臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫系統

:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
第 1 筆 / 總合 1 筆   第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁
/1頁
題名：以自主性為本的規範性理論
作者：黃頌竹
作者(外文)：HUANG, SONG-CHU
校院名稱：國立中正大學
系所名稱：哲學系研究所
指導教授：謝世民
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2020
主題關鍵詞：規範性；自主性；理由；道德；normativity；autonomy；reason；morality
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
相關次數：
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:0
規範性問題充斥在我們生活的每個面向上，只要關乎人類的任何活動，都有規範性問題的存在。我應該或不應該相信什麼？這是與認知有關的規範性問題；我應該或不應該如何使用語言？這是與溝通相關的規範性問題；我應該或不應該採取某個行動？這是與實踐相關的規範性問題。但什麼是規範性問題？規範性問題與其它問題又該如何區隔？
本文將會透過探討我們在實際生活中的規範性實踐為何是如此？規範性事實的形上學或存有學地位？規範性真理究竟因何為真？以及規範性判斷與自主性之關係為何？等問題，來發展出一個自主性為本的規範性理論。
本文分為四章，在第一章中，我將討論哲學家在面對規範性問題時的兩個鮮明對立的立場：懷疑論與實在論。我會先排除懷疑論作為恰當的規範性理論之資格，然後探討規範性的實在論必須面對的存有學困難。在第二章，我將探討實在論與懷疑論之外的第三個選項──自然主義式的化約論，並論證化約論無法說明規範性宣稱對行動的指引功能，因此也不是恰當的規範性理論，最後藉由 Korsgaard 的根本規範性問題來論證規範性其實來自於人的自主性。
在第三章，我將論證 Frankfurt 的欲望階層理論是最適合用來說明自主性如何能夠建構出規範性的自主性理論，一方面是基於這個自主性理論在內容與價值上的中立性，可以避免說明的循環；另一方面，它也能契合 Korsgaard 的反思認同模型。最後，我會在第四章中進一步以 Frankfurt 關於愛和關懷的理論，詳細闡述並論證規範性如何被自主性建構出來。
Normaitve problems are everywhere in our lives. As long as there are human activities, there are normative problems. What should we or should we not believe? This is the kind of normative problems regarding epistemic issues. How should we or should we not us the language? This is the kind of normative problems related to communication. What should I or should I not do in a situation? This is the kind of normative problems that regards the practical aspect of our lives.
In this dissertation, I will discuss topics such as: Why our normative practices are like what they actually are? What is the metaphysical or ontological status of normative facts (if any)? And what is the relation between normativity and autonomy? While I discuss these topics, I will also try to develope an autonomy-based normative theory.
I will devide this dissertation into four chapters. In chapter 1, I discuss
two contrasting doctrines of normativity, the skepticism or nihilism, and the realism. I will first argue that skepticism or nihilism does not fit for a qualified normative theory. After that, I will discuss the ontological problem that realism must face. Then, I will explore a third option, the reductionist naturalism, in chapter two, and argue that it also does not fit for a qualified normative theory for its incapability to account for the guiding power of normative claims. After that, I will turn to the normative question raised by Korsgaard, and argue that the source of normativity is autonomy.
In chapter 3, I argue that Frankfurt's hierarchical theory of autonomy is
best suited for accounting for the constructing of normativity from autonomy. For one thing, the hierarchical theory is value-nuetral, hence is able to avoid circularity. For another, it fits with Korsgaard's reflective-endorsement-model for autonomy. Finally, I will elaborate and argue for Frankfurt's theory on love and caring, by which normativity is to be constructed.
Benson, P. (1991). Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization. Social Theory and Practice, 17(3), 385-408.
Benson, P. (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. The Journal of Philosophy, 9(12), 650-668.
Berlin, I. (2002). Two Concepts of Liberty. In H. Hardy (Ed.), Liberty (166-217). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. (Original Work Published 1958).
Blackburn, S. (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
BonJour, L. (2010). The Myth of Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1), 57-83.
Brandom, R. (2009). Reason in Philosophy. Animating Ideas. MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Christman, J. (2004). Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves. Philosophical Studies, 117(1-2), 143-164.
Dan-Cohen, M. (2006). Socializing Harry. In D. Satz (Ed.), Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right (91-103). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Dworkin, R. (2011). Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Foot, P. (1967). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. The Oxford Review, 5, 5-15.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy, 66(3), 829-839.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of A Person. Journal of Philosophy, 68(1), 5-20.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1988). The Importance of What We Care About. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1992). The Faintest Passion. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 66(3), 5-16.
Frankfurt, H. G. (2004). The Reasons of Love. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Frankfurt, H. G. (2006). Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right. (D. Satz, Ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Hume, D. (1888). A Treatise of Human Nature. (L. A. Selby-Bigge, Ed.). London, UK: Oxford University Press. (Original Work Published 1739).
Korsgaard, C. M. (1996). The Sources of Normativity. (O. O'Neill, Ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Korsgaard, C. M. (2006). Morality and the Logic of Caring. In D. Satz (Ed.), Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right (55-76). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Korsgaard, C. M. (2009a). Self-Constitution. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Korsgaard, C. M. (2009b). The Activity of Reason. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 83(2), 23-43.
Mackie, J. L. (1990). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London, UK: Penguin Books. (Original Work Published 1977).
Moore, G. E. (1959). Principia Ethica. London, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Original Work Published 1903).
Navarrete, C. D., McDonald, M. M., Mott, M. L., & Asher, B. (2012). Virtual Morality: Emotion and Action in a Simulated Three-Dimensional "Trolley Problem." Emotion, 12(2), 364-370.
Nedelsky, J. (1989). Reconceiving Autonomy. Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, 1(1), 7-36.
O'Neill, O. (2015). Constructing Authorities. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Oshana, M. A. L. (1998). Personal Autonomy and Society. Journal of Social Philosophy, 29(1), 81-102.
Oshana, M. A. L. (2001). The Autonomy Bogeyman. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 35(2), 209-226.
Parfit, D. (2011a). On What Matters (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (2011b). On What Matters (Vol. 2). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (2017). On What Matters (Vol. 3). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1963). From A Logical Point of View (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publisher. (Original Work Published 1953).
Quine, W. V. O. (1975). On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World. Erkenntnis, 9(3), 313-328.
Quine, W. V. O. (1981). Theories and Things. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Raz, J. (2001). Value, Respect and Attachment. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Raz, J. (2010). Reason, Reasons and Normativity. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Vol. 5, pp. 5-24). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Raz, J. (2011). From Normativity to Responsibility. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Rennix, B. & Robinson, N. J. (2017, November 3). The Trolley Problem Will Tell You Nothing Useful About Morality. Current Affairs. https://edito r.currentaffairs.org/2017/11/the-trolley-problem-will-tell-you-nothing-use ful-about-morality/
Scanlon, T. M. (2014). Being Realistic About Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Schaller, M., & Park, J. H. (2011). The Behavioral Immune System (and Why MIt Matters). Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(2), 99–103.
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L.& Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34(8), 1096-1109.
Watson, G. (1982). Free Agency. In G. Watson (Ed.), Free Will (pp. 96-110). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Regina v. Charlson, 1 W.L.R. 317 (1955). State v. Snowden, 313 P.2d 706 (1957).
MacKinnon, C. (2013). 性別平等論爭：麥金儂訪臺演講集。陳照如編。國立 臺灣大學出版中心。
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE

臺灣人文及社會科學引文索引資料庫

目前上線人數：834（臺灣：807，外國：27） ／ 本年度總使用人次：2156165 ／ 訪客人次（自102年09月）：67959010
國家圖書館著作權聲明 Copyright © 2013 All rights reserved.
本館地址: 100201臺北市中山南路20號． 本館地圖及交通資訊．
總機：(02)23619132．最佳瀏覽解析度為1024x768以上