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題名:台灣家族企業的社會責任與財務報表品質
作者:黃勝華
作者(外文):Sheng-Hua Huang
校院名稱:國立中興大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系所
指導教授:林丙輝
蘇迺惠
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2020
主題關鍵詞:家族企業經濟附加價值企業社會責任財務報表品質Family frimsEconomic value addedCorporate social responsibilityFinancial reporting quality
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根據2017年臺灣董事學會所發表之2016年華人家族關鍵報告統計,臺灣上市(櫃)公司中達73%以上是家族企業,其市值卻占總體資本市場之63%以上,故對我國經濟發展產生重大影響。因此,本研究擬以上市(櫃)公司之家族企業為研究對象,探索家族企業應如何以自我的經濟附加價值創造永續發展,從而助益資本市場之穩定。研究期間自2010年起至2017年止,採用臺灣經濟新報(TEJ)資料,探討臺灣上市(櫃)公司中之家族企業對企業社會責任、經濟價值、及財務報表品質之影響。首先就家族企業的經濟價值與企業社會責任方面進行探討,實證結果顯示:1. 就家族企業與非家族企業,在企業社會責任(CSR)評比較無差異;2. 家族企業的經濟價值較差;3. 家族企業投入社會責任對其經濟附加價值所造成不利影響的程度較非家族企業低。另一方面,就家族企業的董事會運作效率與財務報表品質方面進行探討,研究顯示:1. 家族企業的財務報表資訊品質較高,但是家族企業與董事會運作效率的關係則未獲得證實;2. 裙帶關係可透過董事會運作間接影響財務報表之品質。
According to the Chinese Family Key Report 2016 published by the Taiwan Institute of Directors in early 2017, more than 73% of listed and OTC companies in Taiwan are family-owned, and their market value accounts for more than 63% of the overall capital market, which mainly affects Taiwan economy. Therefore, the listed and OTC companies that are family-owned are used as the research objects of the study to explore how family firms should create sustainable development with their own economic valueadded, thereby help to stabilize the capital market. During the research period from 2010 to 2017, thedata from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) was used to explore the impact of listed and OTC family-owned firms in Taiwan on corporate social responsibility (CSR), economic value, and financial reporting quality. First, the relationship between economic value of the family firms and corporate social responsibilityis discussed. The empirical results show that: 1. There is no difference between the family firms and the non-family firms in the CSR evaluation; 2. The economic value of the family firms is poor; 3. The degree to which family firms invest in social responsibility has an adverse effect on their economic value added is lower than that of non-family firms. On the other hand, a study on theoperational efficiency of the board of directors in family firms and financial reporting quality is also conducted, the results reveal that: 1. The financial reporting quality of the family firms is high, but the relationship between the family firms and the Board operational efficiency is not confirmed;2. Nepotism can indirectly affect the financial reporting quality through the Board operations.
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