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題名：兩篇關於公司績效之研究：公司治理與無形資產觀點
作者：洪世昌 引用關係
作者(外文)：Hung, Shih-Chang
校院名稱：國立交通大學
系所名稱：財務金融研究所
指導教授：鍾惠民
邱敬貿
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2019
主題關鍵詞：自願設立；審計委員會；代理衝突；公司績效；獨特性風險；知識資本；執行長權力；權力較大的執行長；公司價值；破壞式創新；Voluntary adoption；Audit committee；Agency conflict；Firm performance；Idiosyncratic risk；Knowledge capital；CEO power；Powerful CEO；Firm value；Disruptive innovation
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本論文涵蓋二篇研究論文：其一，探討自願設立審計委員會(Audit committees)對於公司績效的影響；其二，探究破壞式創新(Disruptive innovation)衝擊之下，知識資本(Knowledge capital)與執行長權力(CEO power)對於資訊科技(Information Technology, IT)公司價值的影響。經研究發現：若公司具有良好治理機制與較多知識資本時，會有較好績效表現與競爭優勢。由於良好公司治理降低控制股東與小股東的代理衝突，公司能有較好競爭優勢，來自擁有較多知識資本。
第一篇論文中，使用自我選擇模型探討自願設立審計委員會是否影響公司價值(Tobin’s Q)、總資產報酬(Return on assets)與獨特性風險(Idiosyncratic risk)。經實證得知：臺灣上市櫃公司自願設立審計委員會時，會有較好績效表現與較低獨特性風險，此影響效果於家族企業中特別明顯，原因來自審計委員會改善代理衝突與資訊不對稱。
第二篇論文研究發現：資訊科技公司價值受到知識資本與執行長權力影響，若公司具有較多知識資本，且執行長權力較大時，會有較高公司價值；執行長具有創辦人或董事長身分時，其影響效果特別明顯；另外，金融危機時期，執行長權力的影響，較容易顯露出來。因此公司具有較多知識資本時，創造良好競爭優勢，而且執行長擁有較大權力時，有助於提升決策效率與資源利用效率。
This research contains two studies. First, we investigate the effect of the voluntary adoption of audit committees on firm performance. Second, we explore how knowledge capital and chief executive officer (CEO) power affect information technology (IT) firms’ value under the impact of disruptive innovation. Our findings suggest that firms have better performance and better competitive advantage when they have better governance mechanisms and higher knowledge capital. Improving corporate governance can mitigate agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, and increasing knowledge capital can improve a firm’s competitive advantage.
In the first study, we use a self-selection model to investigate the effect of the voluntary adoption of audit committees on Tobin’s Q, return on assets, and idiosyncratic risk. Our results show that Taiwanese listed firms, especially those that are family controlled, have better performance and lower risk when they voluntarily adopt audit committees. These findings suggest that the voluntary adoption of audit committees can reduce agency conflict and asymmetric information.
For the second study, our results reveal that knowledge capital and CEO power play crucial roles in determining a firm’s value. IT firms with powerful CEOs and increased knowledge capital have a high firm value. The effects of knowledge capital and CEO power on firm value are especially significant for founder and duality CEO firms. Furthermore, the influence of CEO power is more prominent in periods of financial crisis. These findings suggest that firms have better competitive advantages because of higher knowledge capital. Powerful CEOs improve the efficiency of decision-making and resources utilization.
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