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題名：盈餘管理動機研究與盈餘管理對公司績效之影響
作者：施忠華
作者(外文)：Chung-Hua Shih
校院名稱：國立中興大學
系所名稱：財務金融學系所
指導教授：楊東曉
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2021
主題關鍵詞：盈餘管理；餅乾盒；洗大澡；誘因效果；訊息不對稱；Earning management；Cookie-jar；Big-bath；Incentive effect；Information asymmetry
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在盈餘管理的文獻中，餅乾盒和洗大澡的方式為一般常見的操作方式，本文以這二種盈餘管理方式為研究主題，探討兩個相關的議題。第一、有那些因素可以誘使公司採取這二種盈餘管理的方式？第二、公司採行這二種盈餘管理方式後的長期市場表現為何？第一個研究主題主要探討造成盈餘管理事前的因素為何？第二個主題研究盈餘管理後的市場表現，是否受盈餘管理的影響而有所不同。在事前動機的分析中，本文採用更換高階經理人、經理人薪酬結構、財務風險的角度、訊息不確定和公司特性等構面，藉由這些面向的分析，預期能找出重要的盈餘管理動機；本文的實證結果發現，第一、洗大澡之盈餘管理的公司在經理人薪酬中提供較低的誘因效果，於是洗大澡後的股價衝擊對經理人的影響較小；此外，執行長或財務長的更換對公司進行洗大澡的機率有正面的影響，隱含經理人更換後有其動機將過去不好的表現責任劃分清楚。第二、餅乾罐的盈餘管理公司在經理人薪酬中提供較佳的誘因效果；但是執行長的更換並不會增加進行餅乾罐的動機，反而是財務長的更換會顯著增加其動機。第三、本文亦發現經理人的更換，不論是執行長或是財務長，對洗大澡和餅乾罐盈餘管理公司的未來長期表現不存在顯著的影響，因此高階經理人的更換在其他因素的考量下並非影響公司長期表現的主要因素。第四，前五大經理人的公司持股比率對洗大澡公司的長期表現有顯著正面的影響；而誘因效果對於餅乾罐盈餘管理公司有顯著正面影響。綜合來看，經理人的持股對盈餘管理後的公司表現存在顯著的影響，差別在於影響管道的不同。最後，訊息不對稱的程度對兩類型盈餘管理公司的影響，反映在長期市場表現中為顯著負面的影響，亦即訊息不對稱在盈餘管理的公司中為一共同因子。
This dissertation works on two topics related to firms' cookie-jar and big-bath manipulations: one is the motivations that drive firms to take these two types of earning management, and the other is how their stock prices perform in the long-term after the manipulations. The first issue explores the motivations for the manipulations, and the second examines the post-manipulation stock performance. To examine the tendency of cookie-jar and big-bath manipulations, I consider a number of factors including executive turnover, executive compensation, financial risk, information asymmetry, and firm characteristics. Based on the empirical results, there are several findings. First, I find that the big bath firms provide a lower incentive than their matching sample. In addition, the change of CEO and/or CFO increases the possibility of the big bath earning management. Second, compared with big bath firms, cookie jar firms have higher incentive effects than their matching counterparts. The change of CEO does not significantly support the cookie jar earning management. The change of CFO, in contrast, significantly supports that smooth earning management. Third, the cases of big bath and cookie jar show that the change of top executives, either CEO or CFO, has an insignificant impact on a firm’s long-term performance. Therefore, the executives’ turnover is not the main factor in determining a firm’s long-term performance. Fourth, the top five executives’ ownership has a significantly positive impact on the big bath firms’ performance, which is also consistent with the hypothesis of interest alignment. The case of cookie jar shows that the incentive effect has a significantly positive effect on the long-term performance, which implies that the incentive effect is more important for cookie jar firms than big bath firms. Finally, as to information asymmetry, the big bath and cookie jar samples show that information asymmetry might decrease firms’ long-term performance.
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