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題名:以詞彙溝通機率對審計決策的影響
作者:王翰屏 引用關係
作者(外文):Wang Hann Pyng
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:商學研究所
指導教授:杜榮瑞
胡志偉
學位類別:博士
出版日期:1999
主題關鍵詞:機率詞彙雙向性v-u模型冒險理論信念調整模型時近效應the probability phrasesbi-directionalityv-u modelventure theorybelief-adjustment modelrecency effect
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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在實務上,審計人員經常使用機率詞彙來表達和溝通審計風險(如「很有可能」、「極少可能」),會計準則制定者也用機率詞彙描述不確定性(如或有損失的會計處理),由於審計人員的決策也會受機率詞彙的影響,因此有許多會計學者投入機率詞彙的研究中。本文將敘述過去研究的實驗方式與結論。大致而言,許多會計學者認為機率詞彙會造成溝通上的問題,因此他們建議審計人員改用數字溝通機率,並建議準則委員會修改會計、審計的準則內容。
由於改用數字溝通機率以及修改準則內容對審計人員都有極大的影響,在向實務界提出建議之前,我們應先確定改用數字溝通是否真的能改善審計決策,因此本文想深入探討機率詞彙的影響。本文先從過去的文獻中整理出機率詞彙的三項性質,這三項性質分別是:模糊性、個別差異性、雙向性。(一)模糊性是指,一個機率詞彙可以代表許多機率值,就像機率區間一樣模糊。(二)個別差異性是指,同樣的機率詞彙在不同人心中代表的機率有很大的差異。(三)雙向性是指,用機率詞彙描述的資訊會被視為雙向的(bi-directional)資訊,用數字描述的資訊則被視為單向的(uni-directional)資訊。
在說明三項性質的相關研究後,本文將根據各性質逐一討論人們處理機率詞彙和處理數字的差別。首先,本文將引用v-u模型和冒險理論(venture theory),分析模糊性和個別差異性的影響,並建立兩項假說:<1>根據詞彙和根據數字所做的決策或判斷會有差異。但在獲利情境,差異的程度會隨機率的增加而增加;在損失情境,差異的程度會隨機率的增加而減小。<2>相對於用數字溝通機率,用詞彙溝通機率會降低決策者彼此間的共識。其次,本文引用信念調整模型(belief-adjustment model),來分析雙向性的影響,並建立第三項假說:<3>當審計人員要根據兩項證據制定決策,而且兩項證據是一致時,根據數字制定的決策會產生時近效應(也就是給後出現的資訊比較大的權數),根據詞彙制定的決策則不受資訊呈現順序的影響。
在建立假說之後,本文設計兩個實驗來分別驗證這些假說是否正確。其中,假說1和假說2的檢定安排在實驗一,假說3的檢定安排在實驗二。在實驗一方面,實驗結果與假說1不完全相符。在損失情境,兩種判斷(根據詞彙和根據數字所做的判斷)的差異會隨機率的增加而降低。但獲利情境,兩種判斷的差異卻未隨機率的增加而增加。其次,實驗一的結果顯示,受試者根據詞彙回答的答案有比較大的變異數(相對於受試者根據數字回答的答案),但變異數的差異並未達到顯著水準,因此實驗結果並不支持假說2。也就是說,用詞彙溝通機率並未顯著的降低共識。
在實驗二方面,實驗結果符合假說3的預期:當受試者收到的兩項證據是一致時,根據數字制定的決策會產生時近效應,根據詞彙制定的決策則不受資訊呈現順序的影響。此外,本文又增加一個實驗(實驗三),改用不同的詞彙來測試實驗二的結果是否穩定,實驗結果仍然支持假說3。
綜合三個實驗的結果,本文認為,當審計人員只需要溝通一項機率時,因為用詞彙溝通機率並不會顯著的降低共識,所以審計人員仍然可以繼續使用詞彙。但是,當審計人員需要溝通兩項機率,而且兩項機率是一致時,因為整合數字會產生時近效應,而且時近效應是一種偏誤,所以用詞彙溝通對決策反而比較有利。
Auditors frequently use the probability phrases to express and communicate audit risks(e.g.,「probable」、「remote」). Standard setters also use the probability phrases to denote levels of probability in prescribing recognition, measurement and disclosure of events and transaction’s in financial reports(e.g.,SFAS No.5). Consequently, the issue regarding the interpretation of the probability phrases has been the focus of several studies in the accounting literature.
The dissertation investigates the impact of communication with the probability phrases on auditing decisions. The dissertation briefly summarize the relevant findings, and provides three properties of the probability phrases. The three properties are:
<1>Vagueness, which means that one probability phrase can represent many probability numbers, its meaning is as vague as a probability range.
<2>Individual difference, which means that the meaning of the probability phrase varies across people.
<3>Bi-directionality, which means that the sentences described with the probability phrase are seen as bi-directional. The sentences described with the probability number are seen as uni-directional.
After describing the related studies of the three properties,
the dissertation uses venture theory and belief-adjustment model to analyzes how people process the probability phrases and the probability numbers, and suggests three hypotheses:
<1>Decisions based on the probability phrases differ from those based on the probability numbers. And in the gain domain, the difference will increases as probabilities increase. In the loss domain, the difference will decreases as probabilities increase.
<2>Auditors will have lower consensus when communicating with the probability phrases relative to the probability number.
<3>When auditors need to integrate two evidences and the two evidences are consistent, decisions based on the probability numbers will exhibit a recency effect, and decisions based on the probability phrases will exhibit no recency effect.(Recency effect refers to the tendency to overweight the evidence received later in a sequence)
I design two experiments to test the hypotheses. The results of the experiments are as follows:
<1>The results are mixed with respect to the first hypothesis. In the loss domain, the difference between the answers based on the probability phrases and the probability numbers decrease as probabilities increase. But in the gain domain, the difference doesn‘t increase as probabilities increases.
<2>The results don‘t support the second hypothesis. The answers based on the probability phrases are more variable than those based on the probability numbers. But the ratio of verbal to numerical variances is not significant.
<3>The answers of the subjects conform with the prediction of the third hypothesis. In addition, the dissertation adds another experiment which uses new probability phrases to design the questionnaire,and the results also support the third hypothesis.
These findings suggest that when auditors make decisions based on one probability, because the consensus won‘t be lower when communicating with the probability phrases relative to the probability number, so auditors still can use the probability phrases to communicate. However when auditors need to integrate two evidences and the two evidences are consistent, because decisions based on the probability numbers will exhibit a recency effect, and the recency effect is a bias, so their decision based on the probability numbers will be inferior.
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