臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：策略性貿易政策
作者：彭正浩 引用關係
作者(外文)：Cheng-Hau Peng
校院名稱：國立臺灣大學
系所名稱：經濟學研究所
指導教授：黃鴻
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2008
主題關鍵詞：策略性貿易；反傾銷；價格具結；外人直接投資；關稅配額均等；垂直相關市場；有效保護率；Strategic Trade Policy；Antidumping；Price Undertaking；Foreign Direct Investment；Tariffs and Quotas Equivalence；Vertically Related Markets；Effective Rate of Protection
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:310
本論文利用策略性貿易模型探討政府政策對於廠商行為及市場均衡的影響。本文討論的議題包括：反傾銷政策對於外國廠商的最適設廠區位有何影響、存在上游廠商時關稅與其等量配額是否能得到相同的市場均衡價格以及當FDI可能發生時有效保護率該如何修正。
在第二章中，我們利用一個兩國兩廠商的空間競爭模型，討論當本國政府實施反傾銷政策時，是否會影響外國廠商直接投資（FDI）之決策。本章與過去文獻不同之處在於我們將外國廠商的區位選擇內生化；亦即，透過外國廠商的最適區位選擇來探討其FDI的決策。本章得到以下結論：（1）在自由貿易下外國廠商的最適區位為在外國設廠（角解）；而在本國政府實施反傾銷政策下，外國廠商之最適設廠區位會改變至兩國間（內解），亦即發生FDI。（2）兩國間之國界為影響外國廠商進行FDI的重要因素。當國界愈靠近外國時，外國廠商進行FDI的可能性愈高。（3）當外國廠商愈具有成本優勢時其進行FDI之可能性亦愈高，此一結論符合Blonigen (2002)的實證結果。
在第三章中，我們採用三國模型來探討當上游廠商存在時「關稅配額均等」是否成立。我們考慮了上游廠商的三種不同訂價策略，分別為：兩部訂價、差別訂價及單一訂價。本章發現：（1）當上游廠商採兩部訂價時，政府實施關稅下之最終財市場價格高於等量配額下（將該關稅下之進口量訂為進口配額）之價格。若上游廠商採差別訂價或單一訂價，則此結論相反。換言之，當上游廠商存在時，即使下游廠商進行數量競爭，「關稅配額均等」亦不成立。（2）假設配額租等於稅收時，若上游廠商採兩部訂價，政府實施關稅之社會福利低於等量配額下之社會福利。若上游廠商採兩部訂價或單一訂價則得到相反之結果。（3）本國社會福利在上游廠商採差別訂價或單一訂價下較高，則須視本國市場需求的大小而定。
第四章利用Anderson (1998) 對有效保護率的定義來討論FDI對於有效保護率的影響。本章得到以下的結論：（1）當FDI可能發生時，有效保護率的衡量不應只考慮本國政府對上下游商品所課徵之進口關稅。（2）外國廠商的設廠成本亦應該納入考量，該成本愈高則本國可訂定之有效保護率亦愈高。若外國廠商之設廠成本為零，則本國政府不可能對於本國廠商訂出正的有效保護率。此外，在本章之模型架構下，我們可將Anderson (1998) 之有效保護率公式轉換為 Corden之公式。換言之，本章之結論在 Corden (1966)之有效保護率公式下亦成立。
第五章總結本論文並提供往後研究的延伸議題。
This dissertation, applying these most commonly used strategic trade models, explores issues on antidumping policy, foreign direct investment (FDI), tariffs and quotas equivalence and the effective rate of protection (ERP).
In Chapter 2, we employ a spatial competition model with one foreign firm competing with one domestic firm in the domestic market to examine how a domestic antidumping law affects the FDI-jumping decision of the foreign firm. It goes beyond previous studies by treating the FDI decision (i.e., the location of the foreign firm) as an endogenous and continuous variable which allows us to examine thoroughly the location pattern of the foreign firm. In this chapter, our major findings are: (i) The optimal location of the foreign firm is of corner solution under free trade, but it has an interior solution when it is subject to an antidumping law. (ii) The border of the nations is crucial to the FDI decision. FDI is more likely to take place if the border of the nations is closer to the foreign country. (iii) If the foreign firm has a cost advantage over the domestic firm, it is more likely for the foreign firm to engage in FDI which supports the empirical finding of Blonigen (2002).
In Chapter 3, we add an upstream firm to the Cournot model a la Hwang and Mai (1988) and examine the issue of tariffs and quotas equivalence under three different pricing strategies adopted by the upstream firm which include two-part tariff, discriminating pricing and uniform pricing. We find that the market price for the final good under a tariff is higher (lower) than that under the equivalent quota (i.e., the quota is set at the level of import under the tariff), if the upstream firm adopts two-part tariff pricing (discriminating pricing or uniform pricing). This result is in sharp contrast to the finding of Hwang and Mai (1988). We also compare the social welfare under free trade and that under the equivalent quota (i.e., the quota is set at the level of import under free trade). Surprisingly, the social welfare under free trade is necessarily lower than that under the equivalent quota. In addition to the case of two-part tariffs, we also study the cases in which the upstream firm adopts either discriminatory or uniform pricing.
Chapter 4 utilizes the ERP definition a la Anderson (1998) to highlight the impacts of FDI on ERP. Our major findings are as follows: First, when FDI is taken into account, the measurement of the ERP can not be determined solely by tariff rates on the final product and the intermediate good in the model. Second, FDI greenfield costs also play an important role in measuring the ERP. Moreover, it is impossible to have a positive ERP if the greenfield cost is zero. Finally, in this model, the impact of the FDI on ERP à la Anderson can also be applied to that of Corden.
Chpater 5 concludes the dissertation and provides some extensions from this research.
References
Anderson, J. and S. Naya, 1969, “Substitution and Two Concepts of Effective Rate of Protection,” The American Economic Review 59, 607-612.
Anderson, J., 1998, “Effective Protection Redux,” Journal of International Economics 44, 21-44.
Barrell, R. and N. Pain, 1999, “Trade Restraints and Japanese Direct Investment Flows,” European Economic Review 43, 29-45.
Belderbos, R., H. Vandenbussche and R. Veugelers, 2004, “Antidumping Duties, Undertakings, and Foreign Direct Investment in the EU,” European Economic Review 48, 429-453.
Belderbos, R., 1997, “Antidumping and Tariff-Jumping: Japan Firms’ FDI in the European Union and United States,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 133, 419-457.
Bernhofen, D. M., 1997, “Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically-related Industry,” Review of International Economics 5, 429–433.
Bhagwati, J. N., 1965, “On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas,” in Richard E. Baldwin (ed.), Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments—Essays in Honor of G. Haberler, Chicago: Rand McNally.

———, 1968, “More on the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas,” American Economic Review 58, 142–146.
Bhagwati, J., Ramaswami, V. and Srinivasan T., 1969, “Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy: Some Further Results,” Journal of Political Economy 77, 1005–1010.
Blonigen, B. A., 2002, “Tariff-Jumping Antidumping Duties,” Journal of International Economics 57, 31-49.
———, 2005, “A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants,” Atlantic Economic Journal 33, 383-403.
Blonigen B. A. and S. E. Haynes, 2002, “Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates,” American Economic Review 92, 1044-1061.
Brander, J. A., 1981, “Intra-industry Trade in Identical Commodities,” Journal of International Economics 11, 1-14.
Brander, J.A. and P. Krugman, 1983, “A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International Trade,” Journal of International Economics 15, 313-323.
Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer, 1985, “Export Subsidies and International Share Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics 18, 83–100.
Brander, J. A., 1995, “Strategic Trade Policy,” Working Paper.
Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klmeperer, 1985, “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements,” Journal of Political Economy 93, 488-511.
Chen, H. Y. and H. Hwang, 2006, “Tariffs versus Quotas under Market Price Uncertainty,” Review of World Economics 142, 1–14.
Chiou, J. R., H. Hwang and Y. S. Lin, 2005, “On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under a Revenue Constraint,” Review of Development Economics 9, 343–358.
Corden, W. M., 1966, “The Structure of a Tariff System and the Effective Protection Rate,” Journal of Political Economy 74, 221–237.
———, 1969, “Effective Protection Rates in the General Equilibrium Model: A Geometric Note,” Oxford Economic Papers 21, 135-141.
———, 1971, “The Substitution Problem in the Theory of Effective Protection,” Journal of International Economics 1, 37-58.new window
———, 1985, Protection, Growth and Trade: Essays in International Economics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Dixit, A. K., 1979, “A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers,” Bell Journal of Economics 10, 20–32.
———, 1984, “International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries,” Economic Journal 94, 1–16.
Dixit, A. K. and G. M. Grossman, 1986, “Targeted Export Promotion with Several Oligopolistic Industries,” Journal of International Economics 21, 233-250.
Eaton, J. and G. M. Grossman, 1986, “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 383–406.
Either, W., 1972, “Input Substitution and the Concept of the Effective Rate of Protection,” Journal of Political Economy 80, 34-47.
Feng, Z. and J. Dong, 2006, “The Effect of Antidumping Measures on the FDI: A Pre-marketing Behavior Aspect Analysis in China,” Working Paper.
Finger, J. M., 1969, “Substitution and the Effective Rate of Protection,” Journal of Political Economy 77, 972-975.
Fung, K.C., 1989, “Tariffs, Quotas and International Oligopoly,” Oxford Economic Papers 41, 749-757.
Gao, X. and K. Miyagiwa, 2005, “Antidumping Production and R&D Competition,” Canadian Journal of Economics 38, 211-227.
Greenaway, D. and G. Reed, 1994, “By-products and Effective Protection,” Journal of Economic Studies 21, 31-36.
Gross, J. and W. Holahan, 2003, “Credible Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets,” International Economic Review 44, 299-312.

Heitger, B. and J. Stehn, 1990, “Japan Direct Investment in the EC --- Response to the Internal Market?” Journal of Common Market Studies 26, 1-15
Horstmann, I. J. and J. R. Markusen, 1986, “Up the average cost curve: Inefficient Entry and the New Protectionism,” Journal of International Economics 20, 109-130.
Hwang, H., 1984, “Intra-industry Trade and Oligopoly: A Conjectural Variations Approach,” Canadian Journal of Economics 17, 126-137.
Hwang H. and C. Mai, 1990, “Effects of Spatial Price Discrimination on Output, Welfare, and Location,” American Economic Review 80, 567-575.
———, 1998, “On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under Duopoly: a Conjectural Variations Approach,” Journal of International Economics 24, 373–380.
———, 2002, “The Tariff-Jumping Argument and Location Theory,” Review of International Economics 10, 361-371.
Hwang, H., Y. S. Lin and Y. P. Yang, 2007, “Optimal Trade Policies and Production Technology in Vertically Related Markets,” Review of International Economics 15, 823–835.
Irwin, D., 1996, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ishikawa, J. and B. J. Spencer, 1999, “Rent-shifting Export Subsidies with an Imported Intermediate Product,” Journal of International Economics 48, 199–232.
Itagaki, T., 1983, “Multinational Firms and the Theory of Effective Protection,” Oxford Economic Papers 35, 447-462.
Itoh, M. and Y. Ono, 1982, “Tariffs, Quotas and Market Structure,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 97, 295–305.
———, 1984, “Tariffs vs. Quotas under Duopoly of Heterogeneous Goods,” Journal of International Economics 17, 359–373.
Johnson, H. G., 1966, “A Model of Protection and the Exchange Rate,” The Review of Economic Studies 33, 159-163.
———, 1969, “The Theory of Effective Protection and Preference,” Economica 36, 119-138.
Leith, J. C., 1968, “Substitution and Supply Elasticity in Calculating the Effective Protection Rate,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 82, 588-601.
Levinsohn, J. A., 1989, “Strategic Trade Policy when Firms Can Invest Abroad: When Are Tariffs and Quotas Equivalent?” Journal of International Economics 27, 129–46.


Liang, W., H. Hwang and C. Mai, 2006, “Spatial Discrimination: Bertrand vs. Cournot with Asymmetric Demands,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 36, 790-802.
Matschke, X., 2003, “Tariff and Quota Equivalence in the Presence of Asymmetric Information,” Journal of International Economics 61, 209–223.
McCulloch, R., 1973, “When are a Tariff and a Quota Equivalent,” Canadian Journal of Economics 6, 503-511.
Milner, C., 1992, “Second Best Rates of Effective Protection with Imperfect Substitution,” Journal of Economic Studies 19, 3-13.
Motta, M., 1992, “Multinational Firms and the Tariff Jumping Argument: A Game Theoretical Analysis with Some Unconventional Conclusions,” European Economic Review 36, 1557-1571.
Pauwels, W., H. Vandenbussche and M. Weverbergh, 2001, “Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Duties,” International Journal of the Economics of Business 8, 75-99.
Prusa, T., 2001, “On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping,” Canadian Journal of Economics 34, 591-611.
Ray, E. J., 1976, “Imperfect Competition and the Resource Allocative Effects of Effective Protection,” Review of Economic Studies 43, 363-368.
Reitzes, J., 1993, “Antidumping Policy,” International Economic Review 34, 745-763.
Ricardo, D., 1817, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in the Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, ed. P. Sraffa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951.
Selten, R., 1965, “Spieltheoretische Behandlung Eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetragheit,” Zeitschrift Fur die Gesant Staatwissenschaft 121, 301-324, (translated), 1975, “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games,” International Journal of Game Theory 4, 25-55.
Sendo, Y., 1974, “The Theory of Effective Protection in General Equilibrium,” Journal of International Economics 4, 213-215.
Sharpiro, C., 1989, “Theories of Oligopoly Behavior,” in: Schmalensee, R., and R. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 329-410.
Shibata, H., 1968, “A Note on the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas,” American Economic Review 58, 17–42.
Skaksen, M. R., 2005, “Should Governments Subsidize Inward Foreign Direct Investment?” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107, 123–140.

Spencer, B. J. and R.W. Jones, 1991, “Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy,” Review of Economic Studies 58, 153–170.
———, 1992, “Trade and Protection in Vertically-related Markets,” Journal of International Economics 32: 31–55.
Tirole, J., 1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
Vandenbussche H. and X. Wauthy, 2001, “Inflicting Injury Through Product Quality: How EU Antidumping Policy Disadvantages European Producers,” European Journal of Political Economy 17, 101-116.
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：683（臺灣：647，外國：36） ／ 本年度總使用人次：2541260 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：68349082
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上