市民拒絕嫌惡性設施在鄰近地區設置的鄰避現象，是民主制度在本質上難 以處理的困境。而在民主化的情境下，以往長期便宜行事的政府，可信賴度仍 受到民眾的質疑，導致選址決策的協商更為困難。從這個角度思考，南韓2006 年成功地選定低放射性核廢料永久貯存場址，則製造了一個理論上的驚奇：為 什麼公投這樣的民主機制能夠解決民主化過程中的鄰避困境？本文以資訊經濟 學的觀點，透過深入訪談台灣負責核廢選址的官員與台電工作人員，分析鄰避 困境的根源，並解釋南韓為何能以志願的方式順利解決選址的爭議。本研究發 現，這類協商在民主化情境中最大的挑戰，在於政府和社會間的信任不足，加 以先驗理念的干擾，使資訊傳遞失真。透過細緻的公投制度設計，以及配合的 條件，可能抑制先驗信念的影響，讓「競標賽局」得以成形，並透過社會學習 的機制翻轉原先傾向於對抗的主流意見。對於台灣而言，如何讓兩個以上的地 方政府志願考慮提供場址，則為競標賽局成局的關鍵。本研究並藉此分析台灣 現有制度的問題。

It is common in a democracy that the citizens tend to reject the siting plan of potentially harmful or risky facility in their backyard. Such NIMBY (not-in-mybackyard) dilemma poses an even greater challenge in a newly democratized polity in which governments fail to gain trust from the citizens because of the malpractices of their authoritarian antecessors. While many regimes have thought of using referendum to solve this problem, issues such as “ tyranny of the majority” and environmental justice are entangled to prevent this solution from being effective as indicated in the lengthy struggles in Taiwan. From this perspective, the success of South Korea is valuable in revealing possible conditions for using referendum as a means to cope with the NIMBY problem.. The study points out some game theoretical analysis of possible factors for referendum to serve as a useful mechanism and collects empirical data from both Taiwan and South Korea to substantiate its arguments.