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題名：理性、理由與規範性：一種程序論式理性理論之辯護
作者：陳俊明
作者(外文)：Chen, Chun-Ming
校院名稱：國立中正大學
系所名稱：哲學研究所
指導教授：王一奇
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2015
主題關鍵詞：理性；理由；規範性；程序論；理性要求；理性錯誤；Rationality；Reason；Normativity；Proceduralism；Rational Requirements；Rational Mistakes
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本論文探討理性概念，並辯護一種程序式觀點的理性理論。本文針對理性概念提出三個哲學問題：(一)、理性的實踐價值問題─考量理性是否有其實踐價值；如果有的話，理性為何及如何有其實踐價值。(二)、理性的程序問題與機運問題─考量理性是否關乎於思慮程序；如果是的話，理性為何及如何關乎於思慮歷程；以及考量理性作為思慮歷程為何需要考慮機運問題，與如何排除機運發生的情況。(三)、理性的規範性問題─考量理性是否有其規範性；如果有的話，理性為何及如何有其規範性。本文針對理性的兩種研究進路─基於理由的理性理論，特別是實踐理性的實質論，以及基於程序的理性理論，特別是實踐理性的程序論，討論這兩種研究進路如何回應上述的三大問題。
本文指出，實質論主張，實踐理性的概念依賴於實踐理由的概念，而採取此進路的理性理論無法完全對上述三大問題提供良好的說明，特別是針對理性理論的兩項挑戰─理性錯誤問題與機運問題，實質論進路並無法提供恰當的回應。此外，在基於理由的理性觀架構下，支持實質論之一的理性理論，即「理性作為正確回應理由」的理性論，該理論的各項主張也會有自身的難題與困境。本文指出，John Broome 針對理性作為正確回應理由的幾個理論版本所提出反駁他們各項主張的論證，顯示出此理性論把理性概念奠基於理由概念之策略並不成功。
本文的立場是，理性並非基於理由，而是基於程序。因此，本文支持採取程序論進路的理性理論，主張此基於程序的理性理論，能恰當說明與回應理性的三大問題，並解決理性理論的兩項挑戰。考量作為一個恰當的理性理論，程序論比實質論更來得適切。
This dissertation argues against the reason-based theories of rationality and defends for a procedure-based approach to rationality. I propose three philosophical questions of rationality. The first question is about the practical values of rationality which concerns whether rationality is practically useful, and why and how rationality is practically useful, if it is. The second question is the procedure question which concerns whether rationality is about procedure, and why and how it is. And the third question, the normativity question concerns whether rationality is normative, and why and how rationality is normative. I distinguish two approaches to rationality. One is the reason-based theories of rationality, which claim that rationality consists in recognizing and responding correctly to reasons. The other approach is the procedure-based theories of rationality, which claim that rationality consists in undergoing certain sort of correct reasoning procedures or process which is governed by rational requirements.
I argue that, though reason-based theories of rationality can give partial explanations and solutions to the above questions, their explanations and solutions are unsatisfactory. Particularly, the reason-based theories of rationality have difficulties to account for the problem of rational mistakes and the problem of luck. Besides, the view of rationality as reason-responsiveness, which is one of the reason-based theories of rationality, faces its own problems and difficulties. By adapting and elaborating John Broome’s arguments, I claim that, for every version of the view that rationality as reason-responsiveness, their main claims encounter counterexamples and cannot sustain the above three questions of rationality.
The standpoint of my dissertation is that rationality is not based on reasons, but rather on procedures. Therefore, I argue for the procedure-based approach to rationality. I argue that the procedure-based theories of rationality can give good explanations to the three questions of rationality and can also accommodate the problem of rational mistakes and the problem of luck, hence, would be proper theories for rationality.
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