本文之目的在於透過「慈悲」與「無我」兩個概念論述《維摩詰經》的倫理學型態。探究進路將以 Charles Goodman主張維摩詰居士的菩薩行是一種結果主義（ consequentialism）之論證與主張作為思考線索，除了批判反思其論證是否合理、是否符應於《維摩詰經》的義理外，並進一步以《維摩詰經》為核心文獻論述以「慈悲」與「無我」所建構之佛教倫理學的內涵與型態。本文指出， Goodman的論證表面上看起來頗具說服力，但卻存在著內在矛盾。依據他的論證，他在結果主義者「決斷的程序」（ a decision procedure）中考慮了無我、無住與慈悲的內涵，但卻以結果主義整體「評價的結構」（ a structure of evaluation）的判準來衡量《維摩詰經》的倫理學型態時忽略了無我與無住的內涵，使得他的論證結果與他的原初定義產生衝突。依據《維摩詰經》的核心理論與觀點，本文並不同意將其倫理學型態歸類為結果主義。此外，由於無我與慈悲乃奠基於空性的體認之反思，本文主張《維摩詰經》依於無我、慈悲、無住、空、不二……等的概念所揭示的倫理學內涵，可假借《維摩詰經》自身「不盡有為，不住無為」來權說其「特殊的倫理學型態」，此相較於 Goodman的觀點，是與《維摩詰經》的義理較為一致的。

This essay takes a critical look at the ethical system of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra through analyzing the concepts of ‘compassion’ and ‘nonself ’. I take as my main line of inquiry Charles Goodman’s argument that the bodhisattva conduct of Vimalakīrti is a type of consequentialism, aiming not only to establish the validity of his arguments against the original standpoint of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, but furthermore also using the text as a core reference to explore types of Buddhist ethics based on the two theories of ‘compassion’ and ‘non-self’. However, despite appearing quite convincing initially, Goodman’s argument is inherently flawed: having taken into account the implications of ‘non-self’, ‘non-abiding’ and ‘compassion’ during the decision procedure of the consequentialist, he however neglects the implications of ‘non-self’ and ‘non-abiding’ during the structure of evaluation of consequentialism as a whole in his appraisal of the ethical system of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, thus resulting in a conflict between the outcome of his argument and his initial definition. I argue that the core standpoint of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra is irreconcilable with a consequentialist ethical system, and further point out that since the theories of ‘non-self ’ and ‘compassion’ are based on the realization of emptiness, the core implications of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra which relies on concepts such as ‘non-self ’, ‘compassion’, ‘non-abiding’, ‘emptiness’, ‘non-duality’ and so forth can be taken as an authoritative persuasion of its distinctive ethical system under the guise of ‘neither exhaust the conditioned, nor abide in the unconditioned’ as put forward in the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra.