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題名：投資無效率與管理者情緒
作者：蕭小芬
作者(外文)：Hsiao-Fen Hsiao
校院名稱：雲林科技大學
系所名稱：管理研究所博士班
指導教授：胥愛琦
李春安
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2008
主題關鍵詞：投資不足；盈餘操弄；樂觀管理者；悲觀管理者；過度投資；Managerial pessimism；Overinvestment；Underinvestment；Earnings manipulation；Managerial optimism
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本文探討管理者情緒(樂觀、悲觀)對公司投資決策是否引起無效率的現象，公司管理者以公司價值極大下，依據投資案品質可得最適投資水準，然而本文檢測管理者投資決策是否受到管理者情緒影響，而有過度投資或投資不足現象。實證結果表示樂觀管理者會有過度投資現象，且在好的投資案下過度投資現象較為嚴重；悲觀管理者會有投資不足現象，且在差的投資案下投資不足現象較為嚴重。換言之，管理者情緒會造成無效率投資問題。
本研究更進一步探討，公司之投資績效除了可能改變公司型態外，是否影響公司再次投資案之投資水準，並且考慮管理者情緒影響下，是否造成無效率投資現象。實證結果顯示，管理者在樂觀情緒下，不同型態公司均有過度投資現象，且投資績效為正的公司過度投資現象比投資績效為負的公司嚴重；不同型態公司之悲觀管理者均有投資不足現象，且投資績效為負的公司投資不足現象比投資績效為正的公司嚴重。
In this study, we examine the relationship between managerial sentiment and the extent of firms'' inefficient (under/over) investment. Following Morgado and Pindado''s (2003) definition of firms'' optimal investment level, we use a sample of Taiwanese firms and control for variables such as managerial sentiment (optimism or pessimism) and managerial manipulation. The empirical result shows that an optimal level of investment that maximizes firm’s value do exists, and it depends upon the quality of the investment opportunities. We also find that when facing invaluable and non-invaluable investment opportunities, managerial sentiment is an important factor that will cause manager’s overinvestment and underinvestment behavior.
In addition to the above examination, we further investigate whether firm’s value and level of re-investment will be affected by firm’s investment performance. Does managerial sentiment cause corporate investment inefficiencies? The empirical results suggest that optimistic managers will over-invest in all cause, and they over-invest more for better performance firms. On the other hand, pessimistic managers will under-invest in all cause, and the situation is more obvious for poor performance firms.
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