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題名：內部人股票交易與會計資訊品質關聯性之研究
作者：劉若蘭 引用關係
作者(外文)：Jo-Lan Liu
校院名稱：國立成功大學
系所名稱：會計學系碩博士班
指導教授：王萬成
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2006
主題關鍵詞：內部人股票交易；盈餘時效性；會計資訊評價能力；產業專家會計師事務所；資訊不對稱；機構投資者；盈餘管理；institution investors；earnings timeliness；insider trading；valuation ability of accounting information；earnings management；industry specialist auditor firms；information asymmetry
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本研究旨在探討內部人股票交易與會計資訊品質的關係，主要研究議題包括：(1)內部人股票交易、質押交易與盈餘管理的關係，以及(2)此關係反映在會計盈餘時效上的結果；(3)內部人股票交易對會計資訊評價能力之影響；(4)公司與分析師盈餘預測資訊品質，以及產業專家會計師事務所與機構投資者的監督機制，對內部與外部投資者資訊不對稱之影響。實證結果彙總如下：
(1)董監事本季出售股票交易與上季的裁決性應計數呈正向關係，支持董監事出售股票交易是盈餘管理的一種誘因，但董監事購買股票交易與盈餘管理關係不顯著。董監事出售交易對於調高所得的盈餘管理誘因大於購買行為。因無法取得董監事質押借款金額資料，只能間接驗證在固定借款金額的前提下，董監事質押股票交易與上季的裁決性應計數呈負向關係，支持董監事質押股票交易是盈餘管理的一種訊息發放。實證結果說明了在追求自利的前提下，董監事運用盈餘管理做為出售股票交易與質押交易獲利的手段。
(2)董監事質押股票交易與盈餘管理關係，反映在會計盈餘時效上的結果顯示，在固定借款金額的前提下，董監事質押股票的張數愈少，隱含上季調高所得的盈餘管理愈大，反映出在壞消息下盈餘與股票報酬的關聯性，小於在好消息下盈餘與股票報酬的關聯性，間接支持在借款金額固定的前提下，董監事質押股票交易的公司的上季盈餘對壞消息認列的時效性，低於無質押交易公司。董監事購買(出售)股票交易與盈餘管理關係，反映出董監事購買(出售)股票交易的公司的會計盈餘對壞消息認列的時效性，高於(低於)無股票交易的公司，與預期方向相符，但未達統計顯著性。
(3)會計資訊品質影響內部人股票交易的動機，而內部人也會操弄會計數字使股票交易獲得利益。實證結果發現內部人股票交易與會計資訊評價能力具有內生關係，內部人持股淨增加愈大，會計資訊評價能力愈高；而會計資訊評價能力愈高，內部人持股淨增加愈大，支持內部人股票交易影響會計資訊與股價間的評價關係。
(4)公司與分析師發佈的盈餘預測愈正確，內部與外部投資者資訊不對稱愈低。公司預測更新後，預測更新幅度愈大，內部與外部投資者資訊不對稱愈小。而且預測更新後，向下修正預測更新所能減緩的資訊不對稱，小於向上預測更新所能減緩的資訊不對稱。實證結果支持公開資訊的品質愈好，投資者之間的股票交易報酬差異愈小。然而，產業專家會計師事務所與機構投資者對降低內部與外部投資者資訊不對稱，無顯著成效。為避免研究樣本未包括沒有預測的公司，而影響監督機制對資訊不對稱的影響，另以單一年度全體上市櫃公司為研究對象，實證結果發現產業專家會計師事務所對降低資訊不對稱有顯著成效，支持高審計品質對股票交易公平性的貢獻。
綜述本研究結果，內部人股票交易、質押交易會影響會計資訊品質，而公司或分析師的盈餘預測正確性可以降低內部與外部投資者資訊不對稱，支持提升盈餘預測資訊、內部人股票交易與質押資訊的揭露，可以促進股票交易市場的公平性。
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between insider trading and accounting information quality in the Taiwan capital market. The study contains four research issues: (1) insider trading and earnings management, (2) insider trading and accounting earnings timeliness, (3) insider trading and valuation ability of accounting information, (4) the impact of earnings forecast quality and monitoring mechanisms on the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. The empirical results are summarized below.
First, we find a marginal significant positive relation between insider’s (directors and supervisors) sales of current-quarter and discretionary accruals of last-quarter; however, we do not find a negative relation for the case of insider purchases. Besides, because of the amount for shares collateralized are not available, we use share volumes collateralized to proxy. Our evidence only indirectly infers insiders (directors and supervisors) are prone to engaging earnings management when they intend to collateralize their ownership in the next period. It shows that shares collateralized increased by directors and supervisors of current-quarter are negatively related to discretionary accruals of last-quarter, which implied that lower income-increasing discretionary accrual adjustments of current-quarter is related more shares collateralized in the next quarter for given amount of shares collateralized. Directors and supervisors increasing their collateralized shares is a kind of signal about earnings management.
Second, the relationship between insider trading and earnings management is also reflected in accounting earnings timeliness. The timeliness of bad news reflected in earnings is positively related to the insider increasing collateralized shares. For given amount of shares collateralized, increased number of shares collateralized by directors and supervisors suggests lower earnings manipulations in the last period, Therefore, ceteris paribus, firms with insiders stock collateralized trading do not adopt a conservative approach to recording bad news in earnings. In addition, the timeliness of bad news reflected in earnings is negatively (positively) related to the insider sales (insider purchases) trading, but no statistic significant level was attained.
Third, insiders manipulate accounting numbers to make benefit and accounting information quality influence insider trading incentives. The endogenous relationship between insider trading and the value relevance of accounting information was embeded in the empirical results. When insiders increase their ownership, the value relevance of accounting information is higher, which supports insider trading affect valuation ability of accounting information.
Finally, I examine the influence of earnings forecast quality and monitoring mechanism on the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. I use the stock abnormal return to proxy for information asymmetry and find that accuracy of earnings forecast numbers are negatively associated with profitability of insider trading. It supports the more accurate of earnings forecast numbers announced by companies and analysts, the less of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. When the degree of earnings forecast numbers revised gets higher, the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders will get lower. Besides, the decrease of information asymmetry by earnings forecast numbers revised downward is lower than those revised upward. Our results support improving available public information quality and transparency can promote capital market fairness, but it does not support monitoring mechanisms about institutional ownership and industry specialist audit firm can reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Using all public companies in one year as research samples, the evidence shows industry specialist audit firms can reduce information asymmetry.
The results of this study should provide implications for regulatory policy makers and investors. Improving available public information quality and transparency, insider trading and insider shares collateralized information can promote capital market fairness.
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