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題名：員工股票獎酬之研究
作者：林靜香 引用關係
作者(外文)：Ching-Hsiang Lin
校院名稱：國立成功大學
系所名稱：會計學系碩博士班
指導教授：王萬成
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2007
主題關鍵詞：價值攸關性；稀釋效果；員工認股選擇權；員工獎酬；employee stock option；employee stock bonus；value-relevance；dilution effect
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本文主要探討我國員工股票獎酬會計處理相關規範下，股票獎酬的價值攸關性和公司治理機制對監督績效與股票獎酬關係的替代性。第一個研究議題係探討員工股票紅利列為盈餘分配下其價值攸關性。員工股票紅利結合員工與股東的利益一致，具有激勵效果；另一方面股票紅利移轉原股東權益請求權與員工，具有稀釋效果。我們在實證模式中同時考慮股票紅利的激勵效果與稀釋效果，探討影響股票紅利激勵效果的因素；在分離股票紅利的激勵效果後，測試投資者是否瞭解股票紅利的本質為公司的費用。實證結果發現：1.當公司潛在代理成本愈大、人力資源重要性愈高，員工股票紅利可發揮較大的激勵效果；2.在分離員工股票紅利相關利益後，投資者視股票紅利為公司的費用；3.員工股票紅利與權益價值間負向的關聯性大於公司一般薪資費用與權益價值間負向的關聯性，意味股票紅利費用的稀釋效果大於一般薪資費用。
在員工紅利列為盈餘分配下，證期局為提升資訊透明度，強制公司需揭露董事會擬議的員工分紅相關資訊。第二個研究議題係探討強制員工獎酬資訊揭露，對公司治理機制中的股權結構、會計資訊在獎酬與績效關聯性監督角色的影響。預期在強制員工獎酬資訊揭露前，會計資訊治理功能不彰，股權結構扮演績效與獎酬間關聯性重要監督的角色；強制員工獎酬資訊揭露後，提升會計資訊治理的功能，此時股權結構監督績效與獎酬間關聯性的重要程度降低。實證結果發現：1.強制員工獎酬資訊揭露前，大股東持股對績效與獎酬間關連性存在顯著正向的影響；強制員工獎酬資訊揭露後，大股東持股監督績效與獎酬間關聯性重要程度降低。2.強制員工獎酬資訊揭露前，外資機構持股對績效與獎酬間關連性扮演重要監督的角色；強制員工獎酬資訊揭露後，外資機構持股監督績效與獎酬間關聯性的重要程度降低。3. 強制員工分紅資訊揭露前，管理者持股對獎酬政策的影響支持利益掠奪假說，即管理者持股對績效與獎酬間關聯性存在負向影響；但強制獎酬資訊揭露無法顯著改善管理者持股對績效與獎酬間負向的影響。進一步研究發現除了管理者持股若公司同時存在大股東持股或外資機構持股，大股東或外資投資機構較有能力與動機監督管理者自利的行為，強制員工分紅資訊揭露使大股東或外資投資機構更容易觀察管理者獎酬決策的制定，加強資訊揭露在降低管理者持股對績效與獎酬間關聯性負向影響的治理功能。
目前我國對員工認股選擇會計處理係採附註揭露的方式，本文第三個研究議題係探討員工認股選擇權附註揭露資訊價值攸關性。實證結果發現：1.員工認股選擇權的利益並未完全反映於公司帳面價值和淨利中；2.員工認股選擇權公平價值與名目股價間存在正向的關係，在模式中未分離認股選擇權相關的利益和控制內生性偏差，會使的結果產生偏誤；3.應用一般選擇權評價模式所計算的員工認股選擇權公平價值具有價值攸關性；4.認股選擇權附註揭露資訊具有價值攸關性，投資者視員工認股選擇權為公司費用；5.權益獎酬與股價間負向的關係大於現金薪資與股價間負向的關係，意味權益獎酬的稀釋效果大於現金薪酬。6.對於公司所附註揭露的認股選擇權費用不具價值攸關性，主要原因為將選擇權認列為費用已是國際會計處理趨勢，管理者認知到日後需將員工認股選擇權認列為公司費用時，會從事擬制盈餘的管理，影響附註揭露認股選擇權費用的價值攸關性。
ESB (Employee stock bonus) is a cost incurred for generating profits and should accordingly be expensed. However, despite diluting earnings per share, ESB also exerts positive incentive effect on equity value. Hence, ESB is treated as earnings allocation under the accounting regulations of Taiwan. This paper investigates the value relevance of equity-based compensation and the impact of corporate governance on the performance-compensation relationship. Three major issues are examined. First, we take into account ESB-related benefits such as agency cost and human capital and study whether ESB has the same value relevance as general salary. Our empirical results show that ESB, when viewed as a compensation expense by investors, has a significantly stronger negative relation with equity value than general salary does. The higher the agency cost or the more important the human capital, the more ESB exerts its incentive effect on the equity value.
The second issue discusses how mandated compensation disclosure impacts corporate governance. Our empirical results show that 1) before mandated compensation disclosure, major stockholders play an important role in monitoring performance-contingent compensations. Mandated compensation disclosure decreases major stockholders’ importance in monitoring performance-contingent rewards. 2) Mandated compensation disclosure decreases foreign investing institutions’ importance in monitoring performance-contingent rewards. 3) Before mandated compensation disclosure, managerial stock ownership supports the entrenchment hypothesis. That is, managerial stock ownership has negative impact on the performance-compensation relationship. However, mandated information disclosure does not improve the negative impact of managerial stock ownership on the performance-compensation relationship. Further investigation shows that compared with regular shareholders, major stockholders and foreign investing institutions are more capable and motivated in monitoring managers’ self-interest behaviors. Mandated compensation disclosure facilitates the job of monitoring managers’ decision making of incentive policy. Information disclosure thus contributes to the improvement of corporate governance.
The third issue investigates the relation between share price and expense of ESO (employee stock option, which is disclosed but not recognized in net income). The intrinsic value method is currently adopted for the accounting treatment of ESO in Taiwan. Firms are required to disclose the pro forma effects on earnings of employee compensation expense attributable to amortizing the fair value of ESO at the grant date. Our empirical results find that 1) the positive incentive effects of ESO are not fully reflected in net income or equity book value; 2) the Black-Scholes formula appropriately calculates the fair value of ESO; 3) equity market value is significantly negatively related to the fair value of ESO granted during the year. Investors, though viewing ESO as expense, deem that corporate executives would manage pro forma earnings. This explains why an insignificant relation exists between ESO expense and stock price.
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