垂直差異模型於行銷通路議題之應用__臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

:::

詳目顯示

第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆

/1頁

論文基本資料
摘要
外文摘要
參考文獻

題名：	垂直差異模型於行銷通路議題之應用
作者：	曾博泰
作者(外文)：	Bo-Tai Tzeng
校院名稱：	國立東華大學
系所名稱：	經濟學系
指導教授：	李娓瑋
學位類別：	博士
出版日期：	2010
主題關鍵詞：	通路權力；兩部訂價；通路選擇；垂直差異模型；整合；分權；通路結構；納許議價；channel structure；Nash bargaining；integration；vertical differentiation；channel choice；two-part tariff；channel power；decentralization
原始連結：	連回原系統網址
相關次數：	被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0) 排除自我引用:0 共同引用:0 點閱:0

本研究將垂直差異模型應用在行銷通路相關議題。論文內容由三部分所組成，第一部分為「獨占製造商在兩層垂直差異下的通路選擇」，第二部分為「通路權力與通路結構於垂直差異模型的應用」，第三部分為「整合/分權通路結構下，廠商內生化品質的最適選擇」。
在論文的第一部分：假設上游的獨占製造商同時生產高、低兩種品質的產品，並以變動成本的方式生產。下游的兩家零售商則分別提供高、低品質的服務，並以固定成本的方式銷售。在製造商具通路領導且採用兩部訂價的假設下，上游製造商先選擇批發價，再由兩家下游零售商同時選擇零售價格。本文的主要目的在於探討獨占製造商生產出來的(品質)差異性產品，透過何種(服務)差異性的經銷通路才能獲取最大利潤。
比較了五種不同的通路結構後，發現服務成本的高低是影響通路選擇的最重要因素。若高服務水準小於等於0.21，製造商的最佳通路是選擇將高、低品質產品都經由高服務零售商銷售(通路4)。若低服務水準介於0.25到0.5之間，製造商的最佳通路則會是將高、低品質產品都經由低服務零售商銷售(通路5)。
在論文的第二部分：探討不同的通路權力與通路結構，如何影響上、下游廠商於高、低品質市場上的選擇行為。通路權力分成納許議價(NB)、製造商領導 (MS)、零售商領導 (RS)以及垂直納許 (VN)等四種型態。通路結構則分成共同經銷 (2M1R)與獨家經銷 (2M2R) 兩種制度。
假設製造商與零售商均無需負擔生產成本。發現在「相同通路結構」但「不同的通路權力」下，製造商利潤與零售商利潤的排序並不確定，需視產品替代性的高低而有所不同。在「相同通路權力」但「不同的通路結構」下，零售商偏愛共同經銷的配銷方式，而製造商偏愛獨家經銷的配銷方式。
在論文的第三部分：於 2M1R 通路型態下，兩製造商分別生產低、高品質產品，並透過單一零售商將產品銷售給消費者。製造商與零售商之間可以是整合或是分權關係，形成了II，ID，DI，DD四種通路結構。
假設廠商可以內生選擇品質與價格，並設定冪次效用函數代表消費者偏好。隨著冪次 n 增加時，低、高品質以及品質差均會降低。低、高品質產品價格，高品質產品需求量與總需求量，兩製造商的利潤和，消費者剩餘、生產者剩餘以及社會福利均會提高。
當廠商從整合轉向分權結構時，高品質以及其產品價格因分權而提高。低品質以及其產品價格，低、高品質產品需求量，低、高品質製造商利潤，消費者剩餘、生產者剩餘以及社會福利均會因分權而降低。若是初始為II通路結構，兩廠商均不會有誘因偏離整合。

以文找文

This study applies vertical differentiation model to the issue of marketing channel.The dissertation is composed of three parts, part 1 as ``Channel Choice of Monopoly Manufacturer in a Two-tier Vertically Differentiated Market", part 2 as ``An Application of Vertical Differentiation Model on Channel Power and Channel Structure", and part 3 as ``Firms' Optimal Quality Choices under Integration/ Decentralization Structure".
In the first part of dissertation, assume that up-stream monopoly manufacturer produces both high and low-quality goods, and down-stream two retailers provide high and low-level service respectively. Under the assumptions of manufacturer leadership and two-part tariff, the manufacturer decides wholesale price in the first stage, then the two retailers decide their retail price simultaneously. The goal of this study is to evaluate what kind of service-differentiated channel can maximize the quality-differentiated manufacturer's profit.
Comparing five different channel structures, the study finds that service cost is the most important factor to influence channel choice. If high-level service is not more than 0.21, the optimal channel for manufacturer is to sell both goods through high-service retailer. If low-level service is between 0.25 and 0.5, to sell both goods through low-service retailer would be the optimal channel.
In the second part, it discusses how different channel power and channel structure affect the optimal behavior of both up- and down-stream firms in high and low-quality goods market. Channel power is classified into four types, including Nash Bargaining (NB), Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), Retailer Stackelberg (RS), and Vertical Nash (VN), while channel structure includes two types as common dealer (2M1R) and exclusive dealer (2M2R).
Under the assumption that neither manufacturers nor retailers afford production cost, we find that in the condition of the same structure yet different power, the order of profits is not deterministic, which depends on substitutability of goods. In the condition of the same power but different structure, retailers prefer the distribution of common dealer while manufacturers prefer exclusive dealer.
In the third part of dissertation, under the channel pattern of 2M1R, two manufacturers produce low and high-quality goods respectively, and sell to customers through a single retailer. The relationship between manufacturers and single retailer could be integration or decentralization, thus forms four channel structures of II, ID, DI, and DD.
Assume that manufacturers can choose quality and price endogenously, and consumer preference exhibits the form of power utility fuction. In response to the increase of power n, the low and high-quality and quality difference would decrease. While prices of both goods, the quantity demanded of high and total, the aggregate profits of both manufacturers, consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare would increase.
When manufacturer transfers from integration to decentralization, both price and quality level of the high quality good increase. While both price and quality level of the low quality good, the quantity demanded and manufacturers' profits for both goods, consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare would decrease. If it is the channel structure II in the beginning, both manufacturers have no incentive to deviate from integration.

以文找文

林瑞益 (2002),“以議價方式改善雙邊獨占配銷通路合作的問題”,《管理與系統》,9。

鍾谷蘭 (1995),“行銷通路競爭之賽局理論分析”,博士論文,中山企業管理研究所。

A.B.A. (2003), Antitrust Law Developments., American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section, ABA Publishing.

Blanchard, O and Fischer, S (1993), Lectures on Macroeconomics., Cambridge: MIT.

Bucklin, L. P. (1966), Research Program in Marketing:A Theory of Distribution Channel Structure, In Institute of Business and Economic Research,University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A.

Cavero, S., Cebollada, J., and Salas, V. (1998), “Price formation in channels of distribution with diﬀerentiated products: Theory and empirical evidence”, International Journal of Research in Marketing, 15, 427–441.

Chambers, C., Kouvelis, P., and Semple, J. (2006), “Quality-based competition, proﬁtability, and variable costs”,Management Science, 52, 1884–1895.

Chen, Y. (2001), “On vertical mergers and their competitive eﬀects.”,The Rand Journal of Economics, 32, 667–685.

Choi, C. J. and Shin, H. S. (1992), “A comment on a model of vertical product diﬀerentiation.”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 40, 229–232.

Choi, S. C. (1991), “Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer”, Marketing Science, 10, 271–296.

(1996), “Price competition in a duopoly common retailer channel”, Journal of Retailing, 72, 117.

Coughlan, A. T. (1985), “Competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice: Theory and application”, Marketing Science, 4, 110–129.

Coughlan, A. T., Anderson, E., Stern, L. W., and El-Ansary, A. I. (2006), Marketing Channels (7th ed.), Englewood Cliﬀs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.

Coughlan, A. T. and Wernerfelt, B. (1989), “On credible delegation by oligopolists: A discussion of distribution channel management”, Management Science, 35, 226–239.

Economides, N. (1999), “Quality choice and vertical integration.”,International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17, 903–914.

Hamilton, J. L. and Mqasqas, I. (1996), “Double marginalization and vertical integration: New lessons from extensions of the classic case.”,Southern Economic Journal, 62, 567–584.

Henderson, J. and Quandt, R. (1971), Microeconomic Theory, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Ingene, C. A. and Parry, M. E. (2004), Mathematical Models of Distribution Channels, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Iyer, G and Villas-Boas, J.M. (2003), “A bargaining theory of distribution channels”, Journal of Marketing Research., 40, 80–100.

Jeuland, A. P. and Shugan, S. M. (1983), “Managing channel proﬁts”, Marketing Science, 1, 239–272.

Kotler, P. (1988), Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning, and Control, Prentice-Hall.

Lambertini, L. (ed.) (2006), The Economics of Vertically Diﬀerentiated Markets, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

McGuire, T. W. and Staelin, R. (1982), “Channel eﬃciency, incentive compatibility, transfer pricing, and market structure: An equilibrium analysis of channel relationships”,GSIA Working Paper 81-82, Carnegie-Mellon University.

(1983), “An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration”, Marketing Science, 2, 161–192.

Moorthy, K. S. (1988), “Strategic decentralization in channels”,Marketing Science, 1, 335–355.

Motta, M. (1993), “Endogenous quality choice: Price v.s. quantity competition”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 41, 113–131.

Muthoo, A. (1999), Bargaining Theory with Applications, Cambridge University Press.

Lecture Notes on Vertical Structure. (2009), Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Rey, P. and Tirole, J. (1986), “The logic of vertical restraints”, The American Economic Review, 76, 921–939.

Riordan, M. H. (2008), Competitive Eﬀects of Vertical Integration. (in Handbook of Antitrust Economics), Paolo Buccirossi (ed.), MIT Press.

Schmalensee, R. and Thisse, J. F. (1985), “Perceptual maps and the optimal location of new products”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management in its series Working papers with number 1722-85.

Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1982), “Relaxing price competition through product diﬀerentiation”, The Review of Economic Studies, 49, 3–13.

Shugan, S. M. and Jeuland, A. P. (1986), Competitive Pricing Behavior in Distribution Systems, Issues in Pricing Theory and Research, University of Chicago, Center for Research in Marketing.

Spengler, J. J. (1950), “Vertical integration and antitrust policy”, Journal of Political Economy, 58, 347–352.

Stern, L. W., El-Ansary, A. I., and Coughlan, A. T. (1996), Marketing Channels (5th ed.), Englewood Cliﬀs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.

Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MIT Press.

Wauthy, X. (1996), “Quality choice in models of vertical diﬀerentiation”, The Journal of industrial Economics, 44, 345–353.

Zhao, X., Atkins, D., and Liu, Y. (2009), “Eﬀects of distribution channel structure in markets with vertically diﬀerentiated products.”, Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 7, 377–397.

推文
推薦
引用網址
引用嵌入語法
轉寄

top

:::

相關期刊
相關論文
相關專書
相關著作
熱門點閱

1.	The Effect of Retailer Conflicts by Corporate Channel Strategy
2.	行銷通路特性、溝通流程與通路績效之研究--資訊業個人電腦實證

1.	行銷通路特性，溝通流程與通路績效之研究：資訊業個人電腦行銷通路實證

無相關書籍

無相關著作

無相關點閱

QR Code

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

詳目顯示

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫