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題名：經理人過度樂觀程度對公司決策影響之研究
作者：林岳祥
作者(外文)：Yueh-hsiang Lin
校院名稱：臺灣大學
系所名稱：財務金融學研究所
指導教授：胡星陽
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2005
主題關鍵詞：管理者盈餘預測；融資限制；融資決策；投資決策；管理者過度樂觀；Managerial optimism；Investment；Management earnings forecasts；Financing constraints
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本論文在實證上檢視經理人個人的過度樂觀(Optimism)對公司決策的影響。在第一章中我們檢測過度樂觀與投資決策的關連性。我們利用台灣上市上櫃公司經理人個人的財務預測資料，提出一個衡量經理人是否過度樂觀的指標，利用這個指標我們發現當公司面臨融資限制(Financing Constrained)時，過度樂觀的經理人其公司內部資金與投資關聯性比沒有過度樂觀的經理人大。
在第二章中我們檢視過度樂觀與公司融資決策的關連性。Heaton (2002)在Financial management上提出了一個模型，預測過度樂觀的經理人在內部資金不足的時候會先使用舉負融資，然而當內部資金充足的時候卻會先把負債贖回來。因此可以檢測的假說為，過度樂觀的經理人，其舉債程度與內部資金的敏感度會比沒有過度樂觀的經理人大。我們利用類似Shaym-Sunder and Myers (1999)的實證方式，發現在台灣上市、上櫃公司的融資決策符合上述假說，亦即舉債程度與內部資金的敏感度的確受到經理人過度樂觀與否的影響。
In this research we aim to explore the impact of managerial optimism on corporate policies. In the first chapter we examine the relation between managerial optimism and corporate investment decisions. Analyzing a sample of listed companies in Taiwan, we propose a measure of managerial optimism from management earnings forecasts, and find that in more financing constrained firms, optimistic managers exhibit higher investment-cash flow sensitivity than do non-optimistic managers.
In the second chapter we investigate the relation between managerial optimism and corporate financing decisions by empirically testing Heaton’s (2002) model. Heaton’s model gives a prediction that compared to non-optimistic managers, optimistic managers will issue more debt first when internal funds are insufficient and then pay down more debt once internal funds are ample. Therefore, the sensitivities between debt issues and internal funds are larger for optimistic managers than those for non-optimistic managers. Using a specification similar to that of Shaym-Sunder and Myers (1999), we find that in Taiwanese companies, optimistic Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) place more reliance on debt financing than do non-optimistic ones. The findings are consistent with the prediction of Heaton’s model.
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