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題名:公司股權籌資之績效:以台灣的私募與公開增資為例
作者:楊維如 引用關係
作者(外文):Weiju Young
校院名稱:國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱:財務金融系博士班
指導教授:李春安
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2011
主題關鍵詞:管理者鞏固職位私募公開現金增資監督認證MonitoringPrivate PlacementsSeasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)Managerial EntrenchmentCertification
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 點閱點閱:31
Companies’ choice between public offerings (seasoned equity offerings, SEOs) and private placements of equity may convey distinct information and result in different performance. This study investigates that issue by examining announcement and post-issue abnormal returns of companies that make public and private equity offerings. The results show that SEO companies have a negative announcement effect and poor post-issue performance, which is consistent with previous studies. On the other hand, companies conducting private placements elicit a positive response from investors at announcements, and deliver returns slightly lower than the market but higher than their matching sample two years after issue. This suggests that private placements help companies survive, while these companies may not be good targets for long-run investment. When financially weak companies are isolated, the announcement effect of private placements to outsiders is less pronounced than that of placements to insiders. However, the outsider group appears to have higher buy-and-hold abnormal returns than the insider group. These results imply that investors tend to overestimate the certification effect of insiders and ignore their agency problems. In addition, financially weak companies underperform the market, while some of them exhibit extremely positive returns after the issue. This indicates that private placements can serve as a turnaround vehicle for companies in financial trouble.
公司可選擇以公開發行或私募籌措資金,這兩種方式會傳遞不同的資訊,因而有不同的表現,本文比較公開發行與私募的宣告效果及中長期 (兩年) 股價報酬率。研究結果顯示,從事公開現金增資的宣告效果與長期表現都不佳,與先前的研究一致。另一方面,公司從事私募的宣告效果為正,籌資後兩年的股價報酬率略低於市場報酬率,但高於配對公司,顯示私募有助於公司發展,但並不見得是適合長期投資的標的;若排除財務狀況不佳公司,則私募對象為外部人的宣告效果略遜於私募對象為內部人者,不過,私募對象為外部人之公司的中長期買入持有異常報酬率高於對象為內部人之公司,這些結果隱含投資人高估了內部人的認證效果,忽略了其所引起的代理人問題。另外,財務狀況不佳公司中長期的表現差異頗大,其中一些公司在私募後有極高的報酬率,這個現象顯示,對部分陷入財務困境的公司而言,私募是一種讓公司轉危為安的有效方法。
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