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題名:結構管制之相關議題
作者:林啟智
作者(外文):Chi-Chih, Lin
校院名稱:國立中央大學
系所名稱:產業經濟研究所
指導教授:施俊吉
學位類別:博士
出版日期:1999
主題關鍵詞:管制垂直重整訊息不對稱限制轉售價格獨家專賣談判機制設計互補品vertical seperationasymmetric informationRPMETbargainingmechanism design
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本文考慮完全訊息下之靜態配置效率,
分析公用事業之自由化與垂直重整。
自由化政策不僅牽涉水平開放,
垂直重整更是能否提高經濟福利之關鍵。
倘若網路特性不顯著產品之生產技術為固定規模報酬或報酬遞增,
則未進行既存廠商之垂直分割即實施自由化政策,
無論上、下游如何設計%
皆無助於經濟福利之提昇。
惟著手既存廠商之垂直分割後,
再進行網路特性不顯著產品市場之開放,即可經由上、下游之設計%
而達到增進福利之目的。
至於垂
直關係則以上游具網路特性產品,
下游網路特性不顯著產品為宜。
此結論大致適用於具網路特性之公用
事業,
如電信、電力、自來水、液態瓦斯與油品等產業。
垂直重整後,公用事業之上、下游已分屬不同的公司,
上游獨占廠商為追求最大利潤,
可能會對下游廠商實施垂直控制。是否垂直控制必然會損及經濟福利,
本文將在不對稱訊息下,以更寬廣的角度,
就一般商品討論公平交易法是否適宜規範廠商之垂直控制。
若存在訊息成本,
而且零售商擁有訊息優勢,
則製造商將不會以「獨家專賣」作為垂直控制之手段。
當製造商實施「限制轉售價格」
時,可同時達成私利與促進公益。至於放任零售商從事價格競爭之製造商,
其行為很可能會損及經濟福利。
準此,公平交易法對「限制轉售價格」及「獨家專賣」之不公平對待,
若以訊息不對稱的角度視之,恐怕仍有待商榷。
垂直拆解後,上、下游廠商之產
品將成為互補品。
必須結合上、下游產品,方能提供消費者所需之服務。
本文擬採用機制設計模型,
分析雙邊不對稱訊息下互補品之談判。

雙方就談判標的物價值的看法較一致時,
宜以一物一物分別逐次談判,方能儘快
達成協議。

雙方之談判空間較小,宜採用交換條件之談判,
盼經由更多可供利用之訊息,
而加速協議之達成。
此外就有線電視業者之談判而言,
與其讓有限電視之系統業者與頻道節目供應業者垂直整合,
不如在垂直分隔下允許頻道節目供應業者聯合製播。
至於系統業者統購下的談判效率,雖有可能優於垂直整合,
但亦可能不及垂直整合。因此不宜貿然同意系統業者之統購。
Under asymmetric information, when retailers are privately
informed about demand conditions before contracting with the manufacturer,
and there are fixed costs at the retail stage.
If the objectives of vertical controls
are to induce retailers'' information,
exclusive territories (ET) will always not be privately desirable,
but under some conditions, ET will be socially desirable.
When the manufacturer uses resale price maintenance (RPM) to maxize profits,
it will also achieve the social welfare maximum.
If flexible retail price is privately
desirable, we show that such privately desirable may or may not be
socially desirable. The above result calls
into question the current contrasting legal
teratment of RPM and ET.
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\hangindent=.5 true cm\hangafter=1
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Williamson, O. E. (1975),
{\it Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implication}, New York: Free Press.

呂榮海、謝穎青、張嘉真
1992
《公平交易法解讀》。台北:月旦出版社有限公司。

Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz
1979
''Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization,'''' {\it American Economic Review},
62(5), 777-95.

Alexander, C. R. and D. Reiffen
1995
''Vertical Contracts as Strategic Commitments:
How Are They Enforced,'''' {\it Journal of Economics \& Management Strategy},
4(4), 623-49.

Baye, M. R., Crocker, K. J., and J. Ju
1996
''Divisionalization,
Franchising, and Divestiture Incentives,''''
{\it American Economic Review}, 86(1), 223-36.

Blair, B. F. and T. R. Lewis
1994
''Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric
Information and Moral Hazard,'''' {\it Rand Journal of Economics},
25(2), 284-96.

Boyd,D. W.
1996
''Resale Price Maintenance or Dealer Exclusive
Territories: Toward a Theory of Product Distribution,''''
{\it The American Economist}, 40(2), 86-94.

Deneckere, R., Marvel, H. P. and J. Peck
1997
''Demand Uncertainty and
Price Maintenance,'''' {\it American Journal of Economics},
87(4), 619-41.

1996
''Demand Uncertainty,
Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance,'''' {\it Quarterly Journal
of Economics}, 111(3), 885-914.

Friedman, M.
1976
{\it Price Theory}, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.


Gal-Or, E.
1991
''Vertical Restraints with Incomplete Information,''''
{\it The Journal of Industrial Economics}, 39, 503-16.

Marvel, H. P. and S. McCafferty
1984
''Resale Price Maintenance and Quality
Certification,''''
{\it Rand Journal of Economics}, 15(2), 346-59.

Marvel, H. P. and S. McCafferty
1996
''Comparing Vertical Restraints,''''
{\it Journal of Economics and Business}, 48, 473-86.

Maskin, E. and J. Riley
1984
''Monopoly with Incomplete Information,''''
{\it Rand Journal of Economics}, 15(1), 171-96.

Mathewson, G. F. and R. A. Winter
1983
''The Incentives for Resale Price
Maintenance under Imperfect Information,'''' {\it Economic Inquiry},
21, 337-48.

Mathewson, G. F. and R. A. Winter
1984
''An Economic
Theory of Vertical Restraints,''''
{\it Rand Journal of Economics}, 15, 27-38.

Nault, B. R. and A. S. Dexter
1994
''Adoption, Transfers, and Incentives
in a Franchise Network with Positive Externalities,''''
{\it Marketing Science}, 13(4), 412-23.

Rey, P. and J. Tirole
1986
''The Logic of Vertical Restraints,''''
{\it American Economic Review}, 76(5), 921-39.

Spengler, J.
1950
''Vertical Integration and Anti-trust Policy,''''
{\it Journal of Political Economy}, 58, 347-52.

Telser, L.
1960
''Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?,''''
{\it Journal of Law and Economics}, 3, 86-105.

Tirole, J.
1988
{\it The Theory of Industrial Organization},
Cambridge: MIT Press.

Williamson, O. E.
1975
{\it Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implication}, New York: Free Press.

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