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題名：董事會結構、核心代理問題與盈餘管理關係之研究
作者：張巍獻
作者(外文)：Wei-Hsien Chang
校院名稱：逢甲大學
系所名稱：商學博士學位學程
指導教授：劉純之
李永全
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2013
主題關鍵詞：董事會結構；核心代理問題；盈餘管理；Board Structure；Core Agency Problem；Earnings Management
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本研究擬篩選2002年至2011年的台灣上市公司作為研究對象，探討董事會結構、核心代理問題與盈餘管理之間存在的相互影響關係。由於台灣上市公司普遍存在控制股東與股權集中的情況，易產生掠奪小股東的誘因而形成核心代理問題；且經理人在面臨盈餘門檻時亦有可能進行盈餘管理而侵犯小股東的權益。另外，當董事會增加外部成員或提高獨立董事聘任比例時，將有助於增強董事會結構，故欲討論核心代理問題與董事會結構對於經理人操縱盈餘管理行為之影響會如何變化。
本研究證實經理人為求跨越盈餘門檻，經理人會採取減少操縱應計項目盈餘管理的程度，但經理人仍會從事與實際營業活動相關的盈餘管理以跨越盈餘門檻。而且，當董事會提高其規模的時候，股份盈餘偏離差也愈嚴重，將會增加經理人從事盈餘管理的程度，但其他盈餘分配權較高的股東們因其利益與公司一致，將會傾向於增強董事會成員的監督與審查能力，故董事會規模對於盈餘管理程度的負向影響會隨著股份盈餘偏離差而降低。
從董事會獨立性的角度而論，可知在加強董事會獨立性之後，席次盈餘偏離差也會減弱，將會減緩席次盈餘偏離差引發的核心代理問題，但是控制股東仍可決定獨立董事人選，所以無法弱化控制股東的掠奪誘因，因此董事會獨立性對於經理人操縱盈餘管理的正向影響會隨著席次盈餘偏離差而減緩。
綜上所述，對於我國於董事會建置獨立董事制度以達到強化公司治理的目標仍然有進步的空間，期望本研究結果可供我國主管機關制訂政策之建議與參考。
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation of board structure as well as core agency problem on earnings management in Taiwan listed companies during 2002-2011 to investigate. The ownership of listed companies are generally controlled and concentrated by controlling shareholders, core agency problems will be easily formed caused by incentive predatory towards minority shareholders; Moreover, managers will use earnings management behavior to encroach on the rights of minority shareholders while planning to meet the earnings benchmarks.
For board structure, a company would recruit more board members or appoint more independent directors in the Board of Directors to help fortify the structure of the board. Thus, this study will discuss about whether the board structure and core agency problem would affect the managers’ behavior on earnings management.
This study indicates the managers will reduce the manipulation to accruals earnings management, but they still perform real earnings management to cross the threshold of earnings. From the perspective on the deviation between controlling rights and cash flow rights increases for the controlling shareholders, managers will increase significantly on participating earnings management because the bigger the board size is, the more core agency problems exist. Increased the number of members for the board will improve the fiscal oversight abilities in the Board of Directors, and other shareholders with higher cash flow rights in the same company also prefer to strengthen the same competence for controlling shareholders. Over all, the managers will decrease the behaviors of earnings management.
Further, according to aspects of the increasing deviation between controlling seats and cash flow rights for controlling shareholders, managers will reduce significantly on participating earnings management since the stronger board independence is, the lower core agency problems turn out. However, controlling shareholders still have the voting rights to make the list of independent directors; the core agency problem won’t be decreased. After that, the managers will still perform the manipulation to real earnings management because of more independent directors in the Board of Directors.
Overall, this research is aimed to provide a line of discussion on how the strengthening of corporate governance depends on the monitoring effect from the board structure. However, the relevant agencies of Taiwan probably need to make more efforts on the independent directors’ abilities to expand the capacity of existing programs and services.
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