本篇報告在研究談判兩造靜態權力結構不對稱的情況下，弱勢與強勢對手的談判行為。報告以「兩人、單議題」為假想情況，分析弱者與強者在進入談判時不同的開場方式、衝突與合作表現、以及戰術的運用。 研究結果發現，窮竟是強者較願談判或弱者較願談判，其實並無定論。進入談判之後，究竟是強者較會攻擊或弱者較會攻擊。亦無定規可循。談判雙方對權力關係的認知（認為權力關係是「零和」或「非零和」）、弱者選擇增強權力的方法（是設法增加「選項」、抑或設法「堅持」立場）、及雙方權力大小的實際差距，都是影響衝突或合作行為的重要變數。 至於戰術方面，本研究發現透過堅持立場膨脹「行為權力」，以及利用國際環境找到支撐槓桿、是弱勢談判者最常用、也最容易成功的戰術。

This paper is attempted to analyze negotiation behavior under asymmetrical power structures. Topic discussed in the paper including factors that made negotiators decide to enter negotiations, tactics that parties with different power structures employed during the negotiation, as well as outcomes of negotiations under asymmetrical power structures. After a comprehensive study, we were led to the following conclusions: First, both the stronger parties and weaker parties had their own considerations about if go to the negotiating table. There was no pre-set rules of thumb for stronger or weaker parties to follow. Second, as far as tactics were concerned, there was also no rules to predict whether a stronger party or a weaker party would attack the other side, or which party would have a stronger tendency to cooperate. Factors such as negotiators’ perceptions about “power”’ the strategies, such as “increasing alternatives” or “strengthening commitment”, that weaker party used to boost its power position; and the absolute power difference between two negotiators, i.e., how “asymmetrical” were their power structures, were all determinants that influenced negotiators’ attitudes. Third, as to tactical suggestions for the weakers party, “using binding commitments” and “finding leverages in international situation or international organization”, would be two useful ones that deserve our further attention.