本文以觸覺分析為重心來討論身體主體性的問題，藉以分辨現象學中的兩種模式。法國現象學家梅洛龐蒂（Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1908－1961）與昂希（Michel Henry, 1922－2002）分別代表這兩種模式，前者是他異感觸的模式，後者則是自我感觸的模式。在討論梅洛龐蒂的一節中，本文分析其前期與後期有關觸覺的細微差異，在前期中以反身性為核心，將身體與世界的關係放在「共自然性」的角度來理解，而在後期中則從觸覺的反身性導出可逆性的概念。以自我觸摸為分析主題時，可逆性的概念帶入一種包含他者的反身性，使觸覺身體朝向對他者開放，梅洛龐蒂以間距、裂隙來指稱此一現象。相較之下，昂希所極力凸顯的是身體感觸中不可化約的主體性。但是，昂希並不認為觸覺具有優先性，而是藉著觸覺分析呈顯身體的內在性與主動性。這種在身體上發生的感觸內在性涉及的是顯示的本質，亦即，現象的本質；其模式乃是自我感觸、自我體證。能夠使得此自我體證成為可能的乃是生命的呈現，因此，身體的感觸其實是生命的自我顯現。藉此兩種模式的深刻分別，可以更清楚理解現象學對身體感分析的細緻內容，也能更把握現象學開展的不同可能性，進而思考當代處境中身體與生命的課題。

This paper discusses the problem of bodily subjectivity via an analysis of touch, in order to distinguish two models in phenomenology: Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) as the model of hetero-affection and Michel Henry (1922-2002) as the model of self-affection. The first section traces the subtle difference of the problem of touching in Merleau-Ponty. In his earlier works, due to the idea of reflexivity, body and world are understood through the perspective of co-naturality; the concept of reversibility is deduced from the tactile reflexivity in later works. In regards to self-touching, reversibility implies a reflexivity that includes others, leaving the tactile body open to them. Merleau-Ponty refers to this phenomenon as divergence. On the contrary, what Henry emphasizes is the irreducible subjectivity in bodily affection. There is no priority in touching for Henry; rather, through analysis of touching, the immanence and initiative of the body is revealed. The affective immanence taking place in the body designates the essence of manifestation, or the essence of phenomenon. The model for this is self-affection ad self-proof. What makes this self-proof possible is the manifestation of life, so that, the bodily affection is the self-manifestation of life. By way of contrasting these two models, we can better understand the subtle nuances in the analysis of bodily feeling, grasp the different possibilities of phenomenology, and further consider the problem of body and life in the present age.