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題名:淞滬會戰期間的決策與指揮權之問題
書刊名:國立政治大學歷史學報
作者:林桶法
作者(外文):Lin, Tung-fa
出版日期:2016
卷期:45
頁次:頁165-191
主題關鍵詞:指揮權蔣介石張治中淞滬戰役CommandChiang Kai-ShekZhang ZhizhongThe Battle of SonghuAnti-Japanese War
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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蔣的直接指揮前線作戰早已司空見慣,直接指揮對戰事有正負面的影響,本文分為三方面,首先介紹淞滬戰役前後中央與地方對日抗戰的態度及擴大淞滬戰役決策的原因;中央與地方決定擴大淞滬戰役的態度上大抵一致,差別在於地方指揮官較從軍事上考量,而蔣及中央則必須考慮到國際的因素。其次討論攻打日本的決策時機,淞滬會戰並非一直處於戰爭狀況,而是打打停停,蔣與地方特別是與張治中之間為何時攻打、何時撤退等有不同的意見;蔣著眼於全局的考量,張治中等前線將領則重視戰略的層面,整體而言,在這方面中央與地方的立場較為一致。最後討論淞滬戰役中的指揮及執行的問題,分析蔣如何提供前線指揮官各種資訊、調動指揮系統、直接指揮戰術等問題;抗戰期間,作為最高的領袖由於獲得的情報較為多元,著重全面的作戰規畫,地方的戰區司令則較熟悉當地的地形與地物,較清楚當地敵軍的狀況,最高統帥與戰區指揮官如能密切配合,將有利於戰鬥的進行,然由於長期以來蔣介石的領導風格,使戰地指揮官成為戰略的被支配者,就淞滬戰役而言,擴大淞滬戰事的原則與決策並無二致,執行上則有一些問題,先是指揮系統的變動,第三戰區的指揮系統在短短二個月內進行多次調整,引起當事者的不悅,此外,犧牲許多國軍精銳兵力換取國際視聽是否有其絕對的必要及最後撤退的時機,實有檢討的空間。
Chiang Kai-Shek’s direct command of the frontline battles had long been a common occurrence. Such direct command had a positive and negative impact on warfare. This article is divided into three sections. Firstly, the attitudes of central and regional command towards the Songhu campaign, and the reasons for the strategic decision to expand the campaign will be introduced. The attitudes of the central and regional command towards expanding the Songhu campaign were generally unanimous, but their differences would be the considerations of regional commanders who had enlisted in the army, and the fact that Chiang and the centre had to consider international factors. Secondly, in discussing the occasion for the decision to attack the Japanese, the battle of Songhu was not necessarily a constant battle situation, but rather a set of repeated skirmishes. There were different opinions between Chiang, the local command, and specially Zhang Zhizhong with respect to when to attack and when to retreat. Chiang kept his focus on the overall situation in his mind, but Zhang Zhizhong and other high ranking frontline officers, conversely, attached importance to the strategic dimension. On the whole, in this respect, central and regional commands were in relative agreement. Lastly, in discussing the command and execution of the Songhu military campaign, the matters of how Chiang supplied frontline commanders with all sorts of information, mobilized the command system, and directly issued tactics will be analysed. During the War of Resistance, he was regarded as the highest ranking leader, due to the intelligence that he obtained being more diverse, and the emphasis he placed on comprehensive battle plans. But commanders in regional warzones, conversely, were familiar with local terrain and surface features, and were clearer on the state of enemy forces in their local area. The highest commander and warzone commanders were able to cooperate closely, which was beneficial for the undertaking of the battle, so, for a long time, because of the leadership style of Chiang Kai-shek, battlefield commanders became dominated strategically. With respect to the Songhu military campaign, the principle and decision to expand the campaign were not necessarily different. In terms of its execution, there were some issues. First of all, were changes in the command system; secondly, the command system of the theatre of operations adjusted repeatedly within two short months, leading to the people in charge becoming displeased; moreover, as for sacrificing many elite troops from the army, it is open to debate whether or not that this was absolutely necessary along with the occasion for final retreat.
期刊論文
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其他
1.(19370815)。致張治中:在滬抗戰我軍應嚴守紀律與行動,勿影響軍譽與戰局(002-020300-00009-023)。  延伸查詢new window
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