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題名：高階經理人薪酬對公司績效及公司政策之影響：從市場競爭、高階經理人相對薪酬、公司支出政策之觀點探討
作者：林炘嬙
校院名稱：國立彰化師範大學
系所名稱：財務金融技術學系
指導教授：吳明政
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2014
主題關鍵詞：高階經理人薪酬；市場競爭；公司績效；公司支出政策；option incentive；market competition；firm productivity；CEO compensation；firm performance；corporate expenditure；agency problem
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本文探討高階經理人員工認股權、市場競爭、和高階經理人薪酬、高層管理團隊薪酬的比例對公司價值和公司政策的影響，證實代理問題是否存在需視公司特性、市場競爭度而定，實證結果發現高階經理人員工認股權在高度競爭的市場中無激勵效果，在低度競爭的市場中則會發揮激勵效果，較高的CEO相對薪酬會使CEO有風險趨避的行為，傾向選擇較低風險的資本支出投資，而非較高風險的R&;D投資。
本文第一部分中探討「市場的競爭程度對於高階經理人員工認股權對於公司生產力的激勵效果是否有影響?」，採用台灣上市公司為樣本，樣本期間為2000年至2010年，文中將財務槓桿、所有權結構、經濟型態納入考慮，進一步了解企業特性及外部市場競爭是否會影響員工認股權對於企業價值的激勵效果。研究結果證實，對於高市場競爭/低市場競爭、高/低財務槓桿，高/低內部人所有權、舊經濟型態的公司，市場競爭與公司生產力成正向顯著相關。然而，員工認股權的激勵效果只在低度市場競爭、低財務槓桿，高內部人所有權和、新經濟型態的公司中，和公司生產力呈現正向顯著相關。我們的研究結果表明，對於低市場競爭、高財務槓桿、低內部人所有權、舊經濟型態的公司，市場競爭比員工認股權更能影響公司的生產力。最後，我們發現員工認股權激勵效果和公司生產力之間、市場競爭和公司生產力之間皆呈現顯著的非線性關係。
本文第二個部分延續先前他人的研究結果，探討CEO相對權力對於企業績效的影響。CEO相對權力的定義為CEO的薪酬與五大高階主管薪酬的比例，過去文獻發現此比例可有效呈現CEO在高階主管團隊中的影響力，並可反映代理問題。研究結果發現，高CEO相對權力的公司呈現不顯著的代理問題，在Tobin’s Q’、零研發費用、高市值淨值比、低財務槓桿的公司中，低CEO相對權力與企業績效之間的呈現正向顯著相關。根據結果，我們推斷，CEO相對權力的負面影響主要來於自現金薪酬和股票薪酬，員工認股權仍可有效地提升公司價值。另外，研究結果發現，CEO薪酬與Tobin’s Q成非線性相關，這可能是因壕溝侵占效果和激勵效果兩者之間存在抵換的關係。
本文第三個部分，採用美國公司為樣本，探討CEO相對薪酬對公司支出政策的影響。CEO相對薪酬的定義為CEO的薪酬與五大高階主管薪酬的比例。研究結果發現，CEO相對薪酬在公司投資決策上扮演很重要的角色—CEO相對薪酬和公司資本支出呈現顯著正相關，但和研發支出呈現顯著負相關。簡言之，有相對高薪酬的CEO是風險趨避者，傾向低風險的支出，而非高風險的支出，較高的CEO相對薪酬導致高階管理階層投入較低風險的投資決策。
This paper examines the impact of executive compensation on firm performance and policies in consideration of market competition and the CEO relative power.
The first section examines the impacts of option incentive and market competition on firm productivity, further taking into account leverage structure, ownership structure, and economy type. Using a sample of Taiwanese companies over the 2000-2009 period, this paper provides further insight into the influence of firm characteristics and external market discipline on firm performance. Our results show that market competition is positively significantly related to productivity for firms that are competitive/non-competitive, high/low-levered, high/low-insider-ownership and in old economy. Nevertheless, option incentives are positively significantly related to productivity only for firms with non-competitive market, low-leverage, high-insider-ownership and in new economy. Our results show that market competition dominates option incentive in determining productivity for non-competitive, high-levered, low-insider-ownership and old-economy and young firms. Finally, we reveal significant hump-shaped relations not only between option incentive and productivity, but also between market competition and productivity.
In the second section, extending prior research, taking account of firm productivity and characteristics, we investigate the impact of the CEO relative power and that of other executive compensation components on firm performance. The CEO relative power, the ratio of CEO’s compensation to the top-five executives’, is viewed as an effective measure to capture the CEOs’ power in the top executive team and reflect agency problems. Our results indicate that firms with high CEO relative power have insignificant agency problems; firms with high Tobin’s Q, zero R&;D, high market-to-book ratio, low leverage have significant negative association between the magnitude of CEO relative power and firm performance, while firms with low Tobin’s
Q, low CEO relative power have positive association between the magnitude of CEO
relative power and firm performance. Further, based on our results, we deduce that the
negative impact of CEO relative power mainly comes from cash and stock, while
simultaneously stock option still plays an effective role in enhancing firm value.
Additionally, we reveal hump-shaped relation between managerial compensation and
Tobin’s Q, which could result from the trade-off between entrenchment effect and
incentive effect.
In the third section, following prior research, we examine the impact of the CEO
pay and that of managerial compensation components on corporate expenditure using
U.S. data. The CEO pay, defined as the total compensation of CEO divided by that of
the top-five executives, is viewed as an effective measure to capture the CEO pay in
the top executive team and disclose whether agency problems exist. Our results
suggest that CEO pay is important in explaining corporate investment decisions,
showing that CEO pay is positively related to capital expenditures intensity, but
negatively related to R&;D intensity. In brief, CEOs with high relative pay are
risk-averse so that they prefer low- risky expenditure rather than high-risky ones.
Higher CEO pay leads to lower level of managerial risk-seeking behaviors.
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