本論文旨在探討亞太地區的戰略形勢及在此形勢下台灣的角色。根據本文的研究，兩岸關係的探討應該從更廣大的亞太戰略網絡中去瞭解，必須分析該區域相關主要國家的競爭形勢或合作形勢。該主題基本上是從二個層次加以論證：一是透過「鉗子戰略模型」的建構，其次則透過模型的演繹，探討相關的戰術議題。 從美國西岸往太平洋延伸，進而到廣大的歐亞大陸，依循著地緣戰略、地緣政治及地緣經濟的運行機能，美國有足夠的能力整合其亞太地區的盟邦或對其沒有敵意的國家，建構一把咬住歐亞大陸邊陲的鉗子：朝鮮半島及中南半島分別是二邊鉗口，台灣剛好是這隻鉗子的支點。美國透過這樣的戰略模型將可以立於操控的地位。 寰顧該區域各國權力關係的演變，隨著中國的崛起以及美日權力的消長，一般深信該區域的國際關係典範已逐漸產生了轉移；冷戰以來的美國在台政策可能也將隨之變化。以當前的形勢來看，美國想一方面堅守「台灣關係法」的承諾，同時又試圖繼續維持在該地區的霸權，顯然是越來越困難了。美國如果一味無視於台灣傾向獨立的態度，中美之間將可能爆發嚴重的衝突，甚至兵戎相見；果若如此，中、美兩國都將是輸家，而台灣可能是最大輸家；日本也許是惟一的贏家。進一步來說，短期之內，台灣問題的糾葛在某種意義上也可以提供美國影響中國的空間，藉以防止北朝鮮核武問題的失控。根據該地緣戰略的模型，本文得出結論：維持台海現況將是美國亞太政策的最佳選擇。 本文論述的第二個層次是延伸上述的戰略準則，回應下列三項戰術運作的議題：一、美國應採取怎麼樣的戰術以確保台海情勢的現況？二、中國對美國軍售的問題將會做出怎麼樣回應？美國軍售是否會導致兩岸的軍備競賽，進而促成「飛彈防衛系統」在該地區的部署？和三、一旦中美兩國發生衝突，台灣還能否扮演美國的不沉航空母艦？

This paper explores strategic competitions in Asia Pacific, and Taiwan’s role in the strategic game. Based on the research, cross-Strait relations should be probed in a broader context of the great power rivalry/cooperation in this area. To address the topic, it will follow two theoretical points. First, to examine the issue can be based on a theoretical model called “Pliers Strategy from the Pacific Ocean toward Eurasia.” Geostrategically, geopolitically and geoeconomically, from American west-coast to the Pacific Ocean, the U. S. can integrate the other nations and areas under her influence to design them, from functional point of view, as a pair of pliers which bites the Asian side of the Eurasian continent: the Korean Peninsula and the Indochina Peninsula may play the role of two edges of the geographic pliers, and Taiwan is the motional fulcrum of it. The U.S. is in the position to control this mechanism. Deduced from this geo-strategic assumption, it is proved that the best choice for the U.S. Asian policy is to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Looking at the situation in this area, paradigm shift is on the agenda; the US Taiwan policy cannot be pursued due to the rise of China. There is a contradiction between America’s striving for its regional hegemony and its commitments under Taiwan Relations Act. Its support of Taiwan’s independence posture may lead to war, and there will be no winner in the region except Japan. In addition, just leaving the US-China’s security dilemma unresolved in the short run, the U.S. can exploit China’s influence on North Korea. The second point will touch upon the strategic guideline to answer the following questions: 1: In what way can the U. S. secure the status quo across the Strait? 2: How will China respond to the US arms sales to Taiwan? And will this stir up a new cycle of arms race in the region which eventually leads to the establishment of the comprehensive TMD system? and 3: Can Taiwan still remain to be ‘an unsinkable aircraft carrier”in US-China confrontations?