資產特性對國際合資所有權結構的影響__臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

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題名：	資產特性對國際合資所有權結構的影響
作者：	李丹
作者(外文)：	Tan Lee
校院名稱：	國立臺灣大學
系所名稱：	國際企業學研究所
指導教授：	洪茂蔚胡星陽
學位類別：	博士
出版日期：	2000
主題關鍵詞：	資產特性；國際合資；納許談判解；所有權結構；實質選擇權；技術授權；Asset Characteristics；International Joint Ventures；Nash Bargaining Solution；Ownership Structure；Real Options；Technology Licensing
原始連結：	連回原系統網址
相關次數：	被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0) 排除自我引用:0 共同引用:0 點閱:38

國際合資的所有權結構為國企理論重要議題之一。雖然國際合資牽涉到廠房興建及機器設備購買等投資行為，然而，既有文獻均忽略「資產特性」如何影響國際合資所有權結構。本文則應用「實質選擇權」法，探討下列四項「資產特性」的影響效果：第一，由於土地及天然資源有限，或供給短缺，導致合資延後進行，成本卻可能增加；第二，由於政府管制、資產專屬性、或所謂的「檸檬車」問題，導致合資成本可能無法完全回收；第三，合資未來的收益不確定。最後，國際合資廠商對於何時投（增）資及撤（減）資擁有選擇權。
本文考慮一個來自已開發或新興工業化國家的多國籍廠商，擬以直接投資方式進入地主國市場。然而，受限於地主國政府的規定，只能選擇和當地廠商共同設立「國際合資」企業。在國際合資雙方以「納許談判」方式在投資同時決定股權結構的假設下，本文將在第二及第三章探討該合資廠商的所有權、投資及減（撤）資決策。第二及第三章尚有數項假設不同。首先，第二章假設多國籍廠商收取和規模相關之費用，以授權其專屬技術予合資企業；相反地，在第三章此多國籍廠商僅較地主國廠商具成本優勢。其次，第二章假設地主國的市場結構為獨佔，而在第三章則假設為完全競爭。最後，在第二章國際合資廠商面臨一項兩期的連續投資計畫：國際合資雙方先在第一期同時決定股權結構和啟始規模，而當第二期不確定性實現後，可調整規模。在第三章該合資廠商面臨一項兩階段連續時間的固定規模投資計畫：國際合資雙方在第一階段同時決定股權及進入市場的時機，而當市況低迷導致產品價格價低於其營運成本時，則合資廠商可在第二階段決定退出市場時機。
第二章獲致四項主要結論。第一，多國籍廠商的持股應低於50％。第二，當延後投資成本提高，會促使合資企業選取較大啟始規模，並降低多國籍廠商持股意願。第三，當立即投資沈沒成本降低，會促使合資企業選取較大啟始規模，但可能提高、降低、或不影響多國籍廠商持股意願。第四，當多國籍廠商可收取較高的技術移轉價格時，會降低其持股意願，但並不影響合資企業的啟始規模。
第三章則獲致三項主要結論。首先，多國籍廠商的持股應超過50％。其次，當投資不可回復程度下降，則合資廠商投資及撤資誘因均提高，但對股權結構影響則不確定。最後，雖然合資廠商可選擇撤資，然而，當撤資成本相當高時，該選擇權即無價值。在此情況下，當延後投資成本下降，或合資未來收益變異性增加，則合資廠商投資誘因會下降，且多國籍廠商會減少其持股比例。

以文找文

One central topic on international business is to examine the determinants of the ownership structure of international joint ventures (henceforth IJVs). Nevertheless, capital asset characteristics are typically ignored in the past studies even though an IJV firm must purchase materials and machinery and build plants in order to produce and sell outputs. In my dissertation, I will investigate how capital asset characteristics emphasized by real options literature affect the ownership structure of an IJV firm. These characteristics include: first, the limitations on an IJV firm''s ability to recover its investment costs because of asset specificity, the “lemons” problem, or governmental regulations. Second, the IJV firm may incur higher costs to later invest because of limited land, natural resource reserves, or the need for a permit that is in short supply. Finally, the future rewards from IJVs may be stochastic because future demand and/or cost conditions are usually unpredictable.
I consider a multinational corporation which comes from a developed or newly industrialized country and wants to penetrate the market of a less developing country. This corporation must form an IJV firm with a local partner rather than set up a wholly owned subsidiary due to restrictions by the host government. Based on the assumption that both parties of the IJV firm decide their respective share via Nash bargaining upon investing, I will investigate this IJV firm''s ownership structure, investment, and disinvestment decisions in both chapters 2 and 3. There are several different assumptions between these two chapters. First, in chapter 2 the multinational corporation receives royalties from licensing its specific technology to the IJV firm. In contrast, in chapter 3 the multinational corporation exhibits a cost advantage over its local partner. Second, the local market is of a monopoly type in chapter 2 while it is of a competitive type in chapter 3. Finally, in chapter 2, the investment project facing the IJV firm is a two-period continuous one, i. e., both parties of the IJV firm simultaneously decide their respective share and the optimal capacity in period 1. The IJV firm can then expand, contract, or remain inactive after uncertainty is realized in period 2. In chapter 3, the investment project facing the IJV firm is a two-stage continuous-time fixed scale one: both parties simultaneously decide their respective share and the time to exercise the investment project in stage 1. The IJV firm can then decide whether to exit the market should any adverse situation arise.
Four main conclusions of chapter 2 are in order. First, the multinational corporation will demand a minority share. Second, as the cost to purchase capital in period 2 becomes lower, the multinational corporation will hold a larger share of the IJV firm. The IJV firm, however, will install a smaller capacity in period 1. Third, as the revenue from reselling the installed capital stock becomes lower in period 2, the joint venture firm will install a smaller capacity in period 1, yet its share distribution will be ambiguously affected. Finally, as the royalty rate is higher, the multinational corporation will hold a smaller share of the IJV firm. The incentive to install capacity in period 1 of this IJV firm, however, will be unchanged.
Three main conclusions of chapter 3 are in order. First, the multinational firm will demand a majority share. Second, as capital investment becomes more costly to reverse, the IJV firm will have lower incentives to both enter and exit the market, but its share distribution will be ambiguously affected. Finally, suppose that the exit costs are high enough such that the option value to later exit the market becomes worthless. The IJV firm will then be more hesitant to enter the market and its share held by the multinational corporation will also be lower as the IJV firm either yields a return from capital investment that is more volatile or incurs a lower cost to purchase capital later.

以文找文

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