:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
題名:亞當斯論題與指示條件句的三值語意論
書刊名:國立政治大學哲學學報
作者:劉吉宴
作者(外文):Liu, Chi-yen
出版日期:2014
卷期:32
頁次:頁1-56
主題關鍵詞:指示條件句亞當斯論題貧乏性結果三值語意論最大賭注論題Indicative conditionalsAdams' thesisTriviality results3-valued semanticsMaximal stakes thesis
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(1) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:3
  • 點閱點閱:55
亞當斯論題宣稱指示條件句「如果A,B」的機率是條件機率P(B|A),許多學者認為這個論題在直覺上是成立的,但對其明確意義及為何成立,則有不同的立場。本文將論證,亞當斯論題不僅僅是一個關於指示條件句的假說或假定,而且還可以基於指示條件句的三值語意學下,被恰當地說明及導出。本文首先說明史東內克對亞當斯論題的立場是難以成立的;其次論證傑克森對條件句的語意學難以提供對亞當斯論題的恰當說明;最後,基於條件句的三值語意論,提出一個對亞當斯論題的恰當理解方式。
"Adams' thesis" is that the probability of indicative conditionals is the conditional probability of the consequents given the antecedents. Many scholars believe that Adams' thesis is intuitively correct, but they disagree on its exact meaning and why it is correct. This paper argues that Adams' thesis is not only a hypothesis, but also one that can be properly explained and derived by an appropriate semantics of indicative conditionals. I shall first show that Stalnaker's interpretation of Adams' thesis is hardly correct, and that Jackson's semantics for indicative conditionals cannot provide a proper explanation and derivation for Adams' thesis. Finally, I argue that McDermott's 3-valued semantics for indicative conditionals is on the right track to account for Adams' thesis. Based on McDermott's work, I further provide a generalized probability theory of 3-valued indicative conditionals, and given the generalized probability theory it shall be shown that Adams' thesis can be properly explained and derived as a special case when the indicative conditionals under consideration are simple indicative conditionals.
期刊論文
1.王文方、王一奇(20080300)。我們需要一個有關於條件句的統一新理論。歐美研究,38(1),65-102。new window  延伸查詢new window
2.蘇慶輝(20110300)。論瑣碎性結果與對條件化的限制。國立臺灣大學哲學論評,41,113-133。new window  延伸查詢new window
3.Adams, E.(1965)。The logic of conditionals, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary。Journal of Philosophy,8,166-197。  new window
4.Carlstrom, I. F.、Hill, C. S.(1978)。Review of Adam's the logic of conditionals。Philosophy of Science,45,155-158。  new window
5.Douven, I.、Dietz, R.(2011)。A puzzle about Stalnaker's hypothesis。Topoi,30(1),31-37。  new window
6.Dummett, M.(1959)。Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society。New Series,59,141-162。  new window
7.Evans, J. St. B. T.、Handley, S. J.、Over, D. E.(2003)。Conditionals and conditional probability。Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,29(2),321-335。  new window
8.Fine, K.(1975)。Vagueness, truth and logic。Synthese,30,265-300。  new window
9.Hájek, A.(1989)。Probabilities of conditionals - Revisited。Journal of Philosophical Logic,18,423-428。  new window
10.Hájek, Alan(2012)。The Fall of "Adams' Thesis"?。Journal of Logic, Language, and Information,21(2),145-161。  new window
11.Kripke, S. A.(1975)。Outline of a theory of truth。The Journal of Philosophy,72,690-716。  new window
12.Lewis, D.(1986)。Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities II。Philosophical Review,95,581-589。  new window
13.Milne, P.(2012)。Indicative conditionals, conditional probabilities and the“defective truth-table”: A request for more experiments。Thinking & Reasoning,18,196-224。  new window
14.Politzer, G.、Over, D.、Baratgin, J.(2010)。Betting on conditionals。Thinking and Reasoning,3,172-197。  new window
15.McDermott, M.(1996)。On the truth conditions of certain if sentences。The Philosophical Review,105(1),1-37。  new window
16.Stalnaker, R.(1970)。Probability and conditionals。Philosophy of Science,37,64-80。  new window
17.Edgington, Dorothy(1995)。On conditionals。Mind,104,235-329。  new window
18.Lewis, David(1976)。Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities。Philosophical Review,85(3),297-315。  new window
19.Over, D. E.、Evans, J. St. B. T.。The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence。Mind and Language,18,340-358。  new window
圖書
1.Adams, E.(1975)。The logic of conditionals。D. Reidel。  new window
2.De Finetti, B.(2008)。Philosophical lectures on probability collected。Berlin:Springer。  new window
3.Field, Hartry(2008)。Saving truth from paradox。Oxford University Press。  new window
4.Jackson, F.(1987)。Conditionals。Oxford:Basil Blackwell。  new window
5.Jeffrey, R. C.(2004)。Subjective probability: The real thing。Cambridge。  new window
圖書論文
1.De Finetti, B.(1967)。Sur quelques conventions qui semblent utiles [On some conventions that seem useful]。Revue Roumaine de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées xii。  new window
2.Hájek, A.(1994)。Triviality on the cheap?。Probability and conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision。Cambridge University Press。  new window
3.Ramsey, F. P.(1926)。Truth and probability。Philosophical papers。Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press。  new window
4.Ramsey, F. P.(1929)。General propositions and causality。Philosophical papers。Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press。  new window
5.Stalnaker, Robert C.(1968)。A theory of conditionals。Studies in Logical Theory。Basil Blackwell。  new window
6.Stalnaker, R.(1976)。Letter to van Fraassen。Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference and Statistical Theories of Science。Dordrecht:Reide。  new window
7.Grice, H. P.(1967)。Logic and conversation。Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts。New York:Academic Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE