戴震道德學的重心在於如何實踐「善」？他認為只要通過工夫涵養對智性、情性加以「以學養智」和「以情絜情」之功，人便可以在實在界落實經驗之「善」，此其理論軸心；然而經驗行為之「善」之所以可能，還必須返本溯源地以人性之善、即人先天本具的善根為其根源，是以戴震學說的大前提持孟子之「性善」說立場。 戴震對於「性善」並沒有疑惑，故他並未著墨於「性善」之辯證；其論皆扣緊「如何在現象界實現善」而發。所以戴震緊扣人性論而來的「主智重學」工夫論，雖與荀子同皆重學、且同持「氣質之性是性」立場；但其與荀子未具價值根源之人性論，實際上具有「有／無」道德創生義之人性論根本差異。 戴震之批判理學，也不是從自然人性論的立場反對「性善」說，其與理學的最大殊異在於工夫論之經驗進路；戴震亟反對理學內向的主觀存養，他凸顯經驗視域而要求經驗落實與客觀事為，故雙方具有「形而上／形而下」之義理模式不同。因此學界或以戴震批判理學、又持自然人性論之氣性立場，而將他判歸荀子「性惡」一路，實與戴震之自我認知及其義理理想相隔。總論戴震之義理旨歸，他主要是想建立起「非形上學」而強調道德創造性的思想體系。

he focus of ethics of Dai Zhen was how one could realize “Goodness?” He believed that man could practically achieve “goodness” in terms of experiences as long as one could make use of hard work and effort to cultivate intelligence and sentiment as “using learning to nurture intelligence” and “using sentiment to scour emotion.” However, the reason that “goodness” of experiential behavior was learnable would have, tracing back to its very origin, to base on the fact of goodness of humanity; in other words, it had to base on the idea that humanity was good as its origin, and it was why that the grand premise of Da Zhen’s theory would have to find on the stance that humanity was good from Mencius. Though Dai Zhen found no doubt towards “goodness of humanity”, it explicated that he did not elaborate much on the dialectics on “goodness of humanity.” On the other hand, what he had deliberated was all well interlocked with “How goodness could be realized in the world of phenomena?” Therefore, though the theory of humanity by Da Zhen had closely bonded to effort of cultivation for “Focus on Intelligence and Effort for Learning” it was quite similar to the stance that by Xunzi who focused on learning and also adhered to “Essence of temperament is nature”; Da Zhen’s theory was practically found with fundamental difference in terms of “With/Without” meaning of moral creation towards the theory of humanity, while such theory by Xunzi was not equipped with any source of value. The criticism of Neo-Confucianism was by Dai Zhen, in fact, not in opposition to the theory of “Goodness of Humanity” with his theory of human nature that would work to cultivate the nature of human quality, and the greatest difference of his theory to Neo-Confucianism was of the experiential path of cultivation. In other words, the model of argumentation for both parties was found different in terms of “metaphysics/a physics.” In reality, the theory of cultivation by Da Zhen was most opposed to introvert and subjective cultivation of Neo-Confucianism, and he would like to stand out the realization of experience and objective fact based on experience horizon. Therefore, the arena of academics had mostly, as of his criticism Neo-Confucianism and his insistence upon stance of chi and sentiment towards theory of human nature, classified him into the similar category of Xunzi for “Evilness of Humanity.” But, they had, in fact, fallen short to appreciate his grand premise for affirmation of chi and sentiment in terms of “Goodness of Humanity.” The reason that he wrote “Dialectics On Mencius Analects” was mainly because he was proud to say that Mencius knew humanity well. As such, the major motif of Da Zhen’s rationale of argumentation was that he would like to set up “Non-Metaphysics” rather than making focus for the ideology of moral creativity.