In God, Death and Time Lévinas has pointed out that, Heidegger's thesis still originates from the significance of Being. Such statement for the phenomenology which is crucial to the transition from "Being" to "Significance", has designated that Heidegger was no longer a phenomenologist after Being and Time, besides, Heidegger's claim for the significance surrounded by Being could not provide any possibility of conceiving the question of human beings beyond Being. Husserl's critique has drawn up the difference between Heidegger and the phenomenology, and Lévinas' criticism has distinguished Heidegger from the ethics. In this thesis, we will dispose the discussion in Lévinas' explanation for Heidegger. Apart from attempting to investigate whether such explanation from Lévinas who has regarded Heidegger's thoughts as "a necessary transition" is legitimate or not, we will also try to rethink carefully the relation between the traditional ontology, and Heidegger's ontology which poses a question of the significance of "Being" from the subject of "Dasein".