《理學沿革史》，撰寫〈近世第一大哲康德之學說〉。任公如何將中江筆下的「カント」轉變成「康德」？在轉換過程之中是否經過一些加工？而加工是否造成誤會或扭曲？任公又如何闡釋與評估康德的思想？
根據拙文的比較，任公的譯介具有高度的選擇性。他不翻譯中江書中討論康德的哲學方法與文藝理念的部分，對康德的神學則點到為止；在康德思想之中他特別關心倫理思想與政治主張。任公除了介紹康德思想，也將康德的想法與本土觀念相會通。從任公對康德思想的評論可見：他肯定佛學、陽明學與譚嗣同的觀念，而批評朱熹與張載的哲學主張。對他來說，康德思想的優點在於它與佛教的真如說、陽明的良知說與譚嗣同《仁學》中的思想相同，一方面將哲學與道學貫穿為一，一方面又揭櫫了「真我」的超越性，有助於人們的道德實踐，因此康德思想較朱熹理學來得完善，也較張載思想來得實際。然而任公認為康德的缺點在於他只看到個人的真我，卻不像佛教那樣了解到「小我」與「大我」的聯繫，以及由此而生出的普渡眾生之義。
從以上的討論可見：第一，任公對康德思想有所誤會，他看到康德之真我與良知、真如等觀念的相同處，卻忽略其差異。第二，任公從佛學的角度指出康德思想有所不足，這一評估反映任公與康德在認識論上的差距。康德傾向悲觀主義認識論，他不但懷疑有關本體之知識的可能性，並強調超越時間與空間的靈魂或主體不是一種存在的實體或知識的對象；任公則傾向樂觀主義認識論，他主張人們不但可以了解現象界，而且佛教有關本體界和倫理原則的看法也十分可靠。
梁啟超譯介康德思想一事反映西洋、日本、中國等思想因素在任公思想中是「非均衡地相互嵌合著的」。任公筆下的康德不但有康德、Alfred Fouillée、中江兆民等人的身影，也混雜了佛家、儒家等思想因素，因而呈現出各種理念交雜、互釋的景象。

Taking Liang Qichao's introduction of Kant to China as an example, this paper examines how Chinese intellectuals in the early 20th century made use of Japanese literature to understand Western civilization. In 1903, Liang wrote ”The Doctrines of the Greatest Philosopher in Modern Times--Kant” drawing on Nakae Chomin's Japanese translation of the French scholar Alfred Fouillée's Histoire de la philosophie. How did Liang translate Nakae's ”kanto” into ”kangde”? Did he faithfully copy Nakae's image of Kant? Or did he distort it to some extent? Furthermore, how did Liang interpret and evaluate Kant?
According to my comparison, Liang's article about Kant is very selective. He did not translate Nakae's discussion of Kant's philosophical method or his discussion of Kant's attitude toward art. In addition, Liang barely touched on Kant’s ideas about God. Liang was especially concerned with Kant's ideas about ethics and politics, which were relevant to his larger nationalistic project.
Liang not only introduced Kant’s ideas in his own way, but also linked them with Chinese thought and evaluated them by Chinese standards. From his evaluation of Kant, one can see that Liang affirmed Buddhism, Wang Yangming's Neo-Confucianism, and Tan Sitong's ideas centering around ren (benevolence), but criticized Zhu Xi's and Zhang Zai's philosophical outlook. From Liang's perspective, Kant's strength was that some of his concepts were similar to the Buddhist idea of zhenru (bhutatathata, absolute fundamental reality), Wang Yang-ming's idea of liangzhi (spontaneous moral knowing) and Tan Sitong's idea of ren, and thus on the one hand having the merit of linking metaphysics with moral philosophy, and on the other hand showing the transcendental nature of the ”true self.” Yet for Liang, Kant’s shortcoming was that, although he understood the ”true self,” he failed to understand both the linkage between the ”little self (xiaowo)” and the ”greater self (dawo)” and the ideal of ”saving all living beings” in Buddhist philosophy.
Two points can be drawn from the above discussion. 1. To some extent, Liang misunderstood Kant. For example, he equated Kant's ”true self” with Wang Yang-ming's liangzhi and ignored the differences between them. 2. Liang's criticism of Kant from the Buddhist perspective revealed fundamental epistemological differences between himself and Kant. Kant tended toward ”epistemological pessimism,” doubting the possibility of knowing the ultimate nature of things, and emphasizing that the soul is not a known existing entity. Liang, on the other hand, tended toward ”epistemological optimism,” holding that Buddhism provides a full understanding of morality and its ontological basis.
Liang's way of discussing Kant indicates that, in Liang's thought, Western, Japanese, and Chinese intellectual elements are ”combined with one another in an unbalanced way.” It is like a mosaic with pieces from Kant, Alfred Fouillée, Nakae Chōmin, and various Buddhist and Confucian thinkers.