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題名：董事社會網絡與企業融資決策之關聯性探討
作者：楊慧蘭 引用關係
作者(外文)：Hui-Lan Yang
校院名稱：國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱：會計系
指導教授：周淑卿
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2014
主題關鍵詞：社會網絡；董事；資本結構；資金成本；Social network；Directors；Loans；Cost of debt
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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本文主要研究董事的社會網絡關係對台灣企業負債融資決策的影響，論文的實證部分包括兩大部分，第一部分是探討董事成員的社會網絡對企業融資決策的影響；第二部分則探討董事長在外兼任對融資比率與資金成本的關聯性。就第一部分而言，本論文將董事的社會網絡分成三類:董事兼任其他公司董事(Business Ties)，銀行派員擔任董事(Bank Ties)、及董事會成員有政府官員(Political Ties)。實證結果發現財務受限制公司，董事在其他企業兼任及有銀行派任董事有助於銀行借款與增加負債融資比率；然而，非財務受限制公司的銀行聯結與公司取得貸款金額並無顯著的關聯性。另分析董事的社會連結與投資現金流量敏感度，發現財務限制公司透過因董事連結所取得的資金可減緩投資的限制，而非財務受限制公司因董事的社會連結所獲得的資金則增加了過度投資的現象。就第二部分而言，本論文計算董事長在其他公司兼任董事長及高階經理人的席位，發現相較於非財務受限公司，董事長在外兼任高階經理職務可幫助財務受限公司取得更多的銀行貸款、更高的負債比率及較低的負債資金成本。本研究提供了一個有關董事會組成的新的見解，即本研究寓意財務限制公司可能運用董事長兼任塑造有利的資本結構，並且有利於抵銷因外部兼任職務所帶來的代理問題。
This study examines the relation between directors’ social network on debt-financing decisions in Taiwanese companies. The first part classifies social network into three categories: business ties, bank ties, and political ties and investigates how directors’ social network relates to firm financing decisions. The empirical results show that directors’ business and bank ties may facilitate bank lending and increase financing ratio for financially constrained companies. However, in non-financially constrained companies, directors’ bank ties have no significant correlation with the amount of loan they can obtain. The investment-cash flow sensitivity reveals that the investment restrictions in financially constrained companies could be alleviated through the funds obtained via the directors’ social network; however, the phenomenon of over- investment may be aggravated by such funds for non-financially constrained companies. This second part of this study further explores the relationship between chairman outside appointments with debt financing and cost of debt. The results show that financially constrained firms with chairman interlocking tend to have larger loans, greater leverage and lower cost of debt than unconstrained ones. This study provides new insight on board characteristics that chairman interlocking helps constrained firms to shape their optimal capital structure, and this advantage might counteract the agency cost incurred by these outside appointments.
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