:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
題名:完全互補品之相關議題
作者:陳俊宏 引用關係
作者(外文):Chun-Hung Chen
校院名稱:國立中央大學
系所名稱:產業經濟研究所
指導教授:張明宗
吳大任
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2005
主題關鍵詞:鋅銅雙占民營化系統產品中間財策略性貿易完全互補混合寡占System ProductCopper-Zinc DuopolyPrivatizationMixed OligopolyIntermediate InputStrategic TradePerfect Complements
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:2
本論文包含三篇獨立之文章,其中第一篇文章是「完全互補要素之純粹寡占」,第二篇文章是「完全互補性與公民營混合之寡占」,第三篇文章是「系統中間財與最適最終財出口貿易政策」。各文均以當代專業分工的經濟現象為主軸,針對產品或生產要素之間的完全互補特性,深入分析完全互補品的經濟理論與相關應用。
首先,第一篇文章承襲寡占理論中的經典名著關於「鋅銅雙占」完全互補性的脈絡,進行新式市場結構的擴展與均衡的比較。本研究發現「鋅銅雙占」的均衡價格,與消費者自行向廠商購買互補生產要素時的模型相同,與廠商向完全互補廠商購買生產要素時的模型亦相同。此外,當廠商之間的訂價有先後順序之別的狀況下,其結果均等於聞名的雙層獨占之模型。
其次,第二篇文章探討公民營事業共存且具有完全互補性的市場結構,分析公營與民營事業的訂價策略,並探討公營事業存在的價值。本研究發現民營事業確有先行者的優勢,但倘若法律規範公營事業不能虧損,則民營事業將喪失先行者的優勢。此外,當需求曲線並非十分凸向原點時,公營與民營並存的混和寡占,將優於全面民營化。
最後,第三篇文章旨在探討中間財具有完全互補性的情況下,其最適的貿易政策之方向。本研究發現無論兩國最終財廠商從事Cournot數量競爭、Bertrand價格競爭,或是具猜測變量的數量或價格競爭,本國政府的最適出口政策皆是對最終財的出口採取出口補貼政策。此一結論與Eaton and Grossman (1986) 一文的結論大異其趣。
none
Beato, P., and A. MasColell (1984), “The Marginal Cost Pricing Rule as a Regulation Mechanism in Mixed Markets,” in Marchand, P., P. Pestieau., and H. Tulkens (eds), The Performance of Public Enterprises: Concepts and Measurement. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 81-100.
Bernhofen, D.M., (1997), “Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry,” Review of International Economics, 5, 429-433.
Bos, D., (1991), Privatization: A Theoretic Treatment, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brander, J.A., and B.J. Spencer (1985), “Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.
Chang, M.C., (1996), “Ramsey Pricing in a Hierarchical Structure with an Application to Network Access Pricing,” Journal of Economics-Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 64(3), pp.281-314.
Chang, M. C., C.H. Chen, and D. Wu (2003), “The Oligopoly of Perfect Complementary Components,” Workshop on Knowledge Economy and Electronic Commerce. Program for Promoting University Academic Excellence, Ministry of Education. National Sun Yat-sen University and National Central University Press, 341-352.
Chang, W.W., and J.C. Kim (1989), “Competition in Quality-differentiated Products and Optimal Trade Policy,” Keio Economic Studies, 26, 1-17.
Cournot, A., (1838, 1971), Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, English edition of Researches sur les principes mathematiques de la thacuteeorie des richesses. New York: Kelley.
Cremer, H., M. Marchand, and J.-F. Thisse (1989), “The Public Firm as an Instrument for Regulating an Oligopolistic Market,” Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 283-301.
De Fraja, G., (1993), “Unions and Wages in Public and Private Firms: a Game-Theoretic Analysis,” Oxford Economic Papers, 45, 457-469.
Eaton, J., and G.M. Grossman (1986), “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383-406.
Economides, N., (1989), “Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network Externalities,” American Economic Review, 79, 1165-1181.
Fjell, K., and J. Heywood (2002),“Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms,” Australian Economic Papers, 41, 267-281.
Fjell, K., and J. Heywood (2004), “Mixed Oligopoly, Subsidization and the Order of Firm's Moves: the Relevance of Privatization,” Economics Letters, 83, 411-416.
Ishikawa, J., and B.J. Spencer (1999), “Rent-Shifting Export Subsidies with an Imported Intermediate Product,” Journal of International Economics, 48, 199-232.
Ishikawa, J., and K.D. Lee (1997), “Backfiring Tariffs in Vertically Related Markets,” Journal of International Economics, 42, 395-423.
Katz, M.J., and C. Shapiro (1994), “System Competition and Network Effect,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 93-115.
Laffont, J.J., and J. Tirole (1991), “Privatization and Incentives,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, 84-105.
Lin, S.W., and J.J. Shih (2001), “The Effects of the Bilateral Accounting Rate Policy in International Telecommunications: A Game Theoretical Approach,” Taiwan Economic Association Annual Meeting, Taipei, Taiwan, December 2001.
Matutes, C., and P. Regibeau (1988), “Mix and Match: Product Compatibility without Network Externalities,” Rand Journal of Economics, 19, 221-234.
Matutes, C., and P. Regibeau (1996), “A selective review of the economics of standardization, entry deterrence, technological progress and international competition,” European Journal of Political Economy, 12, pp.183-209.
Myles, K., (2002), “Mixed Oligopoly, Subsidization and the Order of Firm's Moves: an Irrelevance Result for the General Case,” Economics Bulletin, 12, 1-6.
Pal, D., and M. White (1998), “Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization and Strategic Trade Policy,” Southern Economic Journal, 65, 264-282.
Poyago-Theotoky, J., (2001), “Mixed Oligopoly, Subsidization and the Order of Firm's Moves: an Irrelevance Result,” Economics Bulletin, 12, 1-5.
Ramsey, F., (1927), “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation,” Economic Journal, 37, 4-61.
Roland, G., and K. Sekkat (2000), “Managerial Career Concerns, Privatization and Restructuring in Transition Economies,” European Economic Review, 44, 1857-1872.
Sepahvand, M., (2002), “Privatisation in a Regulated Market Open to Foreign Competition,” University of Nottingham. Discussion Paper 02/04.
Shih, J.J., (1997), “The Copper-Zinc Duopoly,” paper presented in Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. Paris, Dec. 1997.
Spencer, B.J., and R.W. Jones (1991), “Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy,” Review of Economic Studies, 58, 153-170.
Spencer, B. J., and R.W. Jones (1992), “Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets,” Journal of International Economics, 32, 31-55.
Tirole, J., (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vickers, J., and G. Yarrow (1988), Privatization: an Economic Analysis, The MIT press, Cambridge, M.A.
White, M., (1996), “Mixed Oligopoly Privatization and Subsidization,” Economics Letters, 53, 189-195.
Yarrow, G., (1994), “Privatization, Restructing, and Regulatory Reform in Electricity Supply,” In Privatization and Economic Performance, edited by M. Bishop, J. Kay, and C. Mayer. New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 62-88.
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE