臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：服務業、智慧財產權及形成自由貿易協定下的貿易自由化福利效果
作者：呂得成
作者(外文)：Te-Cheng Lu
校院名稱：國立東華大學
系所名稱：經濟學系
指導教授：林燕淑
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2015
主題關鍵詞：服務業；跨國直接投資；智慧財產權；研發外溢；自由貿易協定；貿易自由化；福利分析；service；foreign direct investment；intellectual property right；R&;D spillover；free trade agreement；trade liberalization；Welfare Effects
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:1
這篇論文分析國際貿易理論行為中的三個重要議題，第二章檢視服務業中貿易及投資自由化的福利效果，第三章探討存在雙向研發外溢，以及進入市場模式及研發投資內生化下的最佳貿易與智慧財產權政策，第四章討論非對稱國家間自由貿易協定如何穩定的形成。
第一個模型(第二章)使用由商品和服務所組成之綜合財模型，且此綜合財對消費者可產生效用，檢驗一外國廠商的進入市場決策和其進入決策對地主國社會福利的影響。廠商由其所生產的商品，讓生產者得以連帶藉由自己從事外國直接投資或外包給其他廠商來提供服務。結果顯示在最終財的貿易自由化下，會增加服務業的外國直接投資誘因。再者，當外國廠商分別藉由外國直接投資或外包來提供服務時，存在著貿易及投資自由化的政策組合，使得本國廠商的獲利性和地主國政府的社會福利產生互相權衡交換的情形。最後，同時發生貿易及投資自由化時，外包體制下的社會福利並非必然地比自給自足的社會福利來得高。
模型二利用一個雙向研發外溢的模型來分析本國政府如何協調智慧財產權及貿易政策，進而檢視本國政府對應外國廠商的出口及外國直接投資行為時之最佳化政策。在某些貿易及智慧財產權的政策組合下，外國廠商的獲利性和本國政府對社會福利的偏好是一致的。在出口體制下，本國政府應該盡可能地保持高關稅，此關稅隨著智慧財產保護的增加而提高。在外國直接投資體制下，存在一個最佳化的智慧財產權政策內解，有別於傳統結論的角解，因此衍生出在較嚴格的智慧財產權保護下，國內廠商的研發雖然增加，卻導致本國社會福利降低的情形。
模型三建構一個非對稱成本廠商的三國產業內貿易模型，分析在最惠國待遇基礎下的自由貿易協定福利效果。一個成本有效率 (成本不效率) 的自由貿易協定會員國對相同的非會員國將課徵一個較高 (低) 的進口關稅。如果成本效率的差距相對於市場大小充分地低時，自由貿易協定的形成會是扮演邁向全球貿易自由化過程中的進階石，此時其他的勾結證明那許均衡 (Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria, CPNE) 為非對稱國家間的自由貿協定。如果成本效率的差異是溫和而適當的，非對稱 {A,B}、{B,C} 和 {A,C} 國家間的自由貿易協定都是長期而穩定的均衡;如果成本效率的差異充分地高時，成本效率和成本不效率 {A,C} 國家間的自由貿易協定並非是一個 CPNE。
The thesis analyzes three important issues in the conduct of trade theory. Chapter 2 investigates welfare effects of liberalizing trade and investment in a service sector. Chapter 3 explores the optimal trade or intellectual property rights (IPRs) policy with endogenous entry mode and R&;D investment in the presence of bilateral R&;D spillover. Chapter 4 discusses stable formation of free trade agreements among asymmetric countries.
The first model (Chapter 2) examines a foreign firm’s entry decision and its effects on the host country’s welfare in a model with a composite good in which both commodity and service generate utility for consumers. Along with the commodity that it produces, a producer can provide the service by itself or outsource the service. The result shows that the incentive for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the service sector increases under liberalizing trade in the final good market. Moreover, there exist policy combinations of trade and investment liberalization, whereby the domestic firms’ profitability is traded off with the host country’s social welfare when the foreign firm provides a service through FDI or through outsourcing respectively. Finally, the welfare in the outsourcing regime after simultaneously liberalizing trade and investment is not necessarily greater than that under autarky.
The second model emploies a bilateral R&;D spillover model to analyze how a domestic country coordinates polices encompassing IPRs and trade and then investigates the optimal choices corresponding to the foreign firm’s behavior: export (EX) or FDI. The domestic government and foreign firm’s preferences are consistent in some combinations of trade and IPRs policies. Under the EX regime the domestic country should keep tariffs as high as possible, which will increase with IPRs protection. Under the FDI regime the domestic country can find an optimal IPRs policy that is different from the corner solution in some conventional results. Therefore, the strict enforecment of IPRs protection may results in a welfare reducing R&;D.
The third model constructs a three-country intra-industry trade model with asymmetric cost firms to analyze the welfare effects under free trade agreements on the basis of the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause. A cost-efficient (cost-inefficient) FTA member imposes a high (low) external tariff on the same non-member country. The formation of FTAs acts as a building block toward global free trade if the difference in cost efficiency relative to market size is sufficiently low, while the other Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria (CPNE) are FTAs among asymmetric countries. Free trade agreements among asymmetric countries {A, B}, {B, C}, and {A, C} are stable if the difference in cost efficiency is moderate; If the difference in cost efficiency is sufficiently high, free trade agreement between the cost-efficient and cost-inefficient countries {A, C} is not a CPNE.
References for Chapter 1
Barros, P. P. and Cabral, L. (2000), “Competing for Foreign Direct Investment,” Review of International Economics 8, 360-71.
Blanchard, E. J. (2010), “Reevaluating the Role of Trade agreements: Does Investment Globalization Make the WTO Obsolete?” Journal of International Economics 82, 63-72.
Chisik, R. (2003), “Gradualism in Free Trade Agreements: A Theoretical Justification,” Journal of International Economics 59, 367-97.
Haufler, A. and Wooton, I. (2010), “Competition for Firms in an Oligopolistic Industry: The Impact of Economic Integration,” Journal of International Economics 80, 239-48.
Klimenko, M. M. (2009), “Policies and International Trade Agreements on Technical Compatibility for Industries with Network Externalities,” Journal of International Economics 77, 151-66.
Klimenko, M., Ramey, G. and Watson, J. (2008), “Recurrent Trade Agreements and the Value of External Enforcement,” Journal of International Economics 74, 475-99.
Lee, G. M. (2007), “Trade Agreements with Domestic Policies as Disguised Protection,” Journal of International Economics 71, 241-59.
Limão N. (2002), “Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?” Review of Economic Studies 74, 821-55.
Limão N. and Saggi, K. (2008), “Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements,” Journal of International Economics 76, 48-60.
Ludema, R. D. (2002), “Increasing Returns, Multinationals and Geography of Preferential Trade Agreements,” Journal of International Economics 56, 329-58.
Martin, A. and Wouter, V. (2008), “On the Role of Retaliation in Trade Agreements,” Journal of International Economics 76, 61-77.
Ornelas, E. (2005), “Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System,” Journal of International Economics 67, 471-97.
Panagariya, A. and Krishna, P. (2002), “On Necessarily Welfare-Enhancing Free Trade Areas,” Journal of International Economics 57, 353-67.
Raff H. (2004), “Preferential Trade Agreements and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment,” Journal of Public Economics 88, 2745-63.

References for Chapter 2
Abramovsky, L. and Griffith, R. (2006), “Outsourcing and Offshoring of Business Services: How Important Is ICT?,” Journal of the European Economic Association 4, 594-601.
Amiti, M. and Wakelin, K. (2003), “Investment Liberalization and International Trade,” Journal of International Economics 61, 101- 26.
Amiti, M. and Wei, S. J. (2005), “Fear of Service Outsourcing: Is It Justified?,” Economic Policy 20, 308-47.
Arnold, J. M., Javorcik, B. S. and Mattoo, A. (2011), “Does Services Liberalization Benefit Manufacturing Firms? Evidence from the Czech Republic,” Journal of International Economics 85, 136-46.
Aronsson, T. and Koskela, E. (2011), “Redistributive Income Taxation, Outsourcing and Foreign Direct Investment,” Economics Letters 110, 86-9.
Arya, A., Mittendorf, B. and Sappington, D. E. M. (2008), “Outsourcing, Vertical Integration, and Price vs. Quantity Competition,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 26, 1-16.
Beladi, H., Marjit, S. and Chakrabarti, A. (2009), “Tariff Jumping and Joint Ventures,” Southern Economic Journal 75, 1256-69.
Bjorvatn, K. and Eckel, C. (2006), “Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment between Asymmetric Countries,” European Economic Review 50, 1891-907.
Buehler, S. and Haucap, J. (2006), “Strategic Outsourcing Revisited,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61, 325-38.
Chang, H. J. (2004), “Regulation of Foreign Investment in Historical Perspective,” The European Journal of Development Research 16, 687-715.
Chaudhuri, A. R. and Benchekroun, H. (2012), “Welfare Effect of Mergers and Multilateral Trade Liberalization,” Review of International Economics 20, 119-33.
Chen, Y., Ishikawa, J. and Yu, Z. (2004), “Trade Liberalization and Strategic Outsourcing,” Journal of International Economics 63, 419- 36.
Claus, I. (2009), “New Zealand’s Economic Reforms and Changes in Production Structure,” Journal of Economic Policy Reform 12, 133–43.
Collie, D. R. (2011), “Multilateral Trade Liberalization, Foreign Direct Investment and the Volume of World Trade,” Economics Letters 113, 47-49.
Crotti, S., Cavoli, T. and Wilson, J. K. (2010), “The Impact of Trade and Investment Agreements on Australia’s Inward FDI Flows,” Australian Economic Papers 49, 259-75.
Demekas, D. G., Horváth, B., Ribakova, E. and Wu, Y. (2007), “Foreign Direct Investment in European Transition Economies—The Role of Policies,” Journal of Comparative Economics 35, 369-86.
Ederington, J. and McCalman, P. (2010), “The Liberalization of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment: A Political Economy Analysis,” Journal of Economic Policy Reform 13, 225-40.
Egger, P., Larch, M. and Pfaffermayr, M. (2004), “Multilateral Trade and Investment Liberalization: Effects on Welfare and GDP per Capita Convergence,” Economics Letters 84, 133-40.
Egger, P., Larch, M. and Pfaffermayr, M. (2007), “On the Welfare effects of Trade and Investment Liberalization,” European Economic Review 51, 669-94.
Francois, J. and Hoekman, B. (2010), “Services Trade and Policy,” Journal of Economic Literature 48, 642-92.
Fujiwara, K. (2011), “Tariffs and Trade Liberalization with Network Externalities,” Australian Economic Papers 50, 51-61.
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (2003), “Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium,” Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 317-27.
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (2005), “Outsourcing in a Global Economy,” Review of Economic Studies 72, 135-59.
Horiuchi, E. and Ishikawa, J. (2009), “Tariffs and Technology Transfer through an Intermediate Product,” Review of International Economics 17, 310-26.
Ishikawa, J. and Horiuchi, E. (2012), “Strategic Foreign Direct Investment in Vertically Related Markets,” Economic Record 88, 229-42.
Ishikawa, J., Morita, H. and Mukunoki, H. (2010), “FDI in Post-production Services and Product Market Competition,” Journal of International Economics 82, 73-84.
Jabbour, L. (2010), “Offshoring and Firm Performance: Evidence from French Manufacturing Industry,” The World Economy 33, 507-24.
Kayalica, M. O. and Lahiri, S. (2007), “Domestic Lobbying and Foreign Direct Investment. The Role of Policy Instruments,” Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 16, 299-323.
Lin, P. and Saggi, K. (2011), “Foreign Direct Investment in a Two-Tier Oligopoly: Coordination, Vertical Integration, and Welfare,” International Economic Review 52, 1271-90.
Lloyd, P. (2008), “100 Years of Tariff Protection in Australia,” Australian Economic History Review 48, 99-145.
Markusen, J. R. (1989), “Trade in Producer Services and in Other Specialized Intermediate Inputs,” American Economic Review 79, 85-95.
Markusen, J. R. (1997), “Trade versus Investment Liberalization,” NBER Working Paper, No. 6231.
Markusen, J. R. (2002), Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Markusen, J. R., Rutherford, T. F. and Tarr, D. (2005), “Trade and Direct Investment in Producer Services and the Domestic Market for Expertise,” Canadian Journal of Economics 38, 758-77.
Mukherjee, A. and Suetrong, K. (2012), “Trade Cost Reduction and Foreign Direct Investment,” Economic Modelling 29, 1938-45.
Neary, J. P. (2009), “Trade Costs and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Review of Economics and Finance 18, 207-18.
Rajan, R. S. and Srivastava, S. (2007), “Global Outsourcing of Services: Issues and Implications,” Harvard Asia Pacific Review 9, 39-40.
Sadleir, C. and Mahony, G. (2009), “Institutional Challenges and Response in Regulating Foreign Direct Investment to Australia,” Economic Papers 28, 337–45.
Shy, O. and Stenbacka, R. (2003), “Strategic Outsourcing” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 50, 203-24.
Skaksen, M. R. (2005), “Should Governments Subsidise Inward Foreign Direct Investment?,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107, 123-40.
Srivastava, S. (2006), “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in India’s Services Exports: An Empirical Investigation,” The Singapore Economic Review 51, 175-94.
Tomiura, E., Ito, B. and Wakasugi, R. (2011), “Offshore Outsourcing Decision and Capital Intensity: Firm‐Level Relationships,” Economic Inquiry 49, 364-78.
Qiu, L. D. and Wang, S. (2011), “FDI Policy, Greenfield Investment and Cross-border Mergers,” Review of International Economics 19, 836-51.

References for Chapter 3
Ang, J. B. and J. B. Madsen (2013). International R&;D Spillovers and Productivity Trends in the Asian Miracle Economies, Economic Inquiry 51, 1523-41.
Atallah, G. (2005). R&;D Cooperation with Asymmetric Spillovers, Canadian Journal of Economics 38, 919-36.
Briggs, K. (2013). Does Patent Harmonization Impact the Decision and Volume of High Technology Trade? International Review of Economics and Finance 25, 35-51.
Chaudhuri, A. R. and H. Benchekroun (2012). Welfare Effect of Mergers and Multilateral Trade Liberalization, Review of International Economics 20, 119–33.
Che, X. G. and Y. Yang (2012). Patent Protection with a Cooperative R&;D Option, Economics Letters 116, 469-71.
Chung, K. S. and C. H. Lu (2014). Non-homothetic Preferences and IPRs Protection, Journal of Development Economics 109, 229-39.
Coe, D. T., Helpman, E. and A. W. Hoffmaister (2009). International R&;D Spillovers and Institutions, European Economic Review 53, 723-41.
Czarnitzki, D. and A. A. Toole (2011), Patent Protection, Market Uncertainty, and R&;D Investment, Review of Economics and Statistics 93, 147-59.
DeCourcy, J. (2005). Cooperative R&;D and Strategic Trade Policy, Canadian Journal of Economics 38, 547-73.
Deltas, G. and S. Karkalakos (2013). Similarity of R&;D Activities, Physical Proximity, and R&;D Spillovers. Regional Science and Urban Economics 43, 124-31.
Diwan, I. and D. Rodrik (1991). Patents, Appropriate Technology, and North-South Trade. Journal of International Economic 30, 27-47.
Gancia, G. and A. Bonfiglioli (2008). North-South Trade and Directed Technical Change. Journal of International Economics 76, 276-95.
Ghosh, A. and J. Ishikawa (2013). Trade Liberalization, Absorptive Capacity and the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Australian School of Business Research Paper No. ECON 11, 1-26.
Glass, A. J. and K. Saggi (2002). Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, Journal of International Economics 56, 387-410.
Grossman, G. M. and E. L. C. Lai (2004). International Protection of Intellectual Property, American Economic Review 94, 1635-53.
Grünfeld, L. A. (2006). Multinational Production, Absorptive Capacity, and Endogenous R&;D Spillovers, Review of International Economics 14, 922-40.
Haaland, J. I. and H. J. Kind (2008). R&;D Policies, Trade and Process Innovation, Journal of International Economics 74, 170-87.
Keller, W. (2002). Geographic Localization of International Technology Diffusion, American Economic Review 92, 120-142.
Kim, J. E. and H. E. Lapan (2008). Heterogeneity of Southern Countries and Southern Intellectual Property Rights Policy, Canadian Journal of Economics 41, 894-925.
Liao, P. C. and K. Y. Wong (2009), R&;D Subsidy, Intellectual Property Rights Protection, and North-South Trade: How Good Is the TRIPS Agreement? Japan and the World Economy 21, 191-201.
Long, N. V., Raff, H. and F. Stähler (2011). Innovation and Trade with Heterogeneous Firms, Journal of International Economics 84, 149-59.
Lu, T. C., Lin, Y. S. and J. L. Hu (2014). FDI and Outsourcing in a Service Industry: Welfare Effects of Liberalising Trade and Investment, Economic Record 90 Special Issue, 74-86.
Luintel, K. B. and M. Khan (2004). Are International R&;D Spillovers Costly for The United States? Review of Economics and Statistics 86, 896-910.
Manasakis, C. and E. Petrakis (2009). Union Structure and Firms’ Incentives for Cooperative R&;D Investments, Canadian Journal of Economics 42, 666-93.
Maskus, K. E. (1997). Implications of Regional and Multilateral Agreements for Intellectual Property Rights, World Economy 20, 681-94.
Mathew, A. J. and A. Mukherjee (2014). Intellectual Property Rights, Southern Innovation and Foreign Direct Investment, International Review of Economics and Finance 31, 128-37.
Morita, T. (2012). Cost-reducing R&;D Investment, Labor Market and Trade, Review of International Economics 20, 821-27.
Mukherjee, A. and U. B. Sinha (2013). Patent Protection, Southern Innovation and Welfare in a North-South Trade Model, Economica 80, 248-73.
Naghavi, A. (2007). Strategic Intellectual Property Rights Policy and North-South Technology Transfer, Review of World Economics 143, 55-78.
Park, W. G. (2008). International Patent Protection: 1960–2005, Research Policy 37, 761-66.
Vishwasrao, S., Gupta, S. and H. Benchekroun (2007). Optimum Tariffs and Patent Length in A Model of North–South Technology Transfer, International Review of Economics and Finance 16, 1-14.
Yang, Y. (1998). Why Do Southern Country Have Little Incentive to Protect Northern Intellectual Property Rights? Canadian Journal of Economics 42, 800-16.
Zhu, L. and B. N. Jeon (2007). International R&;D Spillovers: Trade, FDI, and Information Technology as Spillover Channels, Review of International Economics 15, 955-76.


References for Chapter 4
Aghion, P., Antràs, P. and Helpman, E. (2007), “Negotiating Free Trade,” Journal of International Economics 73, 1-30.
Barros, P. P. (1998), “Endogenous Merger and Size Asymmetry of Merger Participants,” Economics Letters 60, 113-19.
Bhagwati, J. N. (1993), “Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview,” New Dimensions in Regional Integration, New York: Cambridge University Press, 22-57.
Bernheim B.D., Peleg, B. and Whinston, M. D. (1987), “Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria,” Journal of Economic Theory 42, 1-12.
Chen, M. X. and Joshi, S. (2010), “Third-country Effects on the Formation of Free Trade Agreements,” Journal of International Economics 82, 238-48.
Choi, J. P. (1995), “Optimal Tariffs and the Choice of Technology Discriminatory Tariffs vs. the ‘Most Favored Nation’ Clause,” Journal of International Economics 38, 143-60.
Das, S. P. and Ghosh, S. (2006), “Endogenous Trading Bloc Formation in a North-Sourth Global Economy,” Canadian Journal of Economics 39, 809-30.
Egger, H., Egger, P. and Greenaway, D. (2008), “The Trade Structure Effects of Endogenous Regional Trade Agreements,” Journal of International Economics 74, 278-98.
Facchini, G., Silva, P. and Willmann, G. (2013), “The Customs Union Issue: Why Do We Observe So Few of Them?” Journal of International Economics 90, 136-47.
Furusawa, T. and Konishi, H. (2007), “Free Trade Networks,” Journal of International Economics 72, 310-35.
Goyal, S. and Joshi, S. (2006), “Bilateralism and Free Trade,” International Economic Review 47, 749-78.
Hwang, H. and Mai, C. (1991), “Optimum Discriminatory Tariffs under Oligopolistic Competition,” Canadian Journal of Economics 24, 693-702.
Kennan, J. and Riezman, R. (1990), “Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions,” Canadian Journal of Economics 90, 70-83.
Kennan, J. and Riezman, R. (1988), “Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?” International Economic Review 29, 81-5.
Krishna, P. (1998), “Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 227-51.
Macho-Standler, I. and Xue, L. (2007), “Winners and Losers from Gradual Formation of Trading Blocks,” Economica 74, 664-81.
Melatos, M. and Woodland, A. (2007), “Endogenous Trade Bloc Formation in an Asymmetric World,” European Economic Review 51, 901-24.
Mukunoki, H. and Tachi, K. (2006), “Multilateralism and Hub-and-Spoke Bilateralism,” Review of International Economics 14, 658-74.
Nakamura, Y. (2011), “Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Contracts and Merger Incentives with Asymmetric Costs,” The Manchester School 179, 718-39.
Nomura R., Ohkawa,T., Okamura, M. and Tawada, M. (2013), “Does a Bilateral FTA Pave the Way for Multilateral Free Trade?” Review of International Economics 21, 164-76.
Ornelas, E. (2007), “Exchanging Market Access at the Outsiders’ Expense: The Case of Customs Unions,” Canadian Journal of Economics 40, 207-24.
Ornelas, E. (2005a), “Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System,” Journal of International Economics 67, 471-97.
Ornelas, E. (2005b), “Trade Creating Free Trade Areas and the Undermining of Multilateralism,” European Economic Review 49, 1717-35.
Park, J. H. (2000), “International Trade Agreements between Countries of Asymmetric Size,” Journal of International Economics 50, 473-95.
Richardson, M. (1995), “Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area,” European Economic Review 39, 1429-37.
Saggi, K. and Yildiz, H. M. (2011), “Bilateral Trade Agreement and the Feasibility of Multilateral Free Trade,” Review of International Economics 19, 356-73.
Saggi, K. and Yildiz, H. M. (2010), “Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Quest for Global Free Trade,” Journal of International Economics 81, 26-37.
Saggi, K. (2006), “Preferential Trade Agreements and Multilateral Tariff Cooperation,” International Economic Review 47, 29-57.
Straume, O. R. (2006), “Managerial Delegation and Merger Incentives with Asymmetric Costs,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162, 450-69.
Vicard, V. (2011), “Determinants of Successful Regional Trade Agreements,” Economic Letters 111, 188-90.
Viner, J. (1950), “The Customs Unions Issue,” Carnegie Endowment, New York.
Yi, S. S. (2000), “Free-Trade Areas and Welfare: An Equilibrium Analysis,” Review of International Economics 8, 336-47.
Yi, S. S. (1996), “Endogenous Formation of Customs Unions under Imperfect Competition: Open Regionalism Is Good,” Journal of International Economics 41, 153-77.
Zhang, J., Xue, L. and Yin, X. (2011), “Forming Free-trade Networks: A Sequential Mechanism,” Review of International Economics 19, 402-17.

 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：706（臺灣：692，外國：14） ／ 本年度總使用人次：2196945 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：68000359
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上