中國制定「反分裂國家法」，是55年來對台戰略的第三次大轉折。第一次是1958年823砲戰結束，中國對台政策由武力解放這兼具世界革命和內戰性格的戰略攻勢，轉變為冷戰格局下的戰略守勢；第二次是冷戰後期聯美制蘇格局下，誤認為統一指日可待，對台政策轉變為一國兩制的和平招降，這政策經過後冷戰新圍堵逐漸形成而落空，覺悟統一不是一蹴可及，再度轉變為「不放棄統一，但承認現狀為合法」立場，其體現則為「反分裂國家法」既圍堵”法理台獨”，又積極進行”以商促統”，可說是中國式的「congagement」。立場轉變之劇烈，堪稱對台新典範的形成。 其基本兩岸定位是「兩岸既未統一，也未分裂」，並將對台政策區分為「”非政治性交往”（第六條）、”政治談判終局能解決”（第七條）和”非和平手段”（第八條）」三層次。 該法兼具退步性與務實性。退步之處是將台灣問題向前追溯55年，認為是「內戰遺留」並得以對台採非和平手段，結果引起國際、台灣強烈反彈。務實之處是雖未能承認中華民國合法性，但承認「現狀合法」。結果因為台灣朝野因應錯誤而發揮強大統戰效果，中國首度獲得強力介入內部事務的空間，並使台灣社會對其敵意降到新低點。整體來說，不論正面或負面的反應效果之強烈都遠超過原先的預期。

The passing of the “Anti-Secession Law” was the third major watershed for China’s strategy towards Taiwan. The first was the end of the Kinmen Campaign in 1958. China’s Taiwan policy transformed from the offensive strategy of military liberation with the aspiration of world revolution and the characteristics of civil war to the defensive strategy of the cold war framework. The rapprochement with the US was the second watershed. With the Soviet Union as the common enemy with the US, Beijing falsely believed that unification with Taiwan was inevitable, and transformed its Taiwan policy to the ‘peace’ natured One Country,Two Systems This policy,however, became an empty promise after the post cold war ‘neo containment’ policy imposed by the US gradually came into shape. Upon the realization that unification could not be achieved in the immediate future, Beijing switched its strategy towards Taiwan again, and transformed its stance to “continue the pursuit of unification, while admitting the legality of the status quo.” The “Anti-Secession Law” was the manifestation of this policy. The law attempts to contain ‘de jure independence’ while actively engage in the tactics of ‘unification via commerce’. This can be seen as ‘congagement’, Chinese style. This violent shift in its position on Taiwan can be seen as the birth of Beijing’s new Taiwan discourse. The law’s fundamental definition of the cross-strait situation is that ‘unification is yet to take place, but the nation is not divided.’ The law also categorized Beijing’s Taiwan policies into three levels, which are ‘apolitical engagements’ (Article 6), ‘political negotiations of the final settlement’ (Article 7), and ‘non-peaceful methods’ (Article 8). The law is realistic yet backward. It’s backward because it traced the origin of the Taiwan problem back to the ‘Civil War’ 55 years prior, and used this origin to legitimize the use of non-peaceful methods. The result was the angry reactions and condemnations from both Taiwan and the international community. However, it is also realistic because it admitted that the ‘status quo’ is ‘legal’, even though it still does not recognize the existence of the ‘Republic of China’. The result of its realistic nature was an enormous success due to the inappropriate handlings by both the Taiwan government and oppositions. For the first time, Beijing was allowed spaces to interfere powerfully with Taiwan’s domestic politics, and for a while lowered Taiwan Society’s animosity towards Beijing. On the whole, the intensities of both positive and negative effects were far stronger than originally expected.