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題名：平行輸入、技術授權與政府政策
作者：施姵全 引用關係
作者(外文)：Pei-Cyuan Shih
校院名稱：國立臺灣大學
系所名稱：經濟學研究所
指導教授：黃鴻
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2015
主題關鍵詞：垂直相關市場；技術授權；政府關稅；平行輸入；技術採用；產品研發；市場結構；Vertically Related Markets；Technology Licensing；Tariffs；Parallel Imports；Technology Adoption；Product Innovation；Market Structure
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本論文旨在分析存在廠商授權行為之下，技術擁有廠商的最適授權行為及技術採用和研發誘因如何受到政府政策和市場架構的影響。本文討論的議題包括：在垂直相關市場中上游廠商的最適授權策略、存在政府關稅時外國廠商的最適授權訂價與技術採用對社會福利的影響，以及存在平行輸入和寡占市場架構之下廠商的研發誘因。
在第二章中，我們利用一個垂直相關市場模型，探討產業內技術授權廠商的最適授權決策。此一授權廠商生產並出售一中間財貨給予下游廠商，且可採用單位權利金或固定權利金的方式將其技術授權給另一家上游的競爭廠商。本章發現當下游廠商之進入成本介於中間時，上游技術授權廠商的最適授權方式為固定權利金；藉此下游的潛在廠商會進入最終財市場而提高中間財的衍伸性需求。另外，即使這兩種授權方式皆導致下游的潛在廠商進入市場，固定權利金仍可能優於單位權利金，其原因在於為了使下游廠商進入，上游技術授權廠商將無法再透過單位權利金的授權來享有完全的成本優勢。
在第三章中，我們採用兩國模型來探討存在進口關稅之下，外國廠商擁有先進技術且同時授權給本國技術落後廠商的最適授權訂價與技術採用。本章發現：當關稅較低時，外國廠商會採用較先進的技術生產產品。但當關稅較高時，外國廠商會採用較落後的生產技術，透過兩部訂價的授權方式攫取本國廠商的授權利潤。此舉不但提升了本國的消費者剩餘也提高了全球的社會福利。
在第四章中，我們利用兩國模型來探討政府平行輸入決策和市場結構對廠商產品研發誘因的影響。本章發現：當本國市場結構為獨占的情況下，平行輸入發生會使廠商的研發誘因下降。若本國市場為寡占，平行輸入發生反而會使廠商的研發誘因上升。另外，若廠商可授權給多位經銷商的情況下，平行輸入也有可能會使廠商的研發誘因上升，此結論視兩國市場消費者對於產品研發的效用而定。
第五章總結本論文並提出往後研究的延伸議題。
Through analyzing how the government policy and market structure affect the licensor’s optimal licensing contract, the optimal technology adoption and the product innovation, the dissertation explores issues on optimal licensing contract under vertically-related model, tariffs and foreign licensor’s optimal technology adoption and product innovation under parallel imports and oligopoly market structure.
In Chapter 2, we investigate the optimal licensing strategy of an insider licensor, which produces and sells an intermediate good in a vertically-related market. The licensor can adopt either fixed-fee or royalty licensing. It is found that the licensor firm may prefer fixed-fee to royalty licensing as the former is more likely to induce downstream entry which expands the derived demand. Moreover, even if downstream entry takes place under both regimes, fixed-fee licensing could still be superior to royalty licensing, because the licensor, in order to make room for the entry, cannot enjoy the full cost advantage under royalty licensing.
In Chapter 3, we set up a three-stage (technology adoption, technology licensing, and output) oligopoly game in which one foreign firm licenses its superior technology to a domestic firm by means of a two-part tariff (i.e., a per-unit royalty and a fixed fee) contract. It is found that if the tariff imposed by the domestic country is large enough, the foreign licensor firm prefers to use an inferior technology for its own production but licenses a superior technology to its rival. This arrangement can raise the domestic consumer surplus and the world social welfare.
In Chapter 4, we set up a two-country model in which there is one domestic manufacturer authorizing its product to a distributor in foreign country to investigate the effect of parallel imports (PI) on product innovation of the former. The distributor can sell the product not only to its own market (i.e., the foreign market) but also back to the domestic market if parallel imports are allowed by the domestic government. We find that if the manufacturer adopts a two-part tariff pricing scheme when selling its output to the foreign distributor, permitting PI necessarily decreases the manufacturer’s product innovation. This result however is very sensitive to market structures. If the domestic market becomes duopolistic or oligopolistic, the above result is definitely reversed—PI have a positive effect on the manufacturer’s product innovation. Finally, if there are more than one distributor in the foreign market, parallel imports may increase or decrease product innovation depending on the consumers’ quality valuations in the two countries.
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation and provides some extensions from this research.
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