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題名：資本公積發放現金對債權人影響之研究
作者：李品陞
作者(外文)：Pin-ShengLee
校院名稱：國立成功大學
系所名稱：會計學系
指導教授：吳清在
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2014
主題關鍵詞：資本公積配發現金；現金減資；公司治理；債權人保障；公司法第241條；資本維持原則；債權人；Capital Surplus Cash Payment；Capital Reduction；Corporate Governance；Creditor Protection；Company Act Article 241；Capital Maintenance；Creditor
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近年來台灣公司法對於資本制度修正皆為偏向公司靈活運用資本的角度為著眼點，不再以債權人保障為重，其因有二：其一為資本維持是否對債權人提供保障，目前尚無定論。其二為債權人可使用其他方式來保全債權。再者，公司法亦不再強調公司資本之穩固，所以現行法對於債權人保謢機制可說是愈趨減少，公司法更於2012年1月4日修正公布放寬公司得以資本公積發放現金股利，此舉有違長久以來公司法及會計所強調資本維持原則，本研究認為在尚未真正確定對企業目前既有債權無影響之情況下，再加上無相關配套措施，就開放企業可將資本公積發放現金退還給股東，此舉對既有債權人之保障會稍嫌不足之感。資本公積發放現金會立即使企業最主要償債資產－現金產生實質減少，進而增加債權人受損及發生鉅額代理成本的機率。另外，本次公司法修正第241條，對金融機構等債權人之保障無非是一項重大衝擊，本研究認為債權人的授信政策應立即反應調整，金融監理機關應立即檢查所有金融機構對企業授信條件及品質，以避免日後可能需付出鉅額之社會成本。故本研究基於債權人的立場，探討 (1) 以資本公積分配現金是否會違反資本維持原則，侵害債權人權益；(2) 以資本公積分配現金與現金減資的決策中，公司是否會將風險轉嫁給債權人；(3) 公司治理制度在以資本公積分配現金與現金減資的決策中扮演的角色。本研究實證發現若以資本公積發放現金股利的公司，其償債能力相較其他盈餘發放現金股利的公司為差，因此，債權受損可能性相對較高；若再考慮現金減資制度，現金減資相較於資本公積發放現金股利，更能保護債權人利益。故管理當局在修改公司法的同時，應同時考量到債權人保護機制或強化公司治理制度，以緩和公司與債權人之間的代理問題。
Recently, in Taiwan’s Company Act, amendments for capital regime all focus on the perspective that the company flexibly uses capital instead of focusing on the protection of creditors. As a result, in the current law, there are increasingly reduced protection mechanisms for creditors. Therefore, in this study, based on the position of the creditors, the following lists are investigated: i. whether cash distribution of capital reserves violates the principle of capital maintenance and damage to the interests of creditors; ii. in the decision-making of cash distribution of capital reserves and cash capital decrease, whether the company will pass risks to creditors; and iii. the role the corporate governance system plays in the decision-making of cash distribution of capital reserves and cash capital decrease. In empirical findings of this study, the solvency of the companies paying cash dividends with capital reserves is poor compared to other companies paying cash dividends with earnings and thus the likelihood of damaging creditor's rights is relatively high. Furthermore, in considerations of the cash capital reduction system, cash capital reduction will better protect the interests of creditors compared to cash dividends paid with capital reserves. Therefore, regulatory authorities should also consider creditors’ protection mechanisms or strengthen the governance system of companies when amending the Company Act, to ease the agency problem between companies and creditors.
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