:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
題名:高保額汽車保險與逆選擇
作者:許永慶
作者(外文):Yung-Ching Hsu
校院名稱:國立高雄第一科技大學
系所名稱:管理學院博士班
指導教授:周百隆
陳彥銘
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2015
主題關鍵詞:從人因素加減費制度道路交通意外事故汽車保險逆選擇Bonus-malus systemRoad traffic accidentsVehicle insuranceAdverse selection
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:1
由於近年來道路交通意外事故的發生率呈現陡然上升的趨勢,為減輕交通意外事故所伴隨而生的財務損失,世界各國政府通常採取鼓勵甚至強制要求汽車駕駛人須購買汽車保險。本文貢獻主要在於從預防交通意外事故觀點,探討高風險駕駛人的保單購買行為與發生道路交通意外事故間之關聯性。本文藉由分析汽車車體損失險的保單資料發現,選擇購買高保額車體損失險保單的要保人,將來發生交通事故與保單出險的可能性則相對較高。本文另發現,駕駛風險性愈高的駕駛人,比較傾向於選擇購買高保額車體損失險的保單,而且未來發生交通事故與保單出險可能性均屬較高。本文研究結果顯示,從人因素加減費制度運用於保險實務上之功用,並進一步提出交通業務主管機關於研訂政策上之參考建議。
Over the years, there has been an upward trend in incidences of road traffic accidents (RTAs). In order to mitigate the financial losses arising from traffic accidents, governments across the world generally encourage or even require automobile drivers to purchase automobile insurance. This paper contributes to the literature on traffic accident prevention by investigating this potential relationship between RTAs and the purchase of insurance by high-risk drivers. Using data on vehicle damage insurance policyholders, I find that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage have higher probability of accidents and thus tend to file more claims. This indicates that insurance coverage contains information that can be used to assess the probability risk levels of RTAs. I also find that less safe drivers will tend to buy more coverage, and that those who buy more coverage tend to have more accidents and file more claims. My finding justifies the use of the bonus-malus system. A number of traffic policy implications of my results are provided.
REFERENCES
Ardeshiri, A. and M. Jeihani (2014), ‘A Speed Limit Compliance Model for Dynamic Speed Display Signs’, Journal of Safety Research, 51: 33-40.
Akerlof, G.A. (1970), ‘The Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84: 488-500.
Blows, S., R.Q. Ivers, J. Connor, S. Ameratunga and R. Norton (2003), ‘Car Insurance and the Risk of Car Crash Injury’, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 35: 987-90.
Bonander, C., F. Nilson and R. Andersson (2014), ‘The Effect of the Swedish Bicycle Helmet Law for Children: An Interrupted Time-series Study’, Journal of Safety Research, 51: 15-22.
Cassidy, J.D., L.J. Carroll, P. Côté, M. Lemstra, A. Berglund and A. Nygren (2000), ‘Effect of Eliminating Compensation for Pain and Suffering on the Outcome of Insurance Claims for Whiplash Injury’, New England Journal of Medicine, 342: 1179-86.
Chiappori, P.A. and B. Salanié (2000), ‘Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets’, Journal of Political Economy, 108(1): 56-78.
Cohen, A. (2005), ‘Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Vehicle Insurance Market’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(2): 197-207.
Cohen, A. and P. Siegelman (2010), ‘Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77(1): 39-84.
De Brabander, B. and L. Vereeck (2007), ‘Valuing the Prevention of Road Accidents in Belgium’, Transport Reviews, 27(6): 715-32.
Dionne, G., C. Gouriéroux and C. Vanasse (2001), ‘Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Vehicle Insurance Market: A Comment’, Journal of Political Economy, 109: 444-73.
Farmer, C.M. and J.K. Wells (2010), ‘Effect of Enhanced Seat Belt Reminders on Driver Fatality Risk’, Journal of Safety Research, 41: 53-57.
Finkelstein, A. and J. Poterba (2004), ‘Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the UK Annuity Market’, Journal of Political Economy, 112(1): 183-208.
Gilfillan, G. (2000), ‘Road Safety Benefits of Liquid and Anti-icing Strategies and Agents: Kamloops, British Columbia’, Canada Transportation Research Record, 1700: 24-31.
Greene, W.H. (2008), Econometric Analysis, 6th edn., New Jersey, NJ: Pearson.
Harrington, S.E. and G.R. Niehaus (2004), Risk Management and Insurance, 2nd edn., NY: Irwin.
Hultkrantz, L., J. Nilsson and S. Arvidsson (2012), ‘Voluntary Internalization of Speeding Externalities with Vehicle Insurance’, Transportation Research Part A, 46: 926-37.
Kim, H., D. Kim, S. Im and J.W. Hardin (2009), ‘Evidence of Asymmetric Information in the Vehicle Insurance Market: Dichotomous versus Multinomial Measurement of Insurance Coverage’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 76(2): 343-66.
Li, C., C. Liu and S. Peng (2013), ‘Bundled Vehicle Insurance Coverage and Accidents’, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 50: 64-72.
Li, C., C. Liu and J. Yeh (2007), ‘Incentive Effects of Increasing Per-claim Deductible Contracts in Vehicle Insurance’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74: 441-459.
Mills, B.N., J. Andrey and D. Hambly (2011), ‘Analysis of Precipitation-related Motor Vehicle Collision and Injury Risk using Insurance and Police Record Information for Winnipeg, Canada’, Journal of Safety Research, 42: 383-90.
Nasvadi, G.C. and A. Wister (2009), ‘Do Restricted Driver’s Licenses Lower Crash Risk Among Older Drivers? A Survival Analysis of Insurance Data from British Columbia, Gerontologist, 49: 474-84.
Nguyen-Hoang, P. and R. Yeung (2014), ‘Dollars for Lives: The Effect of Highway Capital Investments on Traffic Fatalities’, Journal of Safety Research, 51: 109-15.
Paefgen, J., T. Staake and E. Fleisch (2014), ‘Multivariate Exposure Modeling of Accident Risk: Insights from Pay-As-You-Drive Insurance Data’, Transportation Research Part A, 61: 27-40.
Puelz, R. and A. Snow (1994), ‘Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market’, Journal of Political Economy, 102(2): 236-57.
Romano, E. and T. Kelley-Baker (2015), ‘Child Passengers Injured in Motor Vehicle Crashes’, Journal of Safety Research, 52: 1-8.
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz (1976), ‘Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(402): 629-49.
Saito, K. (2006), ‘Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Vehicle Insurance Market under Rate Regulation’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73(2): 335-56.
Shi, P., W. Zhang and E.A. Valdez (2012), ‘Testing Adverse Selection with Two- dimensional Information: Evidence from the Singapore Auto Insurance Industry’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 79(4): 1077-114.
Sloan, F.A., L.M. Chepke and D.V. Davis (2013), ‘Race, Gender and Risk Perceptions of the Legal Consequences of Drinking and Driving’, Journal of Safety Research, 45: 117-25.
Thomas, R.L. (1997), Modern Econometrics: An Introduction, 1st edn., Hong Kong: Addison-Wesley.
Trieschmann, J.S., R.E. Hoyt and D.W. Sommer (2005), Risk Management and Insurance, 12th edn., New York, NY: Thomson South-Western.
White, H. (1980), ‘A Heteroskedasticity-consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test of Heteroskedasticity’, Econometrica, 48: 817-38.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2006), Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 3rd edn., New York, NY: Thomson South-Western.
Zheng, Y.Y., P.J. Cooper and C.B. Dean (2007), ‘Modeling the Contribution of Speeding and Impaired Driving to Insurance Claim Counts and Costs when Contributing Factors are Unknown’, Journal of Safety Research, 38(1): 25-33.
WHO (2014), Global Status Report on Road Safety 2013, World Health Organization, (available at http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_safety_status/ 2013/en/.).
Zsidisin, G.A. and M.E. Smith (2005), ‘Managing Supply Risk with Early Supplier Involvement: A Case Study and Research Propositions’, Journal of Supply Chain Management, Fall: 44-57.
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE