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題名:經理人投資效率及會計穩健性對投資人的 異質性風險之影響
作者:邱博鴻
作者(外文):Chiou,Bo-Hung
校院名稱:逢甲大學
系所名稱:商學博士學位學程
指導教授:張森河
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2020
主題關鍵詞:異質性風險投資效率過度投資投資不足穩健會計
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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本文主要探討經理人投資效率與會計穩健性是否會影響投資人的異質性風險。本研究發現以下結果:首先,實證顯示經理人從事過度投資(投資不足)的決策時,會造成投資人異質性風險增加(減少)。其次,藉由會計穩健原則能夠提升公司的資訊品質,使投資人異質性風險減少。最後,本研究發現會計穩健性不但能夠弱化經理人投資無效率,還能夠對投資人異質性風險產生具體的影響。藉由會計穩健性弱化經理人過度投資,能夠減少投資人承擔的異質性風險;當公司發生投資不足時,會計穩健性能夠增加經理人投資的動機,使投資人異質性風險適當地提升。
This paper examines whether the investment efficiency of managers and accounting conservatism affect the idiosyncratic risks to investors. The empirical findings suggest the following. Firstly, overinvestment (underinvestment) by managers increases (decreases) idiosyncratic risks to investors. Secondly, accounting conservatism enhances information quality and lowers the idiosyncratic risks. Finally, accounting conservatism mitigates the investment inefficiency by manager and affects the idiosyncratic risks to investors, meaning it mitigates manager’s overinvestment and lowers the idiosyncratic risks to investors. In the case of underinvestment, accounting conservatism improves manager’s motivation for investment, and thus, the idiosyncratic risks to investors.
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