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題名：跨組織關係之研究:盜用、轉撥計價與供應鏈合作
作者：王曉雯 引用關係
作者(外文)：Hsiao-Wen Wang
校院名稱：國立臺灣大學
系所名稱：會計學研究所
指導教授：王泰昌
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2004
主題關鍵詞：供應鏈合作；資訊分享；垂直分工；Nash談判解；盜用；轉撥計價；Supply chain coordination；Nash bargaining solution；Transfer pricing；Misappropriation；Information sharing；Vertical disintegration
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論文提要
本論文聚焦於代工關係中，承包商投機行為如何影響契約主之外包決策與資訊分享策略。在論文的第一部份，即論文的第3章，作者延伸Baiman和Rajan (2002b) 的模式；分析契約主如何在承包商較佳的生產效率與盜用可能性之間進行取捨，並據以決定最佳的自製外包決策。研究結果顯示，當有盜用風險，契約主對於是否將創新資訊揭露給承包商知曉存在著兩個門檻。此項發現一般化Baiman和Rajan (2002b) 一個揭露門檻之研究結論。作者因此建議，只有當投入研發活動所獲得的創新落入兩個門檻之內，契約主才會有誘因與承包商組成有效率的協同供應鏈。本章的結論顯然可以為常見之實務現象－公司策略選擇外包低階產品並且自行生產高階產品，提供適當的學理解釋。另一方面，當契約主具有自行製造產品能力，作者探討契約主的此項能力對於契約主－承包商關係之策略意涵。本章亦將訴訟議題引入分析模型內，並且檢驗承包商之潛在盜用行為對於契約主自製外包決策的影響效果。第3章其餘的研究結果有：（1）當不存在資訊盜用風險，無論是締約雙方或是整個社會，將因契約主採取較有效率的協同供應鏈策略（外包新產品）而獲益。簡言之，在供應鏈內，採取”垂直分工”的生產方式將較採用”垂直整合”者有效率。（2）當存在盜用風險時，無論是契約主的夥伴關係決策，或者是締約雙方之相關投資決策，在與社會最適水準相比較後，確實顯示著扭曲現象。此項論點與Verrecchia (1983) 一致，即契約主會考量揭露創新資訊之相關財產成本後，再行決定是否將創新資訊分享給承包商知曉。締約雙方的談判力亦將因存在著資訊盜用風險而發生變化。（3）與Cachon and Fisher (2000) 以及諸多實務倡導者的論點一致，作者強調，資訊分享在協同供應鏈內扮演著相當重要角色，即資訊分享可有效減緩締約雙方的誘因扭曲問題，並且進一步提昇供應鏈之整體績效。此外，作者建議，施政者若能嚴格立法並且貫徹執行以充分保障契約主的創新成果，社會福趾則可因此而增進。（4）相較於沒有自行製造產品之能力，研究結果顯示，契約主具有此項能力時，將會有誘因進行較多的R&D投資。
在論文的第二部份，即論文的第4章，作者將承包商視為一家採取完全分權的組織，並且據以延伸第3章之分析模型。作者發展一個資訊不對稱模型，將契約主之創新活動、承包商的投機行為與轉撥計價制度整合進供應鏈架構之內。作者使用這個模型來檢視各種不同轉撥計價制度對於供應鏈合作的影響效果，並且進一步比較變動成本轉撥計價制度和完全成本轉撥計價制度的優劣。第4章的研究結果為：（1）當締約雙方存在誘因問題時，供應鏈將會發生資訊扭曲、無效率交易和投資不足等現象。這些因為誘因問題所引發的不良後果，在完全成本轉撥計價制度下將更形惡化。換言之，變動成本轉撥計價制度較能減緩供應鏈內各個締約者之誘因問題。（2）除潛在盜用風險，承包商的會計制度和會計方法選擇亦將會影響契約主的外包決策，並進一步影響整個供應鏈之績效。（3）變動成本轉撥計價制度於達成供應鏈合作上將較完全成本轉撥計價制度為佳。
總而言之，本論文建議契約主將會把一些重要的因素，如（1）締約雙方之相對生產效率，（2）創新的內含價值，（3）承包商之盜用可能性，和（4）承包商採行之會計制度等，納入整體決策考量後，再行決定最佳之外包策略。上述結論與交易成本經濟理論之論點一致。
Misappropriation, Transfer Pricing and Supply Chain Coordination
Opportunism on the part of the subcontractor in a contractor-subcontractor relationship is the focus of research in this dissertation. In the first part of the dissertation, chapter 3, we extend Baiman and Rajan (2002b) with an incorporation of contractors’ internal production option and study how contractors’ make/buy decisions are affected by subcontractors’ superior production efficiency and misappropriation. We show that there exist two thresholds in the contractor’s innovation disclosure strategy when incorporating an internal production capability for the contractor. This generalizes the result of Baiman and Rajan (2002b). Specifically, the contractor will organize an efficient coordinated supply chain only when innovations fall between the two thresholds. Our results explain why firms strategically outsource low-end products and produce high-end products themselves in practice. We also explore the implications for contractor-subcontractor relationships when alternative manufacturing sources are introduced into the supply chain. In addition, we incorporate the legal environment and examine the impact of subcontractors’ opportunism on contractors’ make/buy decision in that context. The results are as follows. Our baseline case shows that in the absence of misappropriation, both the contracting parties and society can benefit from organizing a coordinated supply chain and employing an outsourcing strategy. In addition, it is a more efficient way to adopt the production pattern of vertical disintegration for supply chains. Second, the contractor’s choice of relationships and each party’s investment decisions are socially suboptimal when the possibility of misappropriation exists. Third, our results explain the role of information sharing in improving the performance of the supply chain. We show that stricter legislation to protect the contractor’s innovations will increase social welfare. Finally, we show that introducing a capability to produce in-house increases the incentive for the contractor to invest more in R&D activities.
In the second part of the dissertation, we extend the scenario of chapter 3 and consider the subcontractor as a decentralized firm. We propose an asymmetric model to study the role of transfer pricing schemes in coordinated supply chain. We use the model to examine the impact of various transfer pricing schemes on supply chain efficiency. Specifically, we conduct a performance comparison between the variable-cost transfer pricing scheme and the full-cost transfer pricing scheme. The results of chapter 4 indicate that there exist information distortions, inefficient trades and holdup problems in the supply chain when incentive problems exist among the contracting parties. Second, we suggest that in addition to the misappropriation, the subcontractor’s accounting system and accounting choices will affect the contractor’s sourcing decisions, and in turn, influence the supply chain performance. Third, we find that the variable-cost transfer pricing scheme performs better in achieving the supply chain coordination.
Generally speaking, the key message delivered in this dissertation is that contractors will take some crucial factors into account in deciding their own make/buy and sourcing decisions. Such relevant factors include the relative production efficiency of contracting parties, the underlying value of innovation, the possibility of subcontractors’ misappropriation, and subcontractors’ accounting choices.
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