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題名：廠商區位差異的三篇文章
作者：林松崎
作者(外文)：LIN, SUNG-CHI
校院名稱：國立臺北大學
系所名稱：經濟學系
指導教授：陳孝琪
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2017
主題關鍵詞：空間競爭；不完整訊息；訊息傳遞模型；產量－價格競爭；Spatial competition；Incomplete information；Signaling model；Quantity-Price competition
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本論文由三篇探討廠商區位差異的文章所組成。在這三篇文章中，我們假設消費者均勻分布分在一個 Hotelling (1929) 形式的水平直線市場上，藉由雙占廠商在直線市場上競逐消費者，分析廠商的最適區位策略。
首先，由第二章的分析可知，當廠商面對 Hotelling (1929) 形式的消費者，如果廠商在完整訊息賽局競爭時，只有在特殊條件之下，兩階段模型才存在均衡，其中只有成本優勢廠商存活在市場在中央，並且享有超額利潤；另一方面，如果廠商在不完整訊息賽局競爭時，也只有在特殊條件之下，兩階段模型才存在均衡，除了前述完整訊息賽局的一組均衡之外，另有一組支持 Hotelling (1929) 廠商聚集在市場中央，且均衡價格高於廠商邊際成本的均衡策略，但是基於 Jehle and Reny (2011) 的設定，仍然只有成本優勢廠商存活在市場中央。
其次，由第三章的分析可知，當廠商面對 d’Aspremont et al. (1979) 形式的消費者，如果廠商在完整訊息賽局競爭，可以得到三組均衡策略。第一、當廠商的邊際成本差距較小時，可以得到支持 d’Aspremont et al. (1979) 區位差異極大的結果；第二，當廠商的邊際成本差距中等時，可以得到區位差異縮小但呈現不對稱的結果；第三，當廠商的邊際成本差距很大時，可以得到一組僅有成本優勢廠商存活在市場端點並享有超額利潤的結果。此外，當廠商在不完整訊息賽局競爭，除了上述完整訊息賽局的均衡結果之外，另有一組均衡結果為廠商聚集在市場中央，但是均衡價格等於廠商的邊際成本。
最後，由第四章的分析可知，廠商面對 Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999) 形式的消費者，可以得到四組策略均衡。第一，當消費者的願付價格很低時，可以得到一組支持 Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999) 雙占廠商成為區域性獨占的結果；第二，當消費者的願付價格中等低時，可以得到分開且對稱的區位策略均衡；第三，當消費者的願付價格中等高時，可以得到一組分開但不對稱的區位策略均衡；第四，當消費者的願付價格很高時，可以得得到兩家廠商聚集在市場中央的區位策略均衡。
This dissertation consists of three articles discussing the difference of firms’ locations. In these three articles, we assume that consumers are evenly distributed on a typical Hotelling’s (1929) line to analyze both firms’ optimal location strategies.
First, the article of Chapter 2 extends Hotelling's (1929) spatial game. (i) If firms compete under complete information game, there exists equilibrium under specific condition. At equilibrium, the cost-efficient firm will locate at the center of the line and earn positive profit, but the less efficient firm will not locate at the center of the line and produce zero output. (ii) If firms compete under incomplete information game, there exists another equilibrium outcome seemingly supporting the finding of Hotelling (1929), however, only cost-efficient survives in the market with positive profit.
Second, the article of Chapter 3 extends d’Aspremont et al.’s (1979) spatial game. (i) If firms compete under complete information game, firms’ location differentiation will be asymmetric and reduced while the difference of firms’ marginal costs being greater. Moreover, cost-efficient firm locates at the end of the line with positive profit while the less efficient firm’s marginal cost is too large to survive in the line. (ii) If firms compete under incomplete information game, there exist some equilibrium outcomes as under complete information game. In addition, there exists an equilibrium outcome seemingly supporting the finding of Hotelling (1929), however, the equilibrium prices are equal to firms’ marginal costs.
Finally, the article of Chapter 4 extends Hinloopen and van Marrewijk’s (1999) spatial game while firms play mixed Cournot-Bertrand type competition, and we obtain four equilibria. (i) When the standardized consumers’ willing to pay is very low, firms are local monopolies. (ii) When the standardized consumers’ willing to pay is medium low, firms are symmetrically dispersed duopolies. (iii) When the standardized consumers’ willing to pay is medium high, firms are asymmetrically dispersed duopolies. (iv) When the standardized consumers’ willing to pay is very high, firms are agglomerated duopolies and the equilibrium price is greater than firms’ marginal costs which supports the minimal differentiation of Hotelling (1929).
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