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題名：分配政策與預算制定之政治分析
書刊名：政治科學論叢
作者：羅清俊 引用關係
作者(外文)：Luor, Ching-jyuhn
出版日期：2004
卷期：21
頁次：頁149-188
主題關鍵詞：分配政策；分配政治；幾乎全體一致同意；政黨內部幾乎全體一致同意；立法院；Distributive policy；Distributive politics；Universalism；Intra-party-universalism；Legislative yuan
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(17) 博士論文(1) 專書(1) 專書論文(0)
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  • 共同引用共同引用:90
  • 點閱點閱:83
　　　　　本文以分配理論為基礎，觀察我國第二、三、四屆立法院期間，三讀通過具有分配政策特質的法案以及記名表決預算項目之制定過程與結果，藉以回答立法院在分配政策型態上，是否因為國會議員之間的互惠原則而呈現「幾乎全體一致」的決策型態？這種「幾乎全體一致」的決策型態是否會因為該項分配政策所分配的利益具有爭議而崩解？如果的確如此，那麼政黨與常設委員會所扮演的角色如何？我們觀察「離島建設條例」制定案。並且我們也分析二、三、四屆立法院期間中央政府總預算當中，具有分配政策性質並同時從事過記名表決的預算案項目（單位預算），系統性地觀察區域立法委員在處理爭議性分配政策預算時，政黨與常設委員會所扮演的角色。同時，我們也分析分配法案記名表決分配預算記名表決當中多數聯盟的特質。 整體來說，在分配法案的制定部分，我們發現「幾乎全體一致同意」的決策型態並不是分配政策制定的常態。法案一旦涉及政黨的意識型態或是政黨直接利益，或是政策利益分配的規模過於龐大並涉及公平的爭議時，則全院「幾乎全體一致同意」的決策型態很難出現，而是呈現另一種我們稱之為「政黨內部幾乎全體一致同意」的決策型態（intra-party universalism）。也就是說各政黨之間立場壁壘分明，但是各政黨之內全體一致同意。而當政黨界線分明時，負責審查的常設委員會委員對於審查會審查條文內容所持立場與其他全院非委員所持立場並無顯著的差異。在爭議的分配性預算方面也是呈現類似的決策型態，23筆記名表決的分配性預算幾乎通通呈現「政黨內部幾乎全體一致同意」的決意型態。有趣的是，隨著不同的分配預算項目，獲勝聯盟內部的政黨組合也呈現不同的現象。有時候國民黨與民進黨合作，有時國民黨與新黨（或親民黨）合作，有時候又是新黨與民進黨合作。同樣是爭議性分配預算的分析，我們發現，即使常設委員會委員在一些預算案當中所持的立場較為一致，但是這種一致性的立場並非取決於他們是否屬於同一個委員會，而是取決於常設委員會委員所屬政黨的立場。同時，這種現象在各政黨之間並無明顯的差異。
　　　　　The present study explores the pattern of distributive policy making during the time period of the 2nd to the 4th Legislative Yuan in Taiwan. Specifically, we ask whether universalism is the regular pattern of distributive policy making in the Legislative Yuan? Does the universalism still hold when the policy benefit being distributed is controversial? If it is not the case, then what roles do party and standing committee play? We analyze distributive bills and twenty-three controversial distributive budget items during the time period of the 2nd to the 4th Legislative Yuan aiming at answer these questions. Besides, the characteristics of winning coalition for each distributive bill and budget are explored as well. Overall, we find that universalism is not the monolithic pattern of distributive policy making. The intra-party-universalism tends to prevail once the partisan interests or ideology getting involved, in the sense that every legislator stands in the partisan line, and almost everyone within their party has the same policy preference. Moreover, the policy preferences of committee members are along with party line so long as the partisan issue comes to play. Finally, when the partisan issue breaks legislators apart, different types of wining coalition are formed. There is no constant combination of parties in the winning coalition. Yet different combination of party coalition is formulated depending on the attributes of policy benefits. In most cases with rare exceptions, Democratic Progressive Party tends to cooperate with New Party fighting Kuomintang for the infrastructure or public works related benefits. Kuomin tang is willing to stay with New party on the veteran's affair or ideology related policy benefit.
期刊論文
1.羅清俊(20001200)。政策利益分配的型態：最小獲勝聯盟？還是通通有獎？。政治科學論叢，13，201-232。new window  延伸查詢new window
2.Lee, Frances E.(2003)。Geographical Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives: Coalition Building and Distribution of Benefits。American Journal of Political Science，47(4)，714-728。  new window
3.Shepsle, Kenneth A.、Weingast, Barry R.(198102)。Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization。American Journal of Political Science，25(1)，96-111。  new window
4.Krehbiel, Keith(1990)。Are congressional Committee Composed of Preference Outlier?。American Political Science Review，84，149-163。  new window
5.Weingast, Barry R.、Marshall, William J.(1988)。The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, are not Organized as Markets。Journal of Political Economy，96(1)，132-163。  new window
6.羅清俊(19981200)。分配政策研究的發展與應用。人文及社會科學集刊，10(4)，575-609。new window  延伸查詢new window
7.Alder, E. Scott、Lapinski, John S.(1997)。Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach。American Journal of Political Science，41(3)，895-918。  new window
8.Cox, Gary W.、McCubbins, Matthew D.(1991)。On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress。Legislative Studies Quarterly，16(4)，547-570。  new window
9.Roberts, Brian E.(1990)。A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits。American Journal of Political Science，34(1)，31-58。  new window
10.Sellers, Patrick J.(1997)。Fiscal Consistency and Federal District Spending in Congressional Elections。American Journal of Political Science，41(3)，1024-1041。  new window
11.Weingast, Barry R.、Shepsle, Kenneth A.、Johnsen, Christopher(1981)。The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics。Journal of Political Economy，89(4)，642-664。  new window
12.Rundquist, Barry S.(1979)。On Testing a Military Industrial Complex Theory。American Political Quarterly，6，29-53。  new window
13.盛杏湲(20001100)。政黨或選區﹖立法委員的代表取向與行為。選舉研究，7(2)，37-73。new window  延伸查詢new window
14.Lowi, Theodore J.(1964)。American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory。World Politics，16(4)，677-715。  new window
15.羅清俊(20000300)。猜猜看誰把醃肉帶回家了：補助款利益在縣市分配的分析。人文及社會科學集刊，12(1)，1-45。new window  延伸查詢new window
16.Collie, Melissa P.(1988)。The Rise of Coalition Politics: Voting in the U. S. House, 1933-1980。Legislative Studies Quarterly，13(3)，321-342。  new window
17.楊婉瑩(20020700)。立法院委員會的決策角色--以第三屆立法院為例。問題與研究，41(4)，83-113。new window  延伸查詢new window
18.Bickers, Kenneth N.、Stein, Robert M.(1996)。The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel。American Journal of Political Science，40(4)，1300-1326。  new window
19.Levitt, Steven D.、Snyder, James M. Jr.(1995)。Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays。American Journal of Political Science，39(4)，958-980。  new window
20.Weingast, Barry R.(1979)。A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms。American Journal of Political Science，23(2)，245-262。  new window
21.Collie, Melissa P.(1988)。The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective。Legislative Studies Quarterly，13，427-458。  new window
22.Niou, Emerson、Ordeshook, Peter(1985)。Universalism in Congress。American Journal of Political Science，29，246-258。  new window
23.Rundquist, Barry S.、Griffith, David E.(1976)。An Interrupted Time Series Test of the Distributive Theory of Military Policy-Making。Western Political Quarterly，29，620-626。  new window
24.黃秀端(2001)。立法院委員會制度糾謬：立法效率與品質為何不好。當代，171，86-97。  延伸查詢new window
25.Aldrich, J. H.、Rohde, D.(2000)。The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee。Journal of Politics，62，1-33。  new window
26.Carsey, T.、Rundquist, B.(1998)。The Reciprocal Relationship between State Defense Interest and Committee Representation in Congress。Public Choice，99，455-463。  new window
27.Cox, G. W.、Tutt, T. N.(1984)。Universalism and Allocative Decision Making in the Los Angles County Board of Supervisors。Journal of Politics，46，546-555。  new window
28.Hurwitz, M. S.、Moiles, R. J.、Rohde, D. W.、Hurwitz, Mark S.、Moiles, Roger J.、Rohde, David W.(2001)。Distributive and Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the 104th House。American Political Science Review，95(4)，911-922。  new window
29.Miller, G. J.、Oppenheimer, J. A.(1982)。Universalism in Experimental Committee。American Political Science Review，76，561-574。  new window
30.Rundquist, B.、Rhee, J.、Lee, Jeon-Hwa、Fox, S.(1997)。Modeling State Representation on Defense Committee in Congress, 1959-1989。American Politics Quarterly，25(1)，35-55。  new window
會議論文
1.Rundquist, B.、羅清俊、Lee, Jeong-Hwa(1995)。States and Districts as Units of Analysis in Distributive Studies。Chicago, IL。  new window
2.羅清俊(2000)。Legislative Institution and Local Benefit: Exploring Pork Barrel Politics in Taiwan。Quebec City, Canada。  new window
3.Alvarez, R. Michael、Saving, Jason(1994)。Feeding At the Trough: Committees and The Political Economy of Federal Outlays to Congressional Districts。Annual Meeting of Midwest Political Science Association。  new window
4.Stein, Robert M.、Bickers, Kenneth N.(1992)。Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel: The Interest Group Connection。88th Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association，(會議日期: 1992/09/03-06)。Chicago, Illinois。  new window
5.Rundquist, B.、羅清俊、Lee, Jeong-Hwa(1994)。Testing Distributive Theories Using Bickers' and Stein's Data Book。New York, NY。  new window
學位論文
1.吳宜蓁(2001)。國會中政黨的立法聯合--第三屆立法院的探討(碩士論文)。國立政治大學。  延伸查詢new window
2.Jungho, Rhee(1994)。The Distributive Politics of Cold War Defense Spending(博士論文)。University o f Illinois at Chicago，Chicago, IL。  new window
3.柯俊丞(2003)。議題取向的政黨聯合與對抗－以第四屆立法院為例，沒有紀錄。  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.Aldrich, John H.(1995)。Why Party?。Chicago, IL：University of Chicago Press。  new window
2.Rohde, D.、Rohde, David(1991)。Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House。Chicago, IL：The University of Chicago Press。  new window
3.Adler, E. S.、Adler, E. Scott(2002)。Why Congressional Reforms Fail。Chicago, IL：The University of Chicago Press。  new window
4.Kiewiet, D. Roderick、McCubbins, Mathew D.(1991)。The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process。University of Chicago Press。  new window
5.Krehbiel, Keith(1998)。Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking。Chicago, IL：University of Chicago Press。  new window
6.Stein, Robert M.、Bickers, Kenneth N.(1999)。The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era。  new window
7.Arnold, R. Douglas(1979)。Congress and the Bureaucracy: A theory of Influence。New Haven：Yale University Press。  new window
8.Krehbiel, Keith(1991)。Information and Legislative Organization。Ann Arbor：University of Michigan Press。  new window
9.Cox, Gary W.、McCubbins, Matthew D.(1993)。Legislative Leviathan。CA：University of California。  new window
10.Ferejohn, John A.(1974)。Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968。CA：Stanford University Press。  new window
11.Stein, Robert M.、Bickers, Kenneth N.(1995)。Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy。Cambridge University Press。  new window
12.Bindr, S. A.(1997)。Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress。Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress。Cambridge。  new window
13.Rohde, D.(1995)。Parties and Committees in the House: Member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements。Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions。Ann Arbor, MI。  new window
14.Rundquist, B.、Carsey, T.、Rundquist, Barry、Carsey, Tom(2002)。Congress and Defense Spending。Congress and Defense Spending。Oklahoma。  new window
圖書論文
1.Rundquist, Barry S.(1980)。On the Theory of Political Benefits in American Public Programs。Political Benefits。MA：Lexington Books。  new window
2.Rundquist, Barry S.、Ferejohn, John A.(1975)。Two American Expenditure Programs Compared。Comparative Public Policy。New York：Wiley Inc。  new window
3.盛杏湲(2000)。立法委員為什麼游走在不同的委員會？。政治制度。臺北：中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所。  延伸查詢new window
 
 
 
 
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