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題名：審計訴訟與和解之策略性考量
作者：李 華
作者(外文)：Hua Lee
校院名稱：國立臺灣大學
系所名稱：會計學研究所
指導教授：王泰昌
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2001
主題關鍵詞：法律錯誤；訴訟；和解；過失責任；會計師法律責任；專業注意；查核努力；審計努力；訴訟成本分攤原則；Legal error；Litigation；Settlement；Negligence rule；Auditor liability；Professional care；Audit effort；Litigation cost allocation rule
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過去三十年來，美國會計師面臨嚴重的法律危機，即使是在1995年的改革法案（Reform Act of 1995）或1998年的一致準則法案（Uniform Standards of 1998）執行後，聯邦的舞弊集體訴訟（federal fraud class action litigation）的案件並未明顯的減少。不過，不到10%的訴訟率顯示，絕大部分的案件均為庭外和解或是撤銷。儘管如此，訴訟的時間與成本龐大。一旦進入訴訟程序，法官執法時可能有法律錯誤。原因是在現行法律下，會計師負有過失責任（未善盡專業注意），然而法律上並未清楚地定義「過失」的標準；尤其是法官不一定具備審計專家知識；並且法官也無法精確地認定，會計師在查核過程當中，盡了多少專業注意程度，再加上事後偵查的成本相當高，這些因素都造成法官的判決可能有法律錯誤（legal error）。
本論文的主要目的是分析會計師與投資人在一個審計訴訟賽局中的策略性互動行為；在這個賽局中，當存在法律錯誤（legal error），我們考慮在過失責任下談判和解（settlement bargaining）的可能性。第一部分的結果顯示：在均衡時，投資人正確推測審計人員的努力程度，並且提出一個會計師會接受的合解金額。當法官判定被告(會計師)無罪，如果原告（投資人）必須支付損失懲罰（damage penalty）給被告，審計專業注意力（audit due care）與損失賠償（damage award）或法律誤差的關係並不明確。過失的標準（standard of negligence）或會計師的預期訴訟成本增加，則會提升審計專業注意力。我們也從社會最適的觀點分析，法官對損失賠償與損失懲罰的最適選擇，並考慮到會計師所盡的專業注意力只考慮到個人的利益。
在本論文的第二部分，我們應用模型的結果，分析四種訴訟成本分攤原則（litigation costs allocation rule）的影響，主要的結果並不支持傳統的看法，即在英國制的訴訟成本分攤原則下，會計師的專業注意力（查核努力程度）有可能低於美國制之下的專業注意力；我們也對其他結果作討論。
It is widely recognized that the CPAs have been facing severe legal crises in the past decade, even after the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 or the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. However, the low trial rate (8%, Palmrose, 1991) indicates that most legal disputes are either settled out of court or dropped. Nevertheless, defending against weak claims is financially burdensome and time-consuming. Once having gone to court, the court may commit legal errors, because under negligence liability the definition of the negligence is not clearly specified. In particular, compared to other kind of lawsuits (such as criminal or civil suits), in auditing litigation, the possible lack of expertise by the court in making correct judgment of standards of negligence in accounting and auditing further heightens the extent of legal error.
The purpose of the dissertation is to analyze the strategic interactions between an auditor and an investor in a dynamic auditing litigation game, especially in the presence of legal error under negligence liability, when settlement bargaining is considered. In the first part of the thesis, we show that there exists a set of equilibrium strategies: the investor correctly conjectures the auditor’s chosen due care (audit effort), and proposes a settlement offer that the auditor will accept with certainty. By incorporating a damage penalty into the model as a compensation for the winning defendant (auditor), raising either the standard of negligence or the auditor’s expected litigation cost increases due care, while the effects of damage award, penalty, and legal error remain ambiguous. We also characterize the court’s choices of damage award and penalty subject to the auditor’s chosen due care. In the second part of the thesis, we then apply the model to compare litigation cost rules, the American rule, the British rule, the Proplaintiff rule, and the Prodefendant rule. The application of the model to the litigation cost allocation rule does not support practitioners’ advocacy for a move to the British rule. We show that the effort exerted by the auditors may be lower under British rule, which results in more high-probability-of-losing auditors going to trial.
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