This paper will explores China's cross strait policy toward the Ma Ying-jeou administration to confirm the agenda 'to solve the Taiwan issue and accomplish the great cause of motherland unification' as remaining constant regardless if the Democratic Progressive Party or the Kuomintang is in power. Unlike his predecesor Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao set up a framework of 'one law and two communiqués' (Anti-separation law, Lian-Hu communiqué, and Song-Hu communiqué) in 2005 to reach this strategic objective. This framework will continue guiding present China's Taiwan policy until the end of Hu's term. The key to this framework is to force the Ma administration to implement the 'five points of the common vision' in the Lian-Hu communiqué. This paper further analyzes that after a short period of observing the Ma administration and finishing the deployment of a united front against Ma Ying-jeou, the Beijing authorities responded positively to bilateral negotiation of economic and trade issues, including mainland tourists' visit to Taiwan, cargo and passenger charter flights, and direct marine transportation. Still, implementation of these negotiations still fell short due to Ma's three principles of 'no unification, no independence and no use of force.' The 'no unification' principle especially challenged Beijing's strategic objective. Therefore, at the end of 2008, Hu Jintao formally proposed the 'six points' of Taiwan policy, demanding President Ma to abide by the 'one China', and stating that 'there is a foundation of constructing political mutual trust for both sides to negotiate anything so long as two sides across the Taiwan Strait form a consensus and identical position with respect to safeguarding the principle of the one China framework. In other words, on the issue of reunification, China draws the line for President Ma, stating that this will serve as the basis of mutual trust for both. With respect to that Hu Jintao urged for reunification, this paper finally assumes three scenarios that the Ma administration may react. First, Taipei completely follows the framework of Taiwan policy set up by Beijing. Second, Taipei outright refuses Beijing's framework, even turning hostile against China, which may cause the regression of cross-Straits relations. Third, Taipei does not entirely follow the framework set up by Beijing, with some reservations of Ma's own ideas and insistence in some circumstances. The third scenario relatively accords with the tactics of the Ma administration at present, but this is not sustainable in the long term. Beijing will make great efforts to push the Ma administration to realize the first scenario. However, Ma does not dare to turn hostile suddenly and move towards the second scenario. As a result, the final outcome will be either that Beijing will win or that the progress in cross-Strait relations will slow down or even come to a halt. Nevertheless, based on the current development, the chance that Beijing will win the game seems greater and greater.