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題名：管理誘因對盈餘操縱的影響：預算寬列和創新績效的外溢效果
作者：蔡明修
校院名稱：國立彰化師範大學
系所名稱：財務金融技術學系
指導教授：鄭國枝
吳明政
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2021
主題關鍵詞：管理誘因；盈餘操縱；預算寬列；創新績效；中介效果；Managerial Incentives；Earnings Manipulation；Budget Slack；Innovation Performance；Intermediary Effect
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本研究目的乃從兩方面探討︰
（一）管理誘因對盈餘操縱的影響。（二）本研究考量管理誘因所造成的盈餘操縱是否外溢出預算寬列減少及創新績效增加之意想不到的效果。基於上述研究背景及目的，本研究建構原創性模式，並論述模式內關係、回顧相關文獻及發展研究假說於後。
本研究以相關文獻為基礎編製調查問卷。採用網路問卷調查法，樣本母群體包括兩大來源︰（一）研究者所參與社團相關人脈中之上市公司、上櫃公司、興櫃公司與中小企業公司，以及（二）台灣國際四大聯合會計師事務所審計簽證之國內上市公司、上櫃公司。研究對象為各個公司之企業負責人及各部門主管人員。
本研究共發出360份網路問卷，回收有效問卷185份，回收率約51.38％。所取得資料應用SPSS統計套裝軟體進行相關分析、信度分析、因素分析、簡單廻歸分析及調節複廻歸分析後獲得以下結論：
一、管理誘因與盈餘操縱呈正相關之假說不成立。
二、管理誘因與創新績效呈正相關之假說成立。
三、管理誘因與預算寬列呈負相關之假說不成立。
四、預算寬列與創新績效呈負相關之假說不成立。
五、盈餘操縱與創新績效呈正相關之假說不成立。
六、盈餘操縱與預算寬列呈負相關之假說不成立。
七、盈餘操縱於管理誘因與創新績效之間具中介效果之假說不成立。
八、預算寬列於管理誘因與創新績效之間具中介效果之假說不成立。
依據實證結果，分析管理誘因對盈餘操縱的影響：預算寬列和創新績效的外溢效果，及提出未來研究之建議。
In recent years, the research on innovation performance has mostly focused on how to motivate managers to achieve the goal of sustainable business. Although most of the previous literature believes that managerial incentives are directly helpful to innovation performance, there is not much evidence in the literature that managerial incentives are likely to trigger the dysfunctional behavior of earnings manipulation and budget slack, which will adversely affect innovation performance.
This research adopts the online questionnaire survey method, and the sample population includes two sources: one is the influence of managerial incentives on earnings manipulation; second of this study considers whether the earnings manipulation caused by managerial incentives is the unexpected effect of the reduction of the budget slack and the increase of innovation performance. Based on the above research background and purpose, this research constructs an original model, and discusses the relationships within the model, reviews relevant literature, and develops research hypotheses later.
This study is based on relevant literature to compile a questionnaire. Using the online questionnaire survey method, the parent group includes two sources: （1）Listed companies, OTC companies, Xing OTC companies, and small and medium-sized enterprises in the relevant connections of the associations the researcher participates in, and （2）The big 4 accounting firm joint accountants Domestic listed companies and OTC companies that have been audited by the firm. The research objects are the heads of companies and the heads of departments of various companies.
A total of 360 online questionnaires were sent out in this study, and 185 valid questionnaires were returned, with a return rate of 51.38%. After the data obtained is used SPSS statistical package software for correlation analysis, reliability analysis, factor analysis, simple regression analysis, and adjustment regression analysis, the following conclusions are obtained:
1.The hypothesis that managerial incentives are positively
correlated with earnings manipulation cannot be established.
2.The hypothesis that managerial incentives and innovation
performance are positively correlated is established.
3.The hypothesis that participation and managerial incentives are negatively correlated with budget allowances cannot be established.
4.The hypothesis that the budget slack is negatively correlated with innovation performance cannot be established.
5.The hypothesis that earnings manipulation and innovation
performance are positively correlated cannot be established.
6.The hypothesis that earnings manipulation and budget lenient are negatively correlated cannot be established.
7.The hypothesis that earnings manipulation has an intermediary effect between of the managerial incentives and innovation performance cannot be established.
8.The hypothesis that budget slack has an intermediary effect between managerial incentives and innovation performance cannot be established.
Based on the empirical results, analyze the impact of managerial Incentives on earnings manipulation as follows: the spillover effects of budget slack and innovation performance, and put forward recommendations for future research.
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