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題名：訊息不對稱在併購中所扮演之角色：雙重道德危機下之盈利能力支付計劃契約、併購價格與訊息不對稱
作者：薛舜仁 引用關係
作者(外文)：Shun-Jen Hsueh
校院名稱：國立成功大學
系所名稱：企業管理學系碩博士班
指導教授：康信鴻
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2008
主題關鍵詞：承諾；最適期望併購價格；道德危機；逆選擇；併購；雙重道德危機；盈利能力的支付計劃；adverse selection；mergers and acquisitions (M&A)；commitment；moral hazard；double-sided moral hazard model；earnout；the optimal expected takeover price
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在併購理論與實務中，被併公司所釋放出來的相關資訊是否充足，市場眾多主併者對被併公司之反應與評價，甚或主併公司與被併公司在併購後之互動模式等因素，所有之併購案相關資訊均在在的影響併購價格之訂定。其中，我們認為主併與被併公司間之訊息不對稱會造成對併購價格之訂定，產生較大之扭曲，故對於訊息不對稱於併購中所扮演之角色及影響，我們認為下列兩個議題是相當重要且值得來探討：首先為雙重道德危機下之盈利能力的支付計劃(earnout)契約，其次是併購價格與資訊不對稱。
為減少在收購中之資訊不對稱，且使相關之雙方均能貢獻其力以提高收購利益，本文運用基於盈利能力的支付計劃下之雙重道德危機模型，來探討主併與被併公司之努力程度與收購利益分配之關係。我們得到之結論為，若對於被併公司有較高之資訊不對稱時，為使激勵雙方均付出努力，進而達成收購之目標，主併公司將會讓出較多之收購後利益，且因此會對此收購付出較少之建議努力。此外，本文亦於最適情況下做比較靜態分析，說明其他重要變數對建議之努力與利潤分配兩變數之相關性；並討論當主併公司有財務限制下之最適併購契約。
此外，於併購過程中，主併公司與被併公司之間資訊之不對稱常造成併購後主併公司之嚴重損失，也有因此而使併購案不能成局。本文主要在探討於併購中，主併及被併公司間存在逆選擇問題及道德危機，且上述問題先後發生時之最適期望併購價格。我們發現為滿足資訊租與效率之抵換關係，主併公司為過濾出較佳之被併公司，且使其能自發性的為併購之綜效而努力，對於有效率之被併公司應提出較完全訊息下為優之期望併購價格；相對的，對於無效率之被併公司則應提出較完全訊息下為劣之期望併購價格。接著，本文從滿足被併公司期望的角度，來求取使其履行併購契約承諾之最適期望併購價格。最後，本文亦探討在無效率被併公司退出市場之狀況下，與利用併購利潤分配作為併購價格這兩種情況，對併購契約會產生何種衝擊。
In the theory and practice of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), a wide variety of information, such as whether the details released by the target are accurate, the evaluations of the target undertaken by other interested companies, and the possible interaction patterns between the two companies after M&A, will all influence the price offered for the target. Particularly, we investigate how the information asymmetry between the acquiring and acquired companies will result in greater distortions in the takeover price. We will examine two aspects of this issue, earnout contracts with double-sided moral hazard, and, takeover price versus information asymmetry.
To eliminate the information asymmetry in acquisitions and enable the two related parties exert their best effort to raise acquisition profits, the paper employs the double-sided moral hazard model of earnout to explore the relationships between the effort expended in trying to meet post-acquisition goals and the distribution of acquisition gains for both the acquiring and target companies. We conclude that if the degree of information asymmetry about the acquired company is higher, in order to motivate both parties to accomplish the acquisition, the acquiring company will surrender a greater profit share of the integrated company and make less effort to offer good advice. In addition, we conduct a comparative static analysis around the optimal solution to illustrate the dependence of advisory efforts and profit share on other relevant parameters, and discuss the optimal contract when the acquiring company is operating within financial constraints.
In addition, information asymmetry during the process of takeover often leads to dramatic losses for the acquiring company in the post-integration period, or causes the takeover to fail before signing the official takeover contract. The paper explores the optimal expected takeover price offered by the acquiring company under the conditions of both moral hazard and adverse selection. We find that to resolve the information asymmetry between acquiring and acquired companies and satisfy the trade-off between information rent extraction and efficiency, the takeover contract should offer a higher expected takeover price to an efficient target than for one under the condition of complete information. Conversely, with an inefficient target, the contract should offer a lower expected takeover price. Next, to fulfill the least utility of the efficient target, the paper figures out the optimal expected takeover price which encourages the target to go through with the takeover commitment signed on the Letter of Intent. Finally, we also investigate the impacts of the shutdown condition of the inefficient target and of takeover transfers by means of profit sharing in the takeover contract.
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