本論文利用探討通路競爭的賽局理論模型，分析行銷通路中所發生的相關
實務問題。主要的研究內容包括下列三個主題：一、獨家經銷通路之競爭
－批發價Nash談判解的考量實務上，中間產品的交易往往都是透過買賣雙
方的「協商或談判」而完成的。不過，文獻中探討通路競爭的賽局理論模
型都忽略了此一特性，而將中間產品的批發價設定為製造商單方面的決策
變數。本研究據此觀點採用合作賽局理論的概念，求導批發價的「Nash談
判解」，以期更符合實際市場競爭情況，並將研究結果和相關文獻的研究
結果作一對照比較。結果發現，本文所討論的Nash談判模型所導致的均衡
批發價與零售價皆較低而銷售量較高，因此就消費之立場而言最為有利。
二、上架費之賽局理論分析隨著大型流通業者業者的興起,零售商逐漸擁
有龐大的市場力量。製造商為取得有效通路以銷售商品，往往必須繳納一
筆 上架費」(slotting allowance)以確保商品的銷售地位。此一問題最
近也受到公平交易委員會的關切，希望不致產生廠商間不公平競爭的現象
。本研究即建立賽局理論模型以比較零售商收取上架費的經濟效果。研究
結果發現，若基於消費者與總福利水準與總福利水準的考量,上架費有利
無害，因此公平交易委員會似無過度關切的必要。三、零售商自有品牌商
品策略之通路競爭分析在流通業縱向發展的潮流中，處於通路末端的批發
商或零售商，逐漸開始向上擴展建立自有品牌商品，以便與製造業者的商
品品牌對抗，開拓更廣大的生存空間。本研究利用賽局理論之通路競爭模
型，以了解零售商自有品牌商品策略的致勝因素。研究結果發現，若能保
証使「自有品牌商品銷售量」，或是「整體通路銷售量」有效擴充，才可
使自有品牌零售商受惠。此結論和實務上自有品牌商品要能「以量取勝」
，或是「帶動整體業績」方能奏效的情形十分吻合。

This dissertation employs game theory to investigate the issues
in distribution channels. It includes three essays. 1.
Competition in a Channel Structure with Exclusive Retailers -
Nash Bargaining olutions for wholesale Prices Most terms of
transactions of goods are determined through bargaining or
negotiation between buyers and suppliers rather than being set
unilaterally by one of the parties. A game theoretical model of
channel competition involving exclusive dealing is employed to
characterize this feature. The Nash bargaining solutions of
wholesale prices are derived and contrasted with the findings
of previous studies. Since the wholesale prices and retail
prices are lower and the quantities of sale are higher in our
model, consumers under such circumstances have their best
interests. 2. A Game Theoretical Analysis of Slotting Allowance
Manufacturers often have to pay slotting allowances to obtain
shelf space as the retailers'''''''' market powers become greater.
The Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan is concerned about the
resulting anticompetitive effects . A game theoretical model
of channel competition is developed to investigate the economic
effects of the slotting allowances . It is shown that under
the assumptions of our model, the slotting allowances should do
no damage to the consumers'''''''' welfare and social welfare. These
findings provide policy implications for the Fair Trade
Commission of Taiwan. 3. An Analysis of Retailers'''''''' Private
Brand Strategy