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題名:不同通路權力下零售市場的通路選擇與福利分析
作者:曾貝莉 引用關係
作者(外文):Pei-Li Tseng
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:國際經濟所
指導教授:廖俊雄
崔曉倩
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2007
主題關鍵詞:通路權力複式通路自行銷售自我品牌上架費商店差異化產品差異化slotting allowancedirect sellingprivate brandchannel powerstore differentiationproduct differentiationmultiple channels
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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本論文以三人三期不合作賽局探討現實社會,在製造商領導、零售商領導與包含上架費的零售商領導等三種不同的通路權力下,零售市場業者的通路選擇與社會福利分析。三個模型均考慮一個存在兩家製造商與ㄧ家零售商的寡佔產品市場,設定銷售通路產品需求為具有垂直策略替代特性的線性需求,受產品差異化程度與商店差異化程度所影響,然後分析零售市場在不同通路權力下的通路選擇與福利。
第二章探討製造商領導下製造商自行銷售與零售商自我品牌策略的選擇,第一期兩家製造商產品銷售通路除透過零售商銷售其產品,決定是否採取自行銷售的通路,而零售商除銷售製造商的產品外,決定是否生產銷售自我品牌產品;第二期製造商同時決定經銷通路的產品批發價格;第三期為產品間的零售利差(價格)競爭。研究發現採取自行銷售與自我品牌分別為製造商與零售商的強勢策略,此時經銷通路產品利差為最低而零售價格為最高;消費者剩餘與社會福利皆為最高。當產品替代性愈大時,製造商利潤下降;當商店替代性愈大時,零售商利潤下降。
第三章探討零售商領導下製造商自行銷售與零售商自我品牌策略的選擇,第一期兩家製造商產品銷售通路除透過零售商銷售其產品外,決定是否同時採取自行銷售的通路,而零售商除銷售製造商的產品外,決定是否同時生產銷售自我品牌產品;第二期為產品間的零售利差(價格)競爭;第三期製造商同時決定經銷通路的產品批發價格。研究發現採取自行銷售與自我品牌分別仍為製造商與零售商的強勢策略。當產品替代性愈大時,製造商利潤下降;當商店替代性愈大時,零售商利潤下降。
第四章探討零售商領導(含有上架費)與製造商領導下經銷通路、製造商自行銷售與零售商自我品牌複式通路之福利分析。研究發現在零售商領導下,當產品替代性愈大時,製造商/零售商利潤均下降,消費者剩餘與社會福利上升;當商店替代性愈大時,製造商/零售商利潤均下降,消費者剩餘與社會福利上升;最後,包含上架費的零售商領導下的社會福利最大,零售價格最低;而製造領導下的社會福利最小,零售價格最高;而擁有通路權力的通路成員利潤較高。
A three-stage three-person non-cooperative game is designed in the thesis to model two manufacturers’ and one common retailer’s channel arrangement for product distribution. Goods are assumed to have linear demands with vertical strategic substitutability which consider the effects of both product differentiation and store differentiation. Then we analyze the channel selection and welfare in the retail market under the three channel power, Manufacturer-Stackelberg, Retailer-Stackelberg, and Retailer-Stackelberg with slotting allowance.
Chapter 2 studies the strategic selection of manufacturers’ direct selling and retailer’s private brand in retail market under Manufacturer-Stackelberg. Two manufacturers, besides dealing channel, decide whether to sell directly, and one retailer decides whether to adopt a private brand. Then manufacturers set their wholesale prices for dealing channel’s goods. In the last stage, all manufacturers/retailer compete in price margins. Our results show that direct selling and private brand are dominant strategies for manufacturers and retailer, respectively. Both consumer surplus and social welfare are the highest in equilibrium. Good in dealing channel has the lowest margin and the highest retail price among all sales channels. When products are less differentiated, manufacturers’ profits are lower. When stores are less differentiated, retailer’s profits are lower.
Chapter 3 studies the strategic selection of manufacturers’ direct selling and retailer’s private brand in retail market under Retailer-Stackelberg. In the first stage, each manufacturer, besides selling its product the retailer (the dealing channel), has to decide whether to sell it through a direct selling channel. The retailer, besides selling manufacturers’ products, has to decide whether to also sell its private brand product through a private brand channel. Each manufacturer and the retailer then have to determine their retail margins of all channels’ products; finally, the two manufacturers compete on wholesale price for the dealing channel’s product. Results show direct selling and private brand are dominant strategies for manufacturers and the retailer, respectively. Consumer surplus and social welfare are highest in the equilibrium because diversification of products and stores increases consumers’ willingness to pay.
Chapter 4 compares the welfare of Retailer-Stackelberg (RS) with slotting allowance with manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) under the multiple channels of dealing, direct selling and private brand. Our results show that under RS, manufacturer/retailer’s profit decrease and consumer/social welfare increase with product substitutability or store substitutability. Finally,
retail price is the lowest and consumer/social welfare are the highest under RS with slotting allowance. Retail price is the highest and consumer/social welfare are the lowest under MS. The member’s profit is higher with channel power than without it.
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