機。即令是第五次與第六次憲改，也是以國會為中心代表性問題的延續。因此，基於臺灣特殊的情境，代表性強化成為過去六次憲改的主軸脈絡。六次憲改之後，隨著國民大會的虛級化，憲改邁向以總統、國民國會三者合一的常態結構，總統的憲改的提議權，因而成為憲法進一步發展的重要機制。

　　　　　The Taiwanese constitution was revised six times in the last decade. The driving force behind such constitutional reforms, however, remains unsettled and demands further academic theorizing. Were constitutional revisions taken in order to facilitate political compromises in democratizing politics or were they put into realization to embody political expectation of the people? Or were constitutional reforms carried out because of external influence? As the constitutional revisions ended with a surprising outcome that restructured and disembodied the National Assembly, the previous organ vested with the power of constitutional revisions, it is time for constitutional scholars to identify the nature and patterns of these constitutional revisions and theorize the driving forces behind them. This article finds that it is insufficient, if not impossible, to identify the nature and patterns of constitutional change from a single constitutional revision or individual provisions. Rather, in order to theorize the driving forces behind constitutional revisions, it is necessary to take into consideration the political and historical contingencies after the application of the ROC Constitution in Taiwan. The author argues that the major driving force for these constitutional revisions undertaken in the last decade has been representation reinforcing. The first three constitutional revisions in 1991, 1992, and 1994 were to resolve representational crisis inward. The form constitutional revision of 1997 was to reinforce the Taiwanese representation in an eternal perspective. Still, the last two constitutional reforms of 1999 and 2000 were focused on the issues of national representative organs, namely the coordinating problems between the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. After the six rounds of constitutional revisions centered at the issue of representation reinforcing, the author suggests that future constitutional reforms, if undertaken, aim at strengthening democratic politics and constitutionalism by putting a peculiar emphasis on constitutional structures and the presidential power of proposing constitutional amendments.