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題名:企業內部控制機制與實質盈餘管理之研究
作者:楊惠昱
作者(外文):Hui-Yu Yang
校院名稱:元智大學
系所名稱:管理學院博士班
指導教授:丘邦翰
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2014
主題關鍵詞:審計委員會與財務報導有關之內部控制內部控制缺失沙氏法案404條款實質盈餘管理管理階層股權法人股東股權產業專家Audit CommitteesICOFRInternal Control DeficiencySox 404Real Activities ManipulationManagerial OwnershipInstitutional OwnershipAudit Industry Specialist
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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Essay one
本研究旨在探討會計師事務所與審計委員會特徵是否影響公司內部控制缺失的改善速度。利用內部控制意見書之意見衡量改善情況,樣本分成三組(快、慢、無改善)進行觀察與比較,結果發現審計委員會的成員中若較少財務專家、出席率較低與審計委員會規模較小,皆使內控缺失改善速度較慢。此外,會計師事務所若對該公司收取較高額之審計公費或較低額之非審計公費,或者該公司由非四大會計師事務所查核,均使內控缺失改善速度較慢。同時,以下特徵之公司也有未能及時改善內控缺失速度之情況:公司規模小、有財務危機、成長性公司以及該產業較少訴訟案情況之公司。
Essay Two
本研究旨在探討法人型態與持股與會計師事務所是否為產業專家對實質盈餘管理的影響。本研究將實質盈餘管理活動分為兩大類,分別係膨脹收入活動與抑制成本活動,膨脹收入活動係指透過折價策略提高盈餘
的活動,抑制成本活動係指透過超額生產與削減裁決性應計項目以提高盈餘的營運活動。結果發現董事持股高的公司並無法減少膨脹成本的盈餘管理活動。公司若存在有銀行股東持股5%以上並由產業專家查核者,能有效降低抑制成本的盈餘管理活動。簡而言之,本研究發現銀行股東、投資公司股東與產業專家對膨脹收入活動與抑制成本活動的監督效果係不同的。
Essay One
This research examines the association between the characteristics of audit firms, audit committees and remediation efficiency of internal control deficiencies. By measuring improvement of internal control as remediation efficiency, we find poor remediation efficiency is associated with less financial expertise, lower attending frequencies, smaller audit committee size, higher audit fees, lower non-audit fees and audited by non-Big 4. Also, we find firms with smaller size, financial distress, rapid growth in business or operating in a less litigious environment do not remedy the internal control weakness in a timely manner. The study contributes to our understanding of key determinants to timeliness in improving internal control weakness.
Essay Two
This paper investigates whether the types of institutional investors and audit industry specialists affect the real activities manipulations. The real activities manipulations are divided into two categories: revenue inflating activity which refers to price discounts, cost suppressing activities which refer to overproduction and discretionary expense cutting. We find that directors-owned firms do not limit revenue inflating activity. Audit industry specialists decrease total manipulation and cost suppressing activities when a firm is also owned at least 5% by banks. Overall, our findings suggest that the
impact of banks, investment companies or advisors, and audit industry specialists is different between revenue inflating activity or cost suppressing activities.
Essay one
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Essay two
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