本文以政治學領域當中的分配理論為基礎，利用實證研究途徑分析桃園縣政府在87、88、89年度縣特別統籌分配款的分配。本文有幾項顯著性。首先，本文提供國內分配政策研究在縣行政層級的分析證據。其次，國內過去分配政治實證研究從未觀察過特別統籌稅款的分配，而這種政策利益具有權力運作上的獨特性。因為縣長擁有完整的權力決定如何分配該款項，雖然必須符合運用額度與一般動支規定，但是卻不必然需要接受縣議會的事前監督。也因此該項利益的分配處處顯現出縣長的用心。這種縣長的用心包括解決政策問題的企圖或者是縣長與鄉鎮市長以及縣議員之間的互動關係。第三，過去國內分配政策研究並未處理SNTV制度特質對於台灣分配政治的影響，本研究希望能夠彌補這個不足。最後，87-89年度期間是由呂秀蓮副總統擔任桃園縣縣長，同時也在任內宣布與陳水扁總統搭配競選正副總統。這個案例提供了絕佳的社會實驗，透過這段期間桃園縣特別統籌款分配的觀察，本文可以比較呂前縣長在決定參選副總統前後，該項政策利益分配型態的差異性。 研究結果顯示，影響桃園縣特別統籌款分配金額高低的因素除了款項座落地點所屬鄉鎮市自有財源比例的客觀需求之外，仍有一些其他重要的原因。第一，縣長前一次選舉在款項座落鄉鎮市的得票率越高，該款項金額反而會越低。第二，款項座落地點如果是非國民黨執政的鄉鎮市，則這些特別統籌款的款項會越高。第三，在觀察的期間當中，特別統籌款款項如果越早核定，則金額越高。第四，款項座落地的鄉鎮市所屬縣議員員額越少，則該款項越多。第五，款項座落鄉鎮市的縣議員選票集中指數越低，則特別統籌款的金額越高。第六，呂前縣長決定參選副總統之後，平均每一筆特別統籌款的分配金額並沒有明顯地比決定參選前高，但是決定參選前後的分配型態確有不同。

This paper explores the geographical distribution of special general-revenue-sharing (GRS) in Taoyuan County during the fiscal year of 1998-2000. By law, the special GRS accounts for no more than 10% of total GRS in the county government. Special GRS is the so-called secret purse of the county-in-chief because the executive legally has discretionary powers to decide where and what amounts of policy benefits to be distributed among its jurisdictions without the pre-approval of the county assembly. It is speculated that, more often than not, the county-in-chief utilizes the special GRS as a bargaining chip with county legislators who are seeking policy benefits in their electorate districts. It is also speculated that the county-in-chief tends to distribute disproportionate amounts of special GRS, thus rewarding the constituencies who were supporting her ballot box the most. Yet, it is still possible that the county-in-chief distributes certain policy benefits not for political reasons, but for the objective needs of different jurisdictions in the county. This study aims at clarifying the conditions under which political factors or objective factors are prevalent. The statistical findings show that, while the objective need is an important factor in determining the location and the amounts of special GRS, several political factors affect the distribution of the special GRS. Of the findings of importance, firstly, statistical results show that the towns or the villages which are not controlled by the KMT received more policy benefits. Secondly, the towns or villages which have less county legislators represented in the County Assembly are likely to receive more benefits. Thirdly, the areas where county legislators’ electorate votes were spreading out the towns or villages tended to receive more special GRS. Finally, although the former county-in-chief Liu did not distribute more benefits after deciding to campaign for the Vice-Presidency, the distributive pattern did show different patterns before and after her campaign announcement.