相較於佛洛依德及拉岡以陽物中心論為軸發展出來的精神分析，同樣致力於精神分 析的法國女性（主義）理論家克莉斯提娃 (Julia Kristeva) 究竟做了多少的補強、修正或 顛覆，一直是個頗有爭論的議題。本論文即以克莉斯提娃精神分析架構中的自戀理論來探討 此議題，文分四部份；第一部份係鋪陳克莉斯提娃如何為希臘神話中納西塞斯（ Narcissus ）一角所受的責難做平反 -- 例如，傳統抨擊納西塞斯誤將自己的水中倒影當成可慾求之他 者，這種癡味被克莉斯提娃逆轉為建立主體內在性的必要歷程：愛的凝視在渴求美的形式之 際，將引領靈魂去追求理想之自我；在納西塞斯的抑鬱情結亦被詮解為任何主體為成立自我 而不得不與母親分離時必有的表現。本文第二部份則敘述克莉斯提娃如何據其新詮導出她所 謂包含三方的「自戀結構」 (a ternary narcissistic structure ）： 自戀的自我（ ego ）為抗衡與母親分離的虛無，將與一慈愛的、想像的父親做認同，主體之構亦早奠基於此前 伊底帕斯期的認同。由於想像的父親係克莉斯提娃所新創的概念，第三部份將研究此概念之 引進有何重要性，並點出克莉斯提娃理論與傳統精神分析的曖昧連結：雖然此新創的第三方 補充了佛洛依德及拉岡理論的不足 -- 他們兩人均未說明何以滿足於母子共生體系中的自我 必然願意接受嚴厲的父之律法的召喚而進入象徵秩序 -- 但這第三方也使得克莉斯提娃的自 戀結構有已然伊底帕斯化之嫌，換言之，伊底帕斯架構依舊隱然為克莉斯提娃理論的依歸。 本文最後一部份將進一步指出，克莉斯提娃對納西塞斯的讚揚實出於其「愛能戰勝一切」的 理想，但自戀結構中由想像之父提供的愛如何能如克莉斯提娃所期待的，完全與侵略性、佔 有慾沾不上邊，進而形成一種救贖力量? 克莉斯提娃卻沒有說明；更令人憂心的是，克莉斯 提娃的自戀結構不但完全是為男性主體所鋪設、女性在其中只能以各種病態方式存在，在其 訪談錄中她更表示在此結構下受苦的女性適足以擔負起召喚想像之父出現的重任，處處呈現 了對現行家庭結構、社會體制的服膺。由此觀之，如果說克莉斯提娃新詮下的納西塞斯依然 沒能戰勝自戀的虛無來成立一分離的自我，我們更可以說，在重新銘刻如佛洛依德或拉岡等 父系精神分析師的理論之路上，克莉斯提娃亦未盡全功。

　　　　　It is almost a consensus that the framework of Freudian psychoanalysis primarily hinges on the Oedipus scenario, whose temary structure is what initiates the subject into identification with the Symbolic Law. In Kristeva's investigation of the psychic underpinnings of Westerm culture, however,the main character is no longer Oedipus but Narcissus instead, and it is the subject's narcissism that "determines the choice of a love object and sets into motion the identifications essential to the subsequent development of the ego" (Brandt 89). To put it another way, speaking of the constitution of the subject, Kristeva believes that in the beginning there is pre-Oedipal narcissism whereas Freud and Lacan conceive Oedipal identification as the starting point. For Freud, normal adults are observed to succeed in effacing their infantil narcissism (557; italics mine), and only those people whose libidinal development has suffered some disturbance, such as perverts and homosexuals, will continuously exhibit "a type of object choice which must be temed 'narcissistic'"(554). For Lacan, likewise, the narcissistic moment in the subject is supposed to be "transcended in a normative sublimation " in a later stage (1977:24). Contesting Freud's thrusting aside narcissism in favor of a "true" object choice and Lacan's separating from signifying ideals the narcissistic, driveanimated pre-object-orientation (Kristeva 1987a: 21, 38), Kristeva's new version of narcissism,ostensibly, is opposed to traditional psychoanalysis which posits narcissism as a stage required to be left behind by the Oedipalized subject. Nevertheless, a close reading of Kristeva's dynamics of narcissism would reveal her reinscription as equivocally in tune with the Freudian Oedipal sturcture, at least in the sense that her narcissistic structure is designated as a triad habouring "the narcissistic subject, the adject mother, and the imaginary father" (Oliver 86). In this paper, I would expolore Kristeva's complex dynamics of narcissism so as to show, on the one hand, how the pre-Oedipal narcissism she valorizes is paradoxically Oedipalized. On the other hand, I would like to investigate what this paradox signifies in terms of Kristeva's relation to her psychoanalytic forefathers. Does Kristeva's version of narcissism provide "a new way to conceive of the oedipal situation as well as a new way to use it in the analytic situation" (Oliver 70)? Or does the narcissistic structure she reinterprets ironically testify to her compromise with the partriarchal status quo?