近代中國泰半處於內憂外患的戰火，長久以來，政府及民間社會強調的是一種負面的紀念策略，以所謂的「國恥」做為主要紀念對象；相較於負面的國恥紀念，反映正面、積極及榮耀的歷史事件，明顯來得薄弱許多，其中八年對日抗戰無疑是中華民國建國以來最值得紀念的歷史事件，但在歷史記憶中，這場時人眼中的民族聖戰，值得紀念的抗戰英烈人物，始終不是戰後紀念活動的主軸。 事實上，抗戰爆發未幾，國民政府即大規模地展開戰時忠烈事蹟的普查行動，通令全國各省、市、縣政府調查境內的忠烈祠建築現況及奉祀烈士事蹟名單，在戎馬倥傯的險峻局勢下，國府終於在1942年底前，完成全國資料的彙整統計，在已呈報的1，414個縣中，共有624個縣設立忠烈祠，占44%，共計供奉死難烈士牌位數33，886個，至於抗戰陣亡入祀官兵人數，在內政部分別於1941年底及1942年底所彙整的資料中，前者統計的抗戰烈士人數為3，917人，後者為5，839人，且統計表中均記錄有明確的戰時陣亡日期及地點，並且有詳細的籍貫、官階、學經歷、遺族現況等基本資料。1942年後，國府仍持續進行這項調查工作，抗戰勝利後是另一波從中央到地方同步調查及整理抗戰忠烈事蹟的高峰，根據現存的檔案資料顯示，國府始終高度關心抗戰忠烈事蹟的挖掘、表彰與紀念，並在國土逾半淪陷的惡劣環境下，盡了最大的努力，從某種程度上說，甚至足以顛覆我們對於戰時國府內政空轉、行政執行能力欠佳的刻板印象。 如果將戰時國府對抗戰忠烈事蹟的普查行動，放入晚清以降中華國族建構與想像的脈絡下觀察，至少有三個層面值得我們留意與省思。首先，國府的調查行動，背後牽涉到建構政權合法性的問題，誰能掌握表彰、褒揚與紀念抗戰忠烈之士的權炳，就代表誰能擁有道德裁量的政權合法性。第二，藉此塑造國民典範，戰時國府的表彰忠烈並非特例，在中國歷朝都曾建造各種昭忠祠等祠廟，用以紀念為朝廷戰死沙場的忠義之士，然而兩者的紀念意義卻是迥異。第三，戰時國府的表彰忠烈行動，也是為了達到塑造歷史記憶的目的。戰時國府的普查與紀念行動，反映這個飽受內憂外患的政權，向來被忽視的現代民族國家的特徵與性質，以及藉此重整全民集體記憶的嘗試與努力。 然而，國府雖對抗戰忠烈事蹟的表揚，付出如此大的心力，卻顯然沒有得到相應的迴響與肯定。依照正常的表揚程序，戰時陣亡及有功人員，應先依據「戰地守土獎勵條例」，辦理各項晉級、褒揚及撫卹等獎勵措施後，地方政府再依「抗敵殉難忠烈官民祀祠及建立紀念坊碑辦法大綱」等辦法，呈請內政部核定入祀紀念事宜。由於多數法規都是在抗戰爆發多日後，因應迫在眉睫的實際需要才臨時制定，不論中央政府或地方政府都對表彰忠烈的程序，沒有清楚的概念與認識，於是從內政部的調查資料可以看到，許多在地方政府呈報的入祀烈士名單中，其實並沒有得到褒揚及撫卹。同樣地，許多曾獲褒揚及撫卹的陣亡將士，卻又沒有在原籍忠烈祠的供奉烈士牌位之內。此外，戰時國府對抗戰忠烈事蹟的普查行動，背後的執行基礎牽涉到政權合法性的有效建構，從內政部彙整各地呈報的入祀烈士資料中，很明顯地僅限於國統區轄下的縣治，不包括中共統治區域，抗戰期間重慶、延安及南京汪政權各自宣揚及舉辦自己的烈士紀念活動，這也在若干程度上，衝擊並挑戰了重慶國民政府的政權合法性，連帶地也使國府試圖藉此型塑國民典範與歷史記憶的目標大打折扣。1949年後中華民國政府播遷臺灣，戰時國府在全國各地廣建的忠烈祠與表彰崇祀的抗日烈士，多半在此後遭到破壞及遺忘的命運，兩岸政權雖都肯定中日戰爭是二十世紀中華民族的一場民族聖戰，但八年抗戰對於絕大多數華人來說，可能只是一個光榮卻又空洞的符號。

Contemporary China was mostly in a state of turmoil, arising from inside the country as well as from outside. The nation's survival was constantly under threat. For a long time the government and the general public alike were often preoccupied with the so-called "national disgrace" and often adopted a negative strategy to remind the public. Contrary to "national disgrace", positive, active and glorious moments of history is less represented. For example, the eight years of Anti-Japanese War could be considered as a "sacred" fight against foreign aggression, and the people who had fought and died in the War should be taken as "heroes" with respect and worthy of commemoration. However, the heroic deeds of these martyrs had seldom been the main shaft of any official commemoration. And yet, as a matter of fact, during the pressing period of the War, the national government started to conduct a census on the heroic deeds of the war martyrs; it demanded every province, every city, and every county to investigate the status quo of the number of shrines built for the martyrs and the events of worshipping them. As a result, by the end of 1942, there were shrines built in 624 counties (44% of a total of 1, 414 counties who had reported to the central government), and a total of 33, 886 spirit tablets established for the martyrs. Records were also kept for the martyrs: the numbers of martyrs were 3, 917 in 1941and 5, 839 in 1942, with information of names, birthplaces, official ranks, education and experience, dates and sites of death, and members of their families left behind, etc. After 1942, the national government continued the investigation, and the task did not stop after the War was over. It is obvious from the records that the national government has been highly concerned about the matter, sparing no efforts in collecting data, and in commending and commemorating the heroes. For the people and the government, it was a hard time-the country was in turmoil, economy was low, finance and budget were tight, and the nation was nearly taken over by the enemy. With all the existing records, it almost changed the incompetent and inefficient sterotype people had about the national government for years. To put this matter side by side with the efforts of the late Ching period on similar matters, we have observed three important points. First, the national government's efforts in conducting the census concerns the legitimacy of the regime-whoever had the responsibility to conduct the survey and to commend and commemorate the martyrs had the legitimacy to reign. Secondly, the national government’s action for the war martyrs was nothing special as this was something which had been done over and over again in the past of Chinese history. However, the fact that it put more emphasis on the commemoration part was something deserving appraisal. Thirdly, the commemoration act had achieved the purpose of shaping a memorable history. The weak regime was able to restore nationalism with its own characteristics and traits. Through this effort people could envision their collective efforts and endeavors against foreign threats. And yet, the national government's efforts in this matter did not receive adequate response and acknowledgement from the general public. The proper procedures for commemoration-including rank-raising, commending, and providing financial aids for the bereaved family-should be done according to "the Regulations for Awards during Wartime" first, and then each local government should follow "the Outline for Establishing Shrines for War Martyrs" and related regulations to report to the Interior Department for ratification. As most of these regulations were not ready at the time, neither the central government nor the local had any definite idea how to proceed and they did not act according to a fixed procedure. From the documents of the Interior Department, we have found that among the list of names presented by local governments, many did not actually receive any commendation or financial aid. Similarly, many of those who had received commendation and financial aid did not have tablets set up in the shrines of their birthplaces. Moreover, we also have found that the documents about the martyrs compiled by the Interior Department involved those born in the regions governed by the national government only, excluding the regions governed by the Communist regime or by the Wang regime at Nanking. This challenged the legitimacy of the national government and devalued the efforts made. In 1949, after the Republic of China settled down in Taiwan, the many shrines in mainland China were mostly destroyed and forgotten. Although now both parties across the strait acknowledged that the Anti-Japanese War was a glorious event in the history of China, it remained an empty symbol to most Chinese.